1. The jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission, under
§ 6, par. 13 of the Act to Regulate Commerce as amended, to compel
a railroad carrier to provide transportation service between the
public terminal of a barge canal and points on the railroad and its
connections, may be invoked by a state which owns the canal and
maintains it for the free use of the public, but which does not
itself operate it as a carrier. P.
272 U. S.
462.
2. Where the rail connection already exists, an order requiring
the railroad to furnish the transportation at its own expense may
be made without the presence of a water carrier. P.
272 U. S.
464.
3. Such an order, under the statute, may extend to the entire
current of commerce, flowing through the terminal, though
intrastate in part. P.
272 U. S.
464.
13 F.2d 200 reversed.
Page 272 U. S. 458
Appeal from a decree of the district court enjoining the
enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission
requiring the New York Central Railroad Company to furnish
transportation service between a terminal of the Erie Canal and the
lines and connections of the railroad.
MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The State of New York, by its Superintendent of Public Works in
a complaint filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, sought
to compel the New York Central Railroad Company to provide
transportation service between the public terminal of the Erie
Barge Canal at Buffalo and shippers located along its tracks and
along the lines of other railroads with which it can interchange
traffic. The service demanded included the furnishing of rolling
stock, motive power, and the placing and removal of cars on the
tracks within the terminal, incident to moving traffic between the
terminal and appellee's lines. The jurisdiction of the Commission
was invoked under § 6, par. 13, of the Interstate Commerce Act, as
amended by the Panama Canal Act, August 24, 1912, c. 390, 37 Stat.
568, and §§ 412, 413, Transportation Act, February 28, 1920, c. 91,
41 Stat. 483.
*
Page 272 U. S. 459
A similar application had been made to the Public Service
Commission of New York (Second District). The order of the
commission granting this relief was vacated by the state supreme
court on the ground that the traffic
Page 272 U. S. 460
concerned was interstate in character, jurisdiction over which
under the statutes already cited was in the Interstate Commerce
Commission.
People ex rel. New York Central R. Co. v. Public
Service Commission, 198 App.Div. 436,
aff'd without
opinion, 232 N.Y. 606.
In the proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission,
two barge carriers, neither of which had filed rates with it or the
Public Service Commission of New York, intervened and were made
parties on their petitions setting forth that the interchange of
traffic sought to be established by complainant was essential to
their business.
After a full hearing, the commission granted the relief sought.
New York v. New York Central R. Co., 95 I.C.C. 119. The railroad
company then filed a bill in equity in the District Court for
Northern New York to enjoin the enforcement of the Commission's
order. The case was heard on the record of the Interstate Commerce
Commission proceedings by the district court, three judges sitting,
Urgent Deficiencies Act Oct. 22, 1913, c. 32, 38 Stat. 220;
Lambert Co. v. Balt. & Ohio R. Co., 258 U.
S. 377, which granted the injunction. 13 F.2d 200. The
case comes here by direct appeal. Urgent Deficiencies Act,
supra.
The State of New York built, owns, and controls the Erie Barge
Canal and terminals, wharves, and docks used in connection with it,
including the Erie Basin terminal at Buffalo. The canal extends
eastwardly from Buffalo by a circuitous route to the Hudson River
and has several branches. The state does not own barges or rolling
stock, nor does it transport merchandise or operate the canal, but
it maintains this waterway with its facilities open to free public
use. About 75 percent of the traffic passing over it is
interstate.
The Erie Basin terminal, having an area of 9.25 acres, is
located on the harbor of Buffalo, adjacent to the right of
Page 272 U. S. 461
way of the railroad company. It includes two concrete piers with
equipment for loading and unloading freight, and five thousand feet
of railway track, with sidings, switches and storage tracks. There
is a physical connection by switching tracks between the terminal
and appellee's lines, which was made in 1919 under a contract
between the Director General of Railroads and the State of New
York. The New York Central's main road between Buffalo and New York
City parallels the barge canal, and serves important points reached
by it or its connections. The effect of appellee's refusal to
perform the transportation service ordered by the Commission is to
preclude the interchange of traffic between rail carriers and barge
canal carriers at Buffalo, and incidentally to avoid the diversion
to the canal of a substantial amount of traffic now passing over
the lines of the railroad company to and from industries located
along its right of way.
In granting the injunction, the district court disregarded the
intervention of the two canal carriers on the ground that they were
not shown to be engaged in interstate commerce. Section 6, par. 13,
of the amended Interstate Commerce Act, insofar as it confers
authority on the Commission to order the operation of the
connecting tracks and to determine the sum to be "paid to or by
either carrier," was construed to require the presence of two
carriers before the Commission subject to its jurisdiction. It
therefore held that the Commission was without jurisdiction to
grant the relief sought, because there were not two carriers before
it, and, further, that the complainant, a sovereign state, as owner
of the terminal, but not a carrier, was beyond its regulatory
powers, and presumably could not invoke its jurisdiction.
We lay to one side the question whether the interveners, within
the meaning of these Acts, are carriers of property which "may be
or is transported from point to point in
Page 272 U. S. 462
the United States . . . not entirely within the limits of a
single state." Nor need we consider to what extent, if at all, the
State of New York, in the event of its failure to maintain its
tracks or facilities, is beyond the regulatory or coercive power of
the Commission as asserted below.
Cf. Georgia v.
Chattanooga, 264 U. S. 472;
Bank of United States v.
Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904,
22 U. S.
907.
The jurisdiction of the commission in this case was properly
invoked. A state, when its interests are concerned, as well as a
private individual, whether carrier or not, may file a complaint
with the commission. Interstate Commerce Act, § 13, as amended by
Act June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36 Stat. 550. Moreover a complaint is
not a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Commission. It may of its own motion investigate and act upon any
matter which may be the subject of complaint (with exceptions not
now relevant). Section 13, par. 2, Interstate Commerce Act, as
amended; Panama Canal Act,
supra, 37 Stat. p. 568. Hence,
the only question that need be considered here is the power of the
Commission, assuming there was but one carrier before it, to issue
the order now attacked.
The Panama Canal Act is, by its terms, supplemental to the Act
to Regulate Commerce, and its obvious purpose was to extend to rail
carriers connecting with water carriers in interstate commerce the
requirements of § 1, par. 9 of the earlier acts, ch. 3591, 34 Stat.
585, 586; ch. 309, 36 Stat. 547, for furnishing switching and car
service to lateral branch railroads and private side tracks. By §
6, par. 13, so far as pertinent to the present inquiry, the
Commission is given authority to establish physical connection
between the lines of the rail carrier and the dock of the water
carrier, and to determine and prescribe the terms and conditions
upon which the connecting tracks should be operated. It "may either
in the construction or the operation of such tracks determine what
sums shall be paid to or by either carrier."
Page 272 U. S. 463
We may assume, without deciding, that the Commission may not
determine the amount to be paid to or by either carrier concerned
without having both before it. But the Commission is not required
by the terms of the statute to make such a determination, and here
it did not do so. A determination with respect to construction
costs was not necessary, since the physical connection had already
been established. There could be no need for directing a
contribution of operating expenses, since the rail carrier was
ordered to furnish the entire car service. It was free to establish
such rates as it deemed reasonable, subject to review by the
Commission if necessary. The only parties concerned in the order
actually made were those before the Commission: appellee, which was
required to furnish the service, and the State of New York, whose
terminal facilities were thus to be used. To have required the
presence of one or more canal carriers before the Commission for
the purpose of making this order would have been an idle ceremony.
The construction of the Act contended for is unwarranted by its
language and incompatible with its purpose to create an
administrative body with authority to facilitate the interchange of
interstate traffic between rail and water carriers by a less formal
procedure than prevails in courts of law. We conclude that the
Commission had authority to make the order, and that its findings
were supported by the evidence.
We have fully considered other objections to the order, but only
one is of sufficient moment to require mention. It is argued that
the jurisdiction conferred by § 6, par. 13, is limited to
interstate transportation while the order directs transportation of
both interstate and intrastate traffic. By the terms of this
section, the Commission is given jurisdiction both of the
transportation described and of the carriers, rail and water,
engaged in such transportation. By definition, transportation
includes
". . . all instrumentalities and facilities of shipment or
carriage,
Page 272 U. S. 464
irrespective of ownership . . . and all services in connection
with the receipt, delivery, . . . and transfer in transit, . . .
and handling of property transported."
§ 1, par. 3, Transportation Act,
supra, at 474-475.
The Commission having jurisdiction over the carriers and the
facilities by which the transportation is carried on, the question
is narrowed to whether its jurisdiction extends to the entire
current of commerce flowing through this terminal, although
intrastate in part. When we consider the nature and extent of the
commingling of interstate and intrastate commerce, and the
difficulty of segregating the freight passing through the terminal,
we think it clear that Congress, in employing such broad language
as "the Commission shall have full authority to determine and
prescribe the terms and conditions upon which these connecting
tracks shall be operated," intended to confer upon the Commission
power to regulate the entire stream of commerce. Where, as here,
interstate and intrastate transactions are interwoven, the
regulation of the latter is so incidental to and inseparable from
the regulation of the former as properly to be deemed included in
the authority over interstate commerce conferred by statute. This
was the view of the state court.
People ex rel. New York
Central R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, supra. Cf.
Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153;
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co.,
224 U. S. 194;
Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U.
S. 456,
263 U. S. 485;
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Gulf, etc., Ry., 270 U.
S. 266. An interpretation of the statute which would, in
practice, require the segregation of all shipments in interstate
commerce would make compliance with the Commission's orders
impossible, and defeat the purpose of the Act.
Judgment reversed.
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
*
"When property may be or is transported from point to point in
the United States by rail and water through the Panama Canal or
otherwise, the transportation being by a common carrier or
carriers, and not entirely within the limits of a single state, the
Interstate Commerce Commission shall have jurisdiction of such
transportation and of the carriers, both by rail and by water,
which may or do engage in the same, in the following particulars,
in addition to the jurisdiction given by the act to regulate
commerce, as amended June eighteenth, nineteen hundred and
ten:"
"(a) To establish physical connection between the lines of the
rail carrier and the dock at which interchange of passenger or
property is to be made by directing the rail carrier to make
suitable connection between its line and a track or tracks which
have been constructed from the dock to the limits of the railroad
right of way, or by directing either or both the rail and water
carrier, individually or in connection with one another, to
construct and connect with the lines of the rail carrier a track or
tracks to the dock. The Commission shall have full authority to
determine and prescribe the terms and conditions upon which these
connecting tracks shall be operated, and it may, either in the
construction or the operation of such tracks, determine what sum
shall be paid to or by either carrier:
Provided, that
construction required by the Commission under the provisions of
this paragraph shall be subject to the same restrictions as to
findings of public convenience and necessity and other matters as
this construction required under § 1 of this Act."
"(b) To establish through routes and maximum joint rates between
and over such rail and water lines, and to determine all the terms
and conditions under which such lines shall be operated in the
handling of the traffic embraced."
"(c) To establish proportional rates or maximum, or minimum, or
maximum and minimum proportional rates, by rail to and from the
ports to which the traffic is brought, or from which it is taken by
the water carrier, and to determine to what traffic and in
connection with what vessels and upon what terms and conditions
such rates shall apply. . . ."
The Panama Canal Act also provides:
"The orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission relating to
this section shall only be made upon formal complaint or in
proceedings instituted by the Commission of its own motion and
after full hearing."