1. The power of a state to forfeit property used in violation of
its liquor prohibition laws extend to property (an automobile) of
an innocent owner who entrusted it possession and use to the
wrongdoer. P.
272 U. S.
467.
2.
Semble that there is no valid distinction rendering
this police power less plenary under the Fourteenth Amendment than
similar exercise of the federal taxing power under the Fifth
Amendment. P.
272 U. S.
468.
3. The mere fact that the state statute here in question has a
broader scope than § 26 of the National Prohibition Act,
authorizing confiscation of vehicles used in unlawful
transportation of liquor, does not affect its validity. P.
272 U. S.
468.
4. The Constitution does not require a jury trial of such
forfeitures under state law. P.
272 U. S. 469.
5. The sufficiency of the evidence in such proceedings, and the
effect on the forfeiture of a subsequent acquittal of the offending
person in a separate trial, are matter of state law. P. 469.
119 Kan. 874 affirmed.
Error to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas affirming a
judgment forfeiting an automobile, under the laws of Kansas because
of its use in the illegal transportation of intoxicating
liquor.
MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiff in error purchased an automobile of local dealers in
Finney County, Kansas, agreeing, as part consideration
Page 272 U. S. 466
for the sale, to its retention by the vendors for use in their
business. Clyde Brown, an associate of the dealers, was permitted
by them, with the knowledge of plaintiff in error, to make frequent
use of the automobile. Brown was arrested by state officers, and an
information was filed charging that he used an automobile (which
was plaintiff's) for the illegal transportation of intoxicating
liquor and seeking its forfeiture and sale as a common nuisance
under the Kansas statute. Laws Kan.1919, c. 217, §§ 1-6; §§ 21-2162
to 21-2167, R.S. Plaintiff intervened, denying the allegations of
the information and setting up her ownership of the automobile and
that the transportation of intoxicating liquor, if any, was without
her knowledge or authority.
A trial by the District Court of Finney County without a jury,
as provided by the Kansas statute, resulted in a judgment of
forfeiture. This determination was affirmed on appeal to the
Supreme Court of Kansas.
State v. Van Oster, 119 Kan. 874.
After this decision, but prior to a petition for rehearing
subsequently denied, Brown was acquitted by a jury of the offense
charged in the information. The case comes here on writ of error.
Judicial Code, 237(a), as amended.
The Kansas statute, cited above, declares that an automobile or
other vehicle used in the state in the transportation of
intoxicating liquor is a common nuisance, and establishes a
procedure followed in this case for its forfeiture and sale. The
Kansas Supreme Court, in this as in other cases,
State v.
Peterson, 107 Kan. 641;
State v. Stephens, 109 Kan.
254, has construed this act as authorizing the forfeiture of the
interest of an innocent owner or lienor in property intrusted to
the wrongdoer.
It is contended that the statute as interpreted denies the due
process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute
is further assailed on the ground that it is repugnant to the
provisions of the National Prohibition
Page 272 U. S. 467
Act, which covers the same field; and, finally, objection is
made that evidence of the intoxicating character of the liquor
transported was lacking, and that the acquittal of Brown
establishes beyond contradiction that no crime was committed.
It is not questioned that a state, in the exercise of its police
power, may forfeit property used by its owner in violation of state
laws prohibiting the liquor traffic,
Kidd v. Pearson,
128 U. S. 1;
cf.
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623,
123 U. S. 671
et seq.; Lawton v. Steele, 162
U. S. 133. It is unnecessary for us to inquire whether
the police power of the state extends to the confiscation of the
property of innocent persons appropriated and used by the
lawbreaker without the owner's consent, for here, the offense of
unlawful transportation was committed by on entrusted by the owner
with the possession and use of the offending vehicle.
It is not unknown, or indeed uncommon, for the law to visit upon
the owner of property the unpleasant consequences of the
unauthorized action of one to whom he has intrusted it. Much of the
jurisdiction in admiralty, so much of the statute and common law of
liens as enables a mere bailee to subject the bailed property to a
lien, the power of a vendor of chattels in possession to sell and
convey good title to a stranger, are familiar examples. They have
their counterpart in legislation imposing liability on owners of
vehicles for the negligent operation by those intrusted with their
use, regardless of a master-servant relation. Laws of New York,
1924, c. 534; Pub.Acts Mich.1915, Act No. 302, § 29
(constitutionality upheld,
Stapleton v. Independent Brewing
Co., 198 Mich. 170). They suggest that certain uses of
property may be regarded so undesirable that the owner surrenders
his control at his peril. The law thus builds a secondary defense
against a forbidden use, and precludes evasions by dispensing with
the necessity of judicial inquiry as
Page 272 U. S. 468
to collusion between the wrongdoer and the alleged innocent
owner. So here, the legislature, to effect a purpose clearly within
its power, had adopted a device consonant with recognized
principles, and therefore within the limits of due process.
It has long been settled that statutory forfeitures of property
entrusted by the innocent owner or lienor to another who uses it in
violation of the revenue laws of the United States is not a
violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.
S. 505;
Dobbins Distillery v. United States,
96 U. S. 395;
United States v. Stowell, 133 U. S.
1;
United States v. Mincey, 254 F. 287;
Logan v. United States, 260 F. 746;
United States v.
One Saxon Automobile, 257 F. 251, 168 C.C.A. 335;
United
States v 246 1/2 Pounds of Tobacco, 103 F. 791;
United
States v. 220 Patented Machines, 99 F. 559,
but cf.
National Bond & Investment Co. v. Gibson, 6 F.2d 288.
A like principle has been applied to the unlawful introduction of
liquor into Indian territory in violation of § 2140, R.S.
United States v. One Buick Roadster Automobile, 244 F.
961;
United States v. One Seven Passenger Paige Car, 259
F. 641.
We do not perceive any valid distinction between the application
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the exercise of the police power of
a state in this particular field and the application of the Fifth
Amendment to the similar exercise of the taxing power by the
federal government, or any reason for holding that the one is not
as plenary as the other.
See Hibben v. Smith, 191 U.
S. 310,
191 U. S. 325;
Carroll v. Greenwich Insurance Co., 199 U.
S. 401,
199 U. S. 410.
And see Kidd v. Pearson, supra, at
128 U. S. 26,
upholding the police power of a state to destroy property used in
the unlawful manufacture of liquor on the authority of
Coe v.
Errol, 116 U. S. 517, a
tax case.
The mere fact that the statute now in question has a broader
scope than § 26 of the National Prohibition Act,
Page 272 U. S. 469
authorizing confiscation of vehicles used in unlawful
transportation of liquor, does not affect its validity. In
Hebert v. Louisiana, ante, p.
272 U. S. 312, it
was held that the same transaction may constitute separate offenses
against both state and federal sovereignties, and that, in separate
prosecutions, the statutes of that sovereignty under whose auspices
the proceedings are instituted are alone to be applied.
Cf.
United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377;
Vigliotti v. Pennsylvania, 258 U.
S. 403.
The other questions raised by the record, as to the sufficiency
of the evidence and the effect of the acquittal of Brown on his
separate trial, at most involved questions of state procedure only,
as to which the decision of the state court is controlling. No
tenable ground for attacking the constitutionality of the
determination is suggested. In the brief and on the argument, an
attempt was made to question the constitutionality of the
provisions of this statute dispensing with a jury trial in the
forfeiture proceeding. But the record does not indicate that a jury
trial was demanded, and the question is not raised by the
assignments of error. In any case, the objection is unsubstantial.
Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U. S.
40;
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.
S. 516;
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S.
90;
Kennard v. Louisiana ex rel. Morgan,
92 U. S. 480.
Affirmed.