1. An appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims (entered
April 28, 1924) applied for while a motion for a new trial and
amended findings was pending, though premature, was not a nullity,
and became effective when the motion was denied and the appeal
allowed. P.
272 U. S.
534
2. Time did not run against the right to appeal while the motion
for new trial and amended findings was pending. P.
272 U. S.
535.
3. The limits placed by Congress on the scope of review in this
Court of judgments of the Court of Claims do not deprive defeated
claimants of due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. P.
272 U. S.
536.
4. Under the law and rules governing the subject, review of
judgments of the Court of Claims is confined to questions of law
shown by the record when made up as the rules direct. Evidence is
not included in the record, nor rulings on the admission or
rejection of evidence. P.
272 U. S.
537.
5. Where the findings are ambiguous, contradictory, or silent in
respect of a material matter, or appear on their face ill founded
in point of law, the case may and should be remanded for corrected
or additional findings, but this is to be done only where the need
for correction or addition is apparent either on the face of the
findings or when they are examined in connection with the
pleadings. P.
272 U. S.
539.
6. An order of the Court of Claims overruling a motion for a new
trial, which brought nothing new into the case,
held not
reviewable. P.
272 U.S.
540.
7. Evidential and plainly subordinate matter is inappropriate to
a finding of ultimate facts. P.
272 U.S. 540.
8. A finding of the value of property taken by the government
held a finding of fact, and not reviewable. P.
272 U.S. 540.
9. A claimant is not in position to press requests for findings
which do not appear to have been tendered to the Court of Claims as
required by the Rule. P.
272 U. S.
541.
Page 272 U. S. 534
10. Where an owner of boat which were taken over by the United
States under the Act of June 15, 1917, elected not to accept as
full compensation the sum fixed by the President, but to accept
three-fourth of it, under the Act, and sue for more, but recovered
only the additional fourth which he had declined to accept, he was
not entitled under the Fifth Amendment to interest on such deferred
compensation. P.
272 U. S.
541.
59 Ct.Cls. 628 affirmed.
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims rejecting a claim
for a balance alleged to be due appellant on several barges and
tugs which were taken over by the government under the Act of June
15, 1917.
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was a suit to recover a balance alleged to be due for
several barges and tugs, the possession and title to which were
taken over by the United States under the Act of June 15, 1917, c.
29, 40 Stat. 182. The compensation fixed at the time by the
President not being satisfactory to the claimant, three-fourths of
it was paid, and the claimant, conformably to the act, sued to
recover a further sum which, with what was paid, was alleged to be
just compensation. The Court of Claims found that the amount fixed
by the President was just, and entered judgment for the claimant
for the one-fourth remaining unpaid. 59 Ct.Cls. 628. The claimant,
being still dissatisfied, brought the case here.
The judgment was entered April 28, 1924. The claimant seasonably
moved for a new trial, and included in
Page 272 U. S. 535
the motion a request for amended findings. While that motion was
pending, the claimant, becoming apprehensive lest the time allowed
for an appeal might be running, filed with the clerk an application
for an appeal from the judgment. Thereafter, the motion for a new
trial, with the request for amended findings, was denied, and the
application for an appeal was then brought to the court's attention
and allowed. A little later, the claimant applied for an appeal
from the order refusing a new trial and amended findings, and the
court allowed that appeal.
Counsel for the United States insist that neither appeal was
effective. Plainly the second was not, for it was from an order
which was not appealable. But the first was from the judgment, and
we think it was well taken. The only infirmity suggested is that
the application was premature in that it was made before the motion
for a new trial and amended findings was disposed of. It is true
that, with that motion pending, the judgment was not so far final
as to cause time to run against the right to appeal.
United
States v. Ellicott, 223 U. S. 524,
223 U. S. 539.
But, while the application was thus premature, it was not a
nullity. Evidently it was intended to be pressed only if and when
the motion for a new trial and amended findings was denied. The
court so regarded it, and therefore gave effect to it after
disposing of the pending motion. That this was right is shown in
Ex parte
Roberts, 15 Wall. 384,
82 U. S.
385.
After the record was filed in this Court, the claimant moved
that the case be remanded to the Court of Claims, with directions
either to find or refuse to find each of the several matters
specified in the request for amended findings, or, in the
alternative, to include in the record the motion for a new trial
and that request, together with the evidence on which they were
based. Consideration of the motion to remand was postponed to the
hearing on the merits, and that hearing has been had.
Page 272 U. S. 536
The presentation of the case on behalf of the claimant has
proceeded on the assumption that our power to review is as broad as
the power of the Court of Claims to hear and determine in the first
instance, and that such a review, if not otherwise provided for, is
vouchsafed by the due process of law clause of the Fifth Amendment.
But the assumption is a mistaken one. The Court of Claims is a
special tribunal established to hear and determine suits against
the United States on claims of specified classes. Except as
Congress has consented, there is no right to bring these suits
against the United States, and therefore the right arising from the
consent is subject to such restrictions as Congress has imposed.
McElrath v. United States, 102 U.
S. 426,
102 U. S. 440.
One of these is that the trial shall be by the court without a
jury. Another, in force until changed by the Act of February 13,
1925, c. 229, 43 Stat. 936, forbade an appellate review where the
decision was against the claimant and the amount in controversy was
not in excess of $3,000. Others, still in force, limit the scope of
the review where one is permitted, and, apart from the nature of
these suits, the well settled rule applies that an appellate review
is not essential to due process of law, but is matter of grace.
McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684,
153 U. S. 687;
Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272,
156 U. S. 275;
Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U. S. 293,
160 U. S.
297-299;
Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.
S. 505,
188 U. S. 508;
The Francis Wright, 105 U. S. 381,
105 U. S. 386;
Montana Co. v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co.,
152 U. S. 160,
152 U. S.
171.
The Constitution, Art. III, § 2, declares the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court shall be subject to "such exceptions"
and be exercised under "such regulations" as Congress may
prescribe. This provision was much considered in
The Francis
Wright, supra, and the views there expressed are particularly
apposite here. The court said (p.
105 U. S.
386):
Page 272 U. S. 537
"Authority to limit the jurisdiction necessarily carries with it
authority to limit the use of the jurisdiction. Not only may whole
classes of cases be kept out of the jurisdiction altogether, but
particular classes of questions may be subjected to reexamination
and review, while others are not. To our minds, it is no more
unconstitutional to provide that issues of fact shall not be
retried in any case than that neither issues of law nor fact shall
be retried in cases where the value of the matter in dispute is
less than $5,000. The general power to regulate implies power to
regulate in all things. The whole of a civil law appeal may be
given, or a part. The constitutional requirements are all satisfied
if one opportunity is had for the trial of all parts of a case.
Everything beyond that is matter of legislative discretion, not of
constitutional right."
Save in special cases not needing present mention, Congress
never has provided for a general review by this Court of cases
coming from the Court of Claims. On the contrary, and probably
because that court is composed of five judges, all usually hearing
cases together, and the concurrence of three being necessary to a
decision in any case, Congress has pursued the policy of permitting
only a limited review on questions of law, and the procedural rules
applicable to such cases which this Court has promulgated under
congressional authorization always have recognized that policy. The
rules in force when this case was before the Court of Claims are
copied in the margin. [
Footnote
1] Others promulgated since,
Page 272 U. S. 538
and equally recognizing the same policy, are also copied there.
[
Footnote 2]
This Court uniformly has regarded the legislation and rules as
confining the review to questions of law shown by the record when
made up as the rules direct. Bills of exception are not recognized
in either the legislation or the rules, nor is there other
provision for bringing the evidence into the record or including
therein the various rulings involved in applying to the evidence
presented the rules which mark the line between what properly may
be considered and what must be rejected. As long ago as
Mahan v. United
States, 14 Wall. 109,
81 U. S. 111,
this Court said of the rules that they could not be examined
"without
Page 272 U. S. 539
seeing that the purpose was to bring nothing here for review but
questions of law, leaving the Court of Claims to exercise the
functions of a jury in finding facts, equivalent to a special
verdict, and with like effect."
Other cases establish that, where the findings are ambiguous,
contradictory, or silent in respect of a material matter, or appear
on their face ill founded in point of law, the case may and should
be remanded for corrected or additional findings, but that the mere
assertion on the part of a complaining party that they are against
the evidence or not supported by it, or give too much or too little
weight to particular evidence, affords no ground for so remanding
the case, because that is to be done only where the need for
correction or addition is apparent either on the face of the
findings or when they are examined in connection with the
pleadings.
United States v.
Adams, 6 Wall. 101,
73 U. S.
110-112;
Moore v. United
States, 91 U.S.
Page 272 U. S. 540
270;
United States v. Smith, 94 U. S.
214,
94 U. S.
218-219;
United States v. Clark, 96 U. S.
37,
96 U. S. 38-39;
McClure v. United States, 116 U.
S. 145;
Union Pacific R. Co. v. United States,
116 U. S. 154;
same case,
116 U. S. 116 U.S.
402;
District of Columbia v. Barnes, 197 U.
S. 146,
197 U. S. 150;
Brothers v. United States, 250 U. S.
88,
250 U. S.
93.
In this case, the findings are direct, free from ambiguity,
consistent, fully responsive to the issues, and contain nothing
indicating that they or any of them are ill founded in point of
law, and the unavoidable conclusion from them is that the judgment
is for the right sum unless there be merit in a contention
respecting interest to be noticed later on. So, whether taken by
themselves or in connection with the pleadings, they are not open
to criticism unless possibly as to the matter of interest.
A copy of the motion for a new trial and request for amended
findings is exhibited with the motion to remand. The motion for a
new trial brought nothing new into the case, and the order
overruling it is not open to review. The request for amended
findings asked that two of the findings be changed -- one by
including therein matters which at most are plainly evidential and
subordinate, and therefore not to be included in a finding of
ultimate facts, and the other by increasing the amount found to be
just compensation for the vessels at the time they were taken over
from $1,500,000 to $4,777,000 -- more than three times what the
court found it to be. Whether one amount or the other was the true
one was a question of fact. The court refused to change the
finding, and thereby affirmed that the fact was as stated therein.
This Court cannot reexamine the question, and the fact that the
claimant is still dissatisfied constitutes no ground for remanding
the question to the Court of Claims for reexamination by it. As
part of its request for amended findings, the claimant tendered 27
additional findings and asked that they be adopted. All were
rejected. There is no showing
Page 272 U. S. 541
that they had been tendered theretofore in conformity to the
fifth rule, before quoted, and if that was not done, the claimant
was not in a position to press them.
United States v.
Driscoll, 131 U.S. Appendix, clix. As to many, if not all,
there are also other reasons why the court was free to reject them.
Many state matters which, even if true, are evidential only; some
are merely argumentative, and others contain statements having no
relation to the issues under the pleadings. It must be held,
therefore, that neither the motion for a new trial nor the request
for amended findings gives any support to the motion to remand.
Independently of them, it lays no foundation for granting what it
asks.
The remaining question is whether there should have been an
allowance of interest. The vessels were not taken over at the
outset, nor until after the compensation had been fixed by the
President at $1,500,000 and the officer who was to take them over
had been instructed to pay that sum to the claimant on receiving
the vessels with proof of ownership and bill of sale. The claimant
was advised of this, and possession of the vessels was passed to
the officer a few days later. But it developed that the claimant,
although theretofore in possession and operating the vessels, was
the real owner of only two of them. The claimant then procured
bills of sale to it from the owners of the other vessels and
executed a bill of sale to the United States for all. This was
about two weeks after possession was passed to the officer. The
officer was prepared and willing to pay the full $1,500,000 when
the bill of sale was delivered to him, but the claimant was not
willing to accept it as full compensation. Afterwards, the claimant
elected to accept three-fourths of it, and to reserve a right to
sue for enough more to make full compensation. The three-fourths
was then paid. This was about six weeks after the delivery of the
bill of sale. The judgment awards the remaining one-fourth as a
sufficient
Page 272 U. S. 542
sum, with that already paid, to make just compensation for the
vessels at the time they were taken over. In short, while the
United States was prepared, willing, and offering when the vessels
were taken over to pay the sum now adjudged to have been just
compensation at that time, the claimant was not then in a position
entitling it to demand or receive compensation, because, as yet, it
was without a good title, and had not executed a bill of sale to
the United States, and, after it became entitled to compensation,
it rejected the offer, which was still outstanding, to pay that sum
in full payment, and elected to accept three-fourths as a partial
payment and to take chances on enlarging the compensation by
resorting to this suit against the United States. The effort to
obtain an enlargement has resulted, as already shown, in
establishing that the amount offered and rejected was all that
justly could have been demanded. In these circumstances, we think
such postponement as has occurred in the actual payment of the
compensation is attributable entirely to the claimant, and
therefore that an allowance of interest to the time of payment is
not in this case made essential by the constitutional provision
expounded and applied in
Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United
States, 261 U. S. 299,
261 U. S. 306,
and
Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.
S. 106,
265 U. S.
123.
Judgment affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
"
RULE I"
"In all cases hereafter decided in the Court of Claims in which,
by the Act of Congress, such appeals are allowable, they shall be
heard in the Supreme Court upon the following record, and none
other:"
"(1) A transcript of the pleadings in the case, of the final
judgment or decree of the court, and of such interlocutory orders,
rulings, judgments, and decrees as may be necessary to a proper
review of the case."
"(2) A finding by the Court of Claims of the facts in the case,
established by the evidence, in the nature of a special verdict,
but not the evidence establishing them, and a separate statement of
the conclusions of law upon said facts on which the court founds
its judgment or decree. The finding of facts and conclusions of law
to be certified to this Court as part of the record."
"
RULE III"
"In all cases, an order of allowance of appeal by the Court of
Claims, or the chief justice thereof in vacation, is essential, and
the limitation of time for granting such appeal shall cease to run
from the time an application is made for the allowance of
appeal."
"
RULE IV"
"In all cases in which either party is entitled to appeal to the
Supreme Court, the Court of Claims shall make and file their
findings of fact and their conclusions of law therein, in open
court, before or at the time they enter judgment in the case."
"
RULE V"
In every such case, each party at such time before trial, and in
such form as the court may prescribe, shall submit to it a request
to find all the facts which the party considers proven and deems
material to the due presentation of the case in the findings of
fact.
[
Footnote 2]
The following rules partly modifying those just set forth were
promulgated June 8, 1925, 266 U.S. 683:
"
RULE 38"
"
JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS -- PETITIONS"
"
FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI"
"
(See § 3(b) of the Act of February 13, 1925.)"
"1. In any case in the Court of Claims where both parties
request in writing, at the time the case is submitted, that the
facts be specially found, it shall be the duty of that court to
make and enter special findings of fact as part of its
judgment."
"2. In any case in that court where special findings of fact are
not so requested at the time the case is submitted, a party
aggrieved by the judgment may, not later than twenty days after its
rendition, request the court in writing to find the facts
specially, and thereupon it shall be the duty of the court to make
special findings of fact in the case and, by an appropriate order,
to make them a part of its judgment. The judgment shall be regarded
as remaining under the court's control for this purpose."
"3. The special findings required by the two preceding
paragraphs shall be in the nature of a special verdict, and shall
set forth the ultimate facts found from the evidence, but not the
evidence from which they are found."