1. Military impedimenta were shipped by the War Department by
expedited service over a railroad which was bound by land grant
acts to transport property of the United States "at rates not
exceeding 50 percent of those paid by private shippers for the same
kind of service." The railroad had no tariff for such service
available to the public at large, but had filed with the Interstate
Commerce Commission a special tariff for the government in such
cases without land grant deductions.
Held, (1) that no
contract of the United States to pay the special tariff rate could
be implied from the fact that the shipments were made when the
special tariff was the only one applicable on file, in the absence
of proof that the contracting officers then knew of that tariff;
(2) that, the special tariff was filed without statutory authority;
hence the officers were not chargeable, as a matter of law, with
knowledge of it. P.
272 U. S.
447.
2. To recover in the Court of Claims the reasonable value of
service rendered the government, the claimant must prove its value.
P.
272 U. S. 448.
60 Ct.Cls. 662 affirmed.
Certiorari (270 U.S. 103) to a judgment of the Court of Claims
rejecting the petitioner's claim on account of transportation
service rendered to the United States.
Page 272 U. S. 446
MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner brought suit in the Court of Claims to recover for
the transportation over its lines of several shipments of military
impedimenta made by the War Department in 1916 and 1917. The court
allowed recovery for five items and denied recovery for certain
others, which are alone the subject of controversy here. This Court
granted certiorari,
270 U. S. 103,
107; § 3(b) Act of February 13, 1925, c. 229, 43 Stat. 939.
Some of the lines of petitioner were constructed with the aid of
land grants by the United States under acts of Congress requiring
land-aided railroads to transport troops, munitions of war, and
property of the United States at rates not exceeding 50 percent of
those paid by private shippers for the same kind of service, §§ 11,
18, Act July 27, 1866, c. 278, 14 Stat. 297, 299.
See also
appropriation acts for army transportation for years 1916-1917. Act
March 4, 1915, c. 143, 38 Stat. 1076, 1077; Act Aug. 29, 1916, c.
418, 39 Stat. 633, 634.
At the time of the transportation, the tariff in force on
petitioner's road available to the public at large, Western
Classification, 54 I.C.C. No. 12, did not include any of the items
of military impedimenta here involved. But petitioner then had on
file with the Interstate Commerce Commission a special tariff
applicable to such items when carried by passenger train or
expedited service, without deduction for shipments made over
land-aided or land grant roads.
Petitioner presented its bills for the expedited service in
transporting the items controverted, on the basis of the rates
fixed by this tariff, without deduction. The accounting officers of
the government allowed the claim at a
Page 272 U. S. 447
lower rate corresponding to the schedule embraced in the Western
Classification applicable to emigrant movables carried by ordinary
freight trains, and payment thus computed with land grant
deductions was received by petitioner under protest.
The Court of Claims held that the rate on emigrant movables was
inapplicable, and that petitioner did not establish a lawful rate
by leaving a special tariff schedule with the Interstate Commerce
Commission, since there is no provision of law requiring or
permitting the filing of tariffs applicable only to government
transportation. But it is argued here, as it was below, that, since
there was no rate open to the public applicable to the items
involving expedited service, the shipments by representatives of
the War Department, following the filing of the special tariff for
that service, must be taken to establish an implied agreement to
pay the special tariff rate. And further, since the agreed rate was
not open to the public, there could be, by the very terms of the
applicable acts of Congress, no land grant deductions.
This reasoning omits a step essential to the imposition of a
contractual liability upon the government, for it points to no fact
found from which assent of the shipper to the special tariff rate
could be inferred. The Court of Claims found that there was no
express agreement that the shipments were based upon the special
tariff, and that there was no proof that the contracting officers
had any knowledge of the tariff at the time of the shipments.
Obviously they cannot be held to have yielded assent to a tariff of
which they were ignorant. A basis for a contract implied in fact to
pay the rate charged is therefore wanting. In this respect, the
case differs from those in which a recovery was allowed where there
was no lawful tariff and the shipments were made with knowledge on
the part of the government representatives of the rates published
by the carrier.
Compare Yazoo & Miss. Valley R. Co. v.
United States, 54 Ct.Cls. 165.
Page 272 U. S. 448
Nor were the representatives of the War Department chargeable as
a matter of law with knowledge, which they did not in fact possess,
of a tariff which was not required to be filed. The ordinary
consequences that attend the filing of a schedule of rates with the
Interstate Commerce Commission as demanded or permitted by statute,
cf. Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Mugg, 202 U.
S. 242;
Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Kirby,
225 U. S. 155,
cannot be invoked by the carrier merely because it lodged a special
tariff with the commission without statutory authorization.
Illinois Central R. Co. v. United States, 58 Ct.Cls.
182.
Petitioner is in no better situation with respect to its
asserted right to recover the reasonable value of its services. The
burden was upon it to establish their value. The record contains no
finding of the reasonable value of these services, and petitioner
failed, as the court below found, to offer any proof of the
reasonableness of the rate which it sought to apply.
Judgment affirmed.