1. Proceedings to forfeit a motor boat under § 26 of Title II of
the National Prohibition Act may be maintained even if the seizure
of the boat was by a person not authorized, since subsequent
adoption of the seizure by the government is retroactive. P.
272 U. S.
531.
2. The jurisdiction of the court in such a case was secured by
the fact that the
res was in the power of the prohibition
director when the libel was filed. P.
272 U. S.
532.
11 F.2d 522 affirmed.
Certiorari (271 U.S. 655) to a judgment of the circuit court of
appeals which reversed a judgment of the district court (7 F.2d
189) dismissing a libel brought by the United States to forfeit a
motorboat under § 26 of the National Prohibition Act.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was a proceeding in the district court of the United States
for the condemnation of the motorboat
Ray of Block Island.
The owners appeared as claimants and moved that the libel be
dismissed on the ground that the facts alleged did not warrant a
condemnation. The district Court granted the motion. 7 F.2d
189.
Page 272 U. S. 531
The circuit court of appeals reversed the decree. 11 F.2d 522.
As there was a conflict of decisions between different circuit
courts of appeals, a writ of certiorari was granted by this Court.
271 U.S. 655.
The libel was brought under the National Prohibition Act October
28, 1919, c. 85, Title II, § 26, 41 Stat. 305, 315. It alleged that
police officers of the City of Providence, Rhode Island, discovered
a man named, seemingly one of the claimants, in the act of
transporting, contrary to said law, intoxicating liquors in the
Ray of Block Island over navigable waters of the United
States; that the officers seized the liquors and the boat and
arrested the man; that he subsequently was arrested by officers of
the United States, was convicted of transporting intoxicating
liquors in violation of said law, and was fined; that the motorboat
was now in custody of a federal prohibition director for the
District of Rhode Island, and that, by reason of the premises, the
motorboat was subject to condemnation and sale. The ground on which
the libel was dismissed by the district court was that the language
of § 26, making it the duty of "the Commissioner, his assistants,
inspectors, or any officer of the law" to seize the liquor and
vehicle, did not extend to the police officers of the city, who had
no authority from the state to take these steps. It is stated in
argument and perhaps fairly might be assumed, if we thought it
important, that, when the vessel was handed over to the prohibition
director, the liquor was no longer aboard, and that the man
arrested was not present at the scene.
See United States v. One
Red Motor Truck, 6 F.2d 412. The circuit court of appeals,
while agreeing with the above construction of § 26, held that the
government might adopt the seizure and give it retroactive effect.
This is in accord with
United States v. Story, 294 F. 517,
but contrary to
United States v. Loomis, 297 F. 359; this
last decision being considerably
Page 272 U. S. 532
qualified, however, by the same court in the later case of
United States v. One Studebaker Seven-Passenger Sedan, 4
F.2d 534.
The circuit court of appeals relied on the often quoted language
of Mr. Justice Story in
The
Caledonian, 4 Wheat. 100, to the effect that anyone
may seize any property for a forfeiture to the government, and
that, if the government adopts the act and proceeds to enforce the
forfeiture by legal process, this is of no less validity than when
the seizure is by authority originally given. The statement is
repeated by the same judge in
Wood v. United
States, 16 Pet. 342,
41 U. S. 359,
and
Taylor v. United
States, 3 How. 197.
See
also Gelston v.
Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246,
16 U. S. 310.
The owner of the property suffers nothing that he would not have
suffered if the seizure had been authorized. However effected, it
brings the object within the power of the court, which is an end
that the law seeks to attain, and justice to the owner is as safe
in the one case as in the other. The jurisdiction of the court was
secured by the fact that the
res was in possession of the
prohibition director when the libel was filed.
The
Richmond, 9 Cranch 102;
The
Merino, 9 Wheat. 391,
22 U. S. 403.
The Underwriter, 13 F.2d 433, 434. We can see no reason
for doubting the soundness of these principles when the forfeiture
is dependant upon subsequent events any more than when it occurs at
the time of the seizure, although it was argued that there was a
difference. They seem to us to embody good sense. The exclusion of
evidence obtained by an unlawful search and seizure stand on a
different ground. If the search and seizure are unlawful as
invading personal rights secured by the Constitution, those rights
would be infringed yet further if the evidence were allowed to be
used. The decree of the circuit court of appeals is affirmed.
Decree affirmed.