1. Notice of an application of a mother to be appointed guardian
of the estate of her child, an infant under twelve in the mother's
custody, is not required by the Fourteenth Amendment. P.
273 U. S.
198.
2. A clerical error in the posted notice of such an application
will not invalidate the proceedings if not misleading. P.
273 U. S.
198.
3. A state statute permitting a guardian to make oil and gas
leases lasting beyond the minority of the ward cannot, in view of
the fugitive subject matter, be deemed unconstitutional. P.
273 U. S.
198.
4. Congress has power to remove a restriction against alienation
of a patented homestead allotment of a minor Creek Indian. P.
273 U. S.
199.
5. A state statute governing the procedure for leasing a ward's
real estate is to be taken by this Court as construed by the state
courts, even when such construction supplants an earlier one relied
on as a rule of property. P.
273 U. S.
199.
Affirmed.
Appeal from a decree of the district court dismissing a bill to
set aside oil and gas lease and for an account.
Page 273 U. S. 197
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a bill in equity seeking the cancellation of oil and gas
leases to, or held by, the Prairie Oil & Gas Company, and for
an account. The fundamental facts are as follows. Leonard D. Ingram
was a member of the Muskogee (Creek) Nation, and, as such, on July
1, 1907, received patents of homestead and other land, the
homestead patent expressing the conditions provided by Act of
Congress that the land should be inalienable, etc., for twenty-one
years. On January 3, 1911, the County Court of Wagoner County,
Oklahoma, made an order appointing Minerva Ingram, now Minerva
Jones, guardian of Leonard D. Ingram. On January 24, 1911, March
28, 1911, and December 18, 1911, Minerva Ingram, acting as
guardian, made the leases in question, covering the above lands and
running for as long after the minority of Leonard Ingram as oil or
gas should be found in paying quantities. The defendant company
began to remove oil and gas in 1920, and is continuing to do so
still. The leases are said to be invalid for several reasons: it is
alleged that the appointment of Minerva Ingram as guardian was void
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution because no
notice of the application for appointment was given. It is alleged
further that the guardian had no power to execute leases that would
or might outlast the minority of the ward, as that again is thought
to be contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. Thirdly it is urged
that the inclusion of the homestead was invalid because of the
condition against alienation in the patent under the Act of
Congress, notwithstanding the later Act of May 27, 1908, c.199; 35
Stat. 312, which is admitted to apply but is said to be ineffective
under the Fifth Amendment, as depriving the minor of his property
without due process of law. Finally, it is averred that the leases
were not executed in manner and form required by
Page 273 U. S. 198
law. On motion, the district court dismissed the bill, and the
plaintiffs appealed to this Court.
Lipke v. Lederer,
259 U. S. 557,
259 U. S.
560.
The averment that the guardian was appointed without notice was
qualified by an amendment showing an order for a hearing on January
3, 1911, and for notice by posting in three public places, one
being the door of the Court House. The notice was posted as
directed, but, although dated December 15, 1910, states January 3,
1910, instead of 1911, as the time for the hearing. It was also
sent by mail to the minor, to Minerva Ingram and three others,
stated to be next of kin and persons having the care of the minor.
It is admitted that Minerva Ingram was the mother of the minor, and
the record indicates that the latter was of tender years, or at
least under twelve, which is not denied. The mother seems to have
had him in her custody. The Oklahoma statutes only require such
notice as the judge deems reasonable to be given to the relative
residing in the county and to any person having the care of such
minor. Compiled Oklahoma Statutes, 1921, ยง 1431. In the
circumstances stated, unqualified, the requirement of notice is
merely formal, if it exists.
Lester v. Smith, 86 Okl. 143;
Gibson, Appellant, 154 Mass. 378, 379-381. Certainly there
is nothing in the Constitution of the United States that requires
it.
See Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U. S. 613. The
clerical error in the notice would mislead no one, and did not
invalidate the proceedings. The mother was the petitioner, and no
one but the mother and son was concerned. We see nothing to
overcome the presumption, if any presumption were needed, in favor
of the validity of the appointment declared to exist by the supreme
court of the state.
Baker v. Cureton, 49 Okl. 15.
The Oklahoma statutes are held to give to guardians the power to
execute oil and gas leases that may last beyond the minority of
their wards.
Cabin Valley Mining
Page 273 U. S. 199
Co. v. Hall, 53 Okl. 760;
Mallen v. Ruth Oil
Co., 230 F. 497,
aff'd, 231 F. 845. The fugitive
character of the subject matter makes it necessary in the ward's
interest that guardians should have that power, and it appears to
us that it would be an extravagant interpretation of the
Constitution to hold that the ward's interest must be sacrificed on
the ground of the absolute character of his title when adult. He
takes that title subject to such qualifications as the law
reasonably allows to be imposed for his good. The denial of the
power as to agricultural (
Haddock v. Bronaugh, 92 Okl.197)
or coal lands (
Tierney Coal Co. v. Smith, 180 Ky. 815),
whether right or wrong on constitutional grounds, cannot be
extended to this case.
It is not open to dispute that the removal by the later Act of
Congress that we have cited of the restriction upon alienation
previously imposed is valid.
Williams v. Johnson,
239 U. S. 414,
239 U. S. 420;
Egan v. McDonald, 246 U. S. 227,
246 U. S. 229;
Fink v. County Commissioners, 248 U.
S. 399,
248 U. S.
404.
It is admitted that, if we follow the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma, both those that we have cited and others, the
guardian did not have to follow the procedure prescribed for the
sale of a ward's real estate.
Duff v. Keaton, 33 Okl. 92;
Papoose Oil Co. v. Swindler, 95 Okl. 264.
See also
Jackson v. Gates Oil Co., 297 F. 549;
Clayton v.
Tibbens, 298 F. 18,
aff'g, 288 F. 393. But it is
argued here that, under
Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co.,
215 U. S. 349,
this Court is not bound by the state decisions and may judge for
itself, inasmuch as whatever may be the rule of property now,
Duff v. Keaton was decided after these leases were made.
It would seem from the cases cited that the present rule had been
followed and great interest established on the faith of it before
Duff v. Keaton. But apart from that consideration no case
yet has gone to the length of undertaking
Page 273 U. S. 200
to correct the construction of state laws by state courts. The
exclusive authority to enact those laws carries with it final
authority to say what they mean. The construction of those laws by
the supreme court of the state is as much the act of the state as
the enactment of them by the legislature. If we thought the
decisions cited far more questionable than we do, we nevertheless
should bow to them as binding upon a matter of local administration
and of only local concern. The counsel for the appellants presented
a very thorough and well stated argument, but failed to make us
doubt that the decree must be affirmed.
Decree affirmed.