1. A suit by an individual, claiming injury, on behalf of
himself and all others in like case, to enjoin the maintenance of a
combination in restraint of commerce violating § 1 of the
Anti-Trust Act, is authorized by §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act. P.
272 U. S.
360.
2. Ships and those who operate them are instrumentalities of
commerce, and within the Commerce Clause no less than cargoes. P.
272 U. S.
363.
3. A combination whereby the owners and operators of ships
engaged in interstate and foreign commerce surrender completely
their freedom of action in respect of the employment of seamen to
associations formed to regulate and control the subject violates
the Anti-Trust Act. P.
272 U. S.
362.
Page 272 U. S. 360
4. Where the bill alleged such a combination, the direct and
necessary consequence of which was to restrain interstate and
foreign commerce, it was unnecessary to add an allegation that such
was the specific intent of those in the combination. P.
272 U. S.
363.
5. Therefore it is unimportant in this case to inquire whether
the object of the combination was merely to regulate the employment
of men, and not to restrain commerce. P.
272 U. S.
363.
10 F.2d 96 reversed.
Certiorari (271 U.S. 652), to a decree of the circuit court of
appeals which affirmed a decree of the district court dismissing a
bill to restrain an unlawful combination, and.for damages.
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit to enjoin the respondents from maintaining a
combination in restraint of interstate and foreign commerce in
violation of § 1 of the Anti-Trust Act, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, and
to recover damages. Such a suit is authorized by §§ 4 and 16 of the
Clayton Act, c. 323, 38 Stat. 730, 731, 737.
Duplex Co. v.
Deering, 254 U. S. 443,
254 U. S.
464-465. Upon respondents' motion, the district court
dismissed the bill of complaint apparently upon the merits, and the
circuit court of appeals affirmed the decree. 10 F.2d 96. The only
question necessary to be considered here is whether the bill states
a case within the Anti-Trust Act.
The bill is not concisely drawn, and the application of its
allegations is to some degree obscured by references to acts of
Congress regulating commerce other than the Anti-Trust Act. For
present purposes, the pertinent allegations, shortly stated, are as
follows: Petitioner is a
Page 272 U. S. 361
seaman, and has followed that calling for more than 20 years on
ships engaged in the carrying trade among the states on the Pacific
Coast and with foreign countries. He is member of the Seamen's
Union of America, having a membership of about 10,000 seamen
engaged in various forms of maritime service in the same field, and
he sues on their behalf, as well as his own. The members of the
respondent associations own, operate, or control substantially all
the merchant vessels of American registry engaged in interstate and
foreign commerce among the ports of the Pacific Coast and with
foreign countries. These associations and their members have
entered into a combination to control the employment, upon such
vessels, of all seamen upon the Pacific Coast, and to that end the
associations have established and maintain offices in San Francisco
and San Pedro, California, where seamen are engaged and supplied to
the operators of the vessels. Among other requirements, every
seaman seeking employment is compelled to register, receive a
number, and await his turn according to the number before he can
obtain employment, the result of which is that seamen, well
qualified and well known, are frequently prevented from obtaining
employment at once when, but for these conditions, they would be
able to do so. A certificate is issued to each seaman which he is
obliged to carry and present in order to obtain employment. The
certificate, in part, recites that no person will be employed
unless registered; that the certificate must be delivered to the
master of the vessel upon articles being signed; that the
certificate is the personal record of the seaman and the basis of
his future employment. At the same time, two cards are issued, one
to the seaman, assigning him to a specified employment, and another
to the ship, reciting the capacity in which the seaman is to be
employed, with the statement that
"he must not be employed on your ship in any capacity unless he
presents
Page 272 U. S. 362
an assignment card, grey in color, issued by us and addressed to
your vessel, designating the position to which we have assigned
him."
The associations fix the wages which shall be paid the seamen.
Under the regulations, when a seaman's turn comes, he must take the
employment then offered or none, whether it is suited to his
qualifications or whether he wishes to engage on the particular
vessel or for the particular voyage, and the officers of the
vessels are deprived of the right to select their own men or those
deemed most suitable. Without a compliance with the foregoing
requirements, no seaman can be employed on any of the vessels owned
or operated by members of the associations.
It is further alleged that the petitioner sought employment
through the San Francisco office of the associations and was
refused registration because he failed to produce a discharge book.
At a later time, he was employed by the mate of a vessel engaged in
coastwise interstate traffic, but was required by the mate to apply
at the office of the associations for assignment as a sailor; that,
upon application being thus made, such assignment was refused;
that, nevertheless, he was directed by the mate to report on board
for duty; that he did report, but was informed by the mate that he
had been ordered to take no seamen, except through the office of
the associations, and in consequence petitioner lost the
employment, to his damage in a sum stated.
From these averments, the conclusion results that each of the
shipowners and operators, by entering into this combination, has,
in respect of the employment of seamen, surrendered himself
completely to the control of the associations. If the restraint
thus imposed had related to the carriage of goods in interstate and
foreign commerce -- that is to say, if each shipowner had precluded
himself from making any contract of transportation directly with
the shipper, and had put himself under an obligation to
Page 272 U. S. 363
refuse to carry for any person without the previous approval of
the associations -- the unlawful restraint would be clear. But
ships and those who operate them are instrumentalities of commerce,
and within the commerce clause, no less than cargoes.
Second
Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1,
223 U. S. 47-49.
And, as was said by this Court in
United States v. Colgate
& Co., 250 U. S. 300,
250 U. S.
307,:
"The purpose of the Sherman Act is to prohibit monopolies,
contracts, and combinations which probably would unduly interfere
with the free exercise of their rights by those engaged, or who
wish to engage, in trade and commerce -- in a word to preserve the
right of freedom to trade."
That the effect of the combination now under consideration, both
as to the seamen and the owners, is precisely what this language
condemns is made plain by the allegations of the bill which we have
just summarized. The absence of an allegation that such was the
specific intent is not important, since that is the necessary and
direct consequence of the combination and the acts of the
associations under it, and they cannot be heard to say the
contrary.
United States v. Patten, 226 U.
S. 525,
226 U. S. 543.
It is not important, therefore, to inquire whether, as contended by
respondents, the object of the combination was merely to regulate
of employment of men, and not to restrain commerce. A restraint of
interstate commerce cannot be justified by the fact that the object
of the participants in the combination was to benefit themselves in
a way which might have been unobjectionable, in the absence of such
restraint.
Duplex Co. v. Deering, supra, p.
254 U. S. 468;
Ellis v. Inman, Poulsen & Co., 131 F. 182, 186.
Respondents rely on
Industrial Association v. United
States, 268 U. S. 64,
United Leather Workers v. Herkert, 265 U.
S. 457, and
United Mine Workers v. Coronado
Co., 259 U. S. 344, but
these cases are not in point. The conspiracies or combinations in
all three related to local
Page 272 U. S. 364
matters -- the first to building in San Francisco, the second,
to manufacturing, and the third, to mining operations -- and the
effect upon interstate commerce was held to be purely indirect and
secondary. Neither the making of goods nor the mining of coal is
commerce, and the fact that the things produced are afterwards
shipped or used in interstate commerce does not make their
production a part of it. Nor is building commerce, and the fact
that the materials to be used are shipped in from other states does
not make building a part of such interstate commerce. In the
Industrial Association case, after a reference to the two
earlier decisions (pp.
268 U. S.
80-82), it was said (p.
268 U. S.
82):
"The alleged conspiracy and the acts here complained of spent
their intended and direct force upon a local situation, for
building is as essentially local as mining, manufacturing, or
growing crops, and if, by a resulting diminution of the commercial
demand, interstate trade was curtailed, either generally or in
specific instances, that was a fortuitous consequence so remote and
indirect as plainly to cause it to fall outside the reach of the
Sherman Act."
Here, however, the combination and the acts complained of did
not spend their intended and direct force upon a local situation.
On the contrary, they related to the employment of seamen for
service on ships, both of them instrumentalities of, and intended
to be used in, interstate and foreign commerce, and the immediate
force of the combination, both in purpose and execution, was
directed toward affecting such commerce. The interference with
commerce therefore was direct and primary, and not, as in the cases
cited, incidental, indirect, and secondary.
Taking the allegations of the bill at their face value, as we
must do in the absence of countervailing facts or explanations, it
appears that each shipowner and operator in this widespread
combination has surrendered his freedom of action in the matter of
employing seamen and
Page 272 U. S. 365
agreed to abide by the will of the associations. Such is the
fair interpretation of the combination and of the various
requirements under it, and this is borne out by the actual
experience of the petitioner in his efforts to secure employment.
These shipowners and operators having thus put themselves into a
situation of restraint upon their freedom to carry on interstate
and foreign commerce according to their own choice and discretion,
it follows, as the case now stands, that the combination is in
violation of the Anti-Trust Act.
Decree reversed, and cause remanded to the district court
for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
MR. JUSTICE STONE took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.