1. Where a petition for removal is based on diverse citizenship
and also on the ground that the suit arises under federal law, the
case is removable if either ground be well taken. P.
271 U. S.
101.
2. Where the removal papers are well grounded, it is error for
the state court to deny the petition and proceed further with the
case.
Id.
3. An action against a railroad by one who was owner, consignor,
and consignee of cattle shipped in, partly by another railroad,
from another state on a through bill of lading governed by the
Carmack Amendment, for damage resulting from defendant's failure to
unload them, while in transit, for rest, water, and feeding at
required by the Act of Congress (34 Stat. 607), is a suit arising
under the laws of the United States. P.
271 U. S.
102.
4. A suit by a citizen of the state where it is brought and a
citizen of another state, against a citizen of a third state, is a
suit between
Page 271 U. S. 100
citizens of different states in the sense of Jud.Code, § 24,
defining the general jurisdiction of the district courts, and, the
other requisites being present, is removable by the defendant to
that court from a state court. Jud.Code, § 28. P.
271 U. S.
102.
66 Mont.198; 71
id. 56, reversed.
Certiorari to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana
affirming a judgment against the railway company in an action for
damages to a shipment of cattle.
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an action begun in a state court in Montana to recover
for injuries to cattle shipped by railroad in interstate commerce.
In due time, the defendant presented a verified petition,
accompanied by a proper bond with good and sufficient surety, for
the removal of the case into the Federal District Court for
Montana, but the state court denied the petition, accorded the
defendant an exception, and proceeded to the disposal of the case
on the merits. After a trial, it gave judgment for the plaintiffs,
which the supreme court of the state affirmed after a part of the
damages awarded was remitted. 66 Mont.198; 71 Mont. 56; Rev.Code
Mont.1921, § 9748. The case is here on writ of certiorari.
One of the rulings assigned for error in the supreme court of
the state was the denial of the petition for removal, but that
court held that the case was not removable, and sustained the
ruling. It was to review the decision on this point that certiorari
was granted.
Page 271 U. S. 101
The material allegations of the plaintiffs' complaint were to
the following effect: one of the plaintiffs is a corporate citizen
of Montana and the other is an individual citizen of Wyoming, while
the defendant is a corporate citizen of Minnesota. The cattle were
shipped from Cody, Wyoming, to Seville, Montana, on a through bill
of lading over two connecting lines of railroad, the second being
owned and operated by the defendant. The plaintiffs owned the
cattle, were both consignors and consignees of the shipment, and
were the lawful holders of the bill of lading. The cattle were
injured while in transit over the defendant's road by the
defendant's action in unreasonably delaying and carelessly handling
them, and wrongfully omitting to unload them, when necessary, in a
humane manner into properly equipped pens for rest, water, and
feeding -- the resulting damages to the plaintiffs being upwards of
$30,000.
The petition for removal, besides showing the presence of the
requisite jurisdictional amount and the defendant's nonresidence in
the state where sued, asserted a right of removal on two grounds:
first, that the case was one arising under the laws of the United
States, particularly those applying to the shipment of cattle by
railroad in interstate commerce, and secondly that the case was
between citizens of different states.
If either ground was well taken, the case was removable,
Judicial Code, § 28;
General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore &
Michigan Southern Ry. Co., 260 U. S. 261,
260 U. S. 271
et seq.; Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co.,
260 U. S. 653, and
the state court erred in denying the petition and proceeding
further with the case, Judicial Code, § 29;
New Orleans, Mobile
& Texas R. Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.
S. 135,
102 U. S. 141;
National Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.
S. 118,
106 U. S.
122.
Whether the first ground was well taken is to be determined from
the plaintiffs' statement in the complaint
Page 271 U. S. 102
of their cause of action. According to that statement, the cause
of action was for injuries to cattle resulting from the defendant's
negligent and wrongful nonperformance of duties devolving on it as
a second and connecting carrier while the cattle were being
transported over its road on a through bill of lading, including
the duty to unload them for needed rest, water, and feeding. The
bill of lading was issued under a law of Congress, Carmack
Amendment, c. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 593, 595, and governed the entire
transportation -- that over the defendant's line as well as that
over the line of the initial carrier,
Missouri, Kansas &
Texas Ry. Co. v. Ward, 244 U. S. 383,
244 U. S. 387.
And the carriers' duties in respect of unloading the cattle "in a
humane manner into properly equipped pens for rest, water and
feeding" were prescribed by a law of Congress, c. 3594, 34 Stat.
607. So it is apparent that the case stated in the complaint was
one arising under the laws of the United States.
Cincinnati,
etc., Ry. Co. v. Rankin, 241 U. S. 319,
241 U. S. 326;
St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Starbird, 243 U.
S. 592,
243 U. S. 595;
Southern Pacific Co. v. Stewart, 245 U.
S. 359;
ibid., 245 U. S. 245 U.S.
562; same case,
248 U. S. 248 U.S.
446.
And see Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co., 215 U. S. 501,
215 U. S.
507.
It also is apparent from the complaint and the petition for
removal that the case was one between citizens of different states
in the sense of the statute defining the general jurisdiction of
the federal district courts. Judicial Code, § 24. The words of that
statute are:
"shall have original jurisdiction . . . of all suits of a civil
nature . . . where the matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of
interests and costs, the sum or value of three thousand dollars,
and . . . is between citizens of different states."
This was such a case. The amount in controversy exceeded the
requirement, and the plaintiffs were citizens of states other than
the one of which the defendant was a citizen.
Sweeney v. Carter
Oil Co., 199 U. S. 252,
199 U. S.
256.
Page 271 U. S. 103
And as the case was begun in a court of a state of which the
defendant was a nonresident, it came plainly within the provision
for the removal of cases on the ground of diverse citizenship.
Judicial Code, § 28. In concluding otherwise, the state courts
conceived that they were following
Smith v. Lyon,
133 U. S. 315, and
Camp v. Gress, 250 U. S. 308. But
they misapprehended the question involved in those cases. Both were
begun in a federal court, and both were recognized as falling
within the general jurisdiction of those courts. The question in
each was one of venue -- whether the case could be maintained in
the court of a particular district against the defendant's
objection. That question was answered in the negative. In
Camp
v. Gress, the court was careful to point out the difference in
purpose and operation between the statutory provision defining the
general jurisdiction of the federal district courts and the
provision dealing with venue. And in
General Investment Co. v.
Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co., supra, and
Lee
v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., supra, this Court again
pointed out that difference, and also that the venue provision
respecting suits begun in those courts has no application to suits
removed into them from state courts. The difference between the
original removal statute of 1789, c. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 79, to which
the state courts gave some attention, and the present statute was
shown in the last paragraph of the opinion in
Lee v. Chesapeake
& Ohio Ry. Co., supra, and does not call for further
comment here.
We are of opinion that the state court of first instance should
have given effect to the petition for removal, and had declined to
proceed further in the case, and that the appellate court should
have reversed the judgment, with a direction that that be done.
Judgment reversed.