2. It is a matter of no consequence that the purpose was to shut
out non-union millwork made within the state as well as that made
without. P.
272 U. S.
552.
3. The crime of restraining interstate commerce through
combination is not condoned by inclusion of intrastate commerce as
well. P.
272 U. S.
553.
4. Upon certiorari, when the grounds of the circuit court of
appeals for reversing the district court are found erroneous, this
Court may reverse the judgment and remand the case to the circuit
court of appeals for examination of the other assignments of error
which it did not pass upon. P.
272 U. S.
553.
6 F.2d 98 reversed.
Certiorari (269 U.S. 545) to a judgment of the circuit court of
appeals reversing a conviction under the Sherman Act.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents were charged with engaging in a combination and
conspiracy to restrain interstate trade and commerce contrary to
inhibitions of the Sherman Act, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, and were
found guilty by a jury. The circuit
Page 272 U. S. 551
court of appeals reviewed and reversed the judgment of
conviction upon the sole ground of fatal variance between
allegation and proof, or failure of proof to support the charge. 6
F.2d 98. They said:
"The indictment charged defendants with"
"combining or conspiring to prevent manufacturing plants located
outside of the city of Chicago and in other states than Illinois
from selling and delivering their building material in and shipping
the same to said city of Chicago."
". . . The proof, however, disclosed merely an agreement between
defendants whereby union defendants were not to work upon
nonunion-made millwork. . . . The agreement which the defendants
entered into merely dealt with millwork which was the product of
non-union labor. It mattered not where the millwork was produced,
whether in or outside of Illinois, if it bore the union label. The
restriction was not against the shipment of millwork into Illinois.
It was against non-union-made millwork produced in or out of
Illinois. We find no evidence which would support a finding that
the agreement embodied in Article 3 of ยง 3 was not the real
agreement of the parties. Wherefore we conclude there is a fatal
variance, and the evidence does not sustain the indictment."
They considered no other objection to the judgment of
conviction, and the cause came here by certiorari, because that
point seemed to require further examination. We think it was
wrongly decided.
The challenged combination and agreement related to the
manufacture and installation in the City of Chicago of building
material commonly known as millwork, which includes window and door
fittings, sash, baseboard, molding, cornice, etc. The respondents
were manufacturers of millwork in Chicago, building contractors who
purchase and cause such work to be installed, and representatives
of the carpenters' union, whose members are employed by both
manufacturers and contractors.
Page 272 U. S. 552
It appears that the respondent manufacturers found their
business seriously impeded by the competition of material made by
non-union mills located outside of Illinois -- mostly in Wisconsin
and the South -- which sold their product in the Chicago market
cheaper than local manufacturers who employed union labor could
afford to do. Their operations were thus abridged, and they did not
employ so many carpenters as otherwise they could have done.
They wished to eliminate the competition of Wisconsin and other
non-union mills, which were paying lower wages and consequently
could undersell them. Obviously it would tend to bring about the
desired result if a general combination could be secured under
which the manufacturers and contractors would employ only union
carpenters, with the understanding that the latter would refuse to
install non-union-made millwork. And we think there is evidence
reasonably tending to show that such a combination was brought
about, and that, as intended by all the parties, the so-called
outside competition was cut down, and thereby interstate commerce
directly and materially impeded. The local manufacturers, relieved
from the competition that came through interstate commerce,
increased their output and profits; they gave special discounts to
local contractors; more union carpenters secured employment in
Chicago, and their wages were increased. These were the incentives
which brought about the combination. The non-union mills outside of
the city found their Chicago market greatly circumscribed or
destroyed, the price of buildings was increased, and, as usual
under such circumstances, the public paid excessive prices.
The allegations of the bill were sufficient to cover a
combination like the one which some of the evidence tended to show.
It is a matter of no consequence that the purpose was to shut out
non-union millwork made
Page 272 U. S. 553
within Illinois, as well as that made without. The crime of
restraining interstate commerce through combination is not condoned
by the inclusion of intrastate commerce as well. The applicable
principles have been sufficiently indicated in
Montague &
Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38;
Loewe v.Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274;
Eastern states Lumber Association v. United States,
234 U. S. 600,
234 U. S. 612;
Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.
S. 295,
268 U. S.
310.
To explore the record and pass upon all other assignments of
error presented to the court below would require unreasonable
consumption of our time. We may properly require its view in
respect of them.
An order will be entered reversing the judgment of the circuit
court of appeals and remanding the cause to that court for further
proceedings in harmony with this opinion.
MR. JUSTICE STONE took no part in the consideration or decision
of this cause.