1. A complaint by a seaman against a ship owner for damages for
injuries alleged to have resulted from the owner's negligence in
furnishing a defective appliance
held an action under the
Merchant Marine Act as supplemented by the Employers' Liability
Act, in which the plaintiff must prove negligence and subject
himself to reduction of damages in proportion to any contributory
negligence on his part. P.
271 U. S. 36.
2. The state courts have jurisdiction, concurrently with the
federal courts, to enforce the right of action established by the
Merchant Marine Act as a part of the maritime law. P.
271 U. S.
37.
3. The provision of the Employers' Liability Act that "no action
shall be maintained under this Act unless commenced within two
years from the day the cause of action accrued" is one of
substantive right, both setting a limit and necessarily implying
that the action may be maintained, as a substantive right, within
that period. P.
271 U. S.
38.
4. This provision was incorporated by adoption in the Merchant
Marine Act, and controls in actions brought under that Act in state
courts, regardless of the statutes of limitations of the states. P.
271 U. S.
38.
194 Cal. 344 reversed.
Certiorari to a judgment of the Supreme Court of California
which affirmed a judgment dismissing, on demurrer, a complaint in
an action for damages, brought by Engel against Davenport.
Page 271 U. S. 34
MR. JUSTICE SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
The questions involved in this case relate to the effect of § 33
of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 988, c. 250, which
amended § 20 of the Seamen's Act of 1915, 38 Stat. 1164, c. 153, to
read as follows:
"That any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course
of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for
damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action
all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common
law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway
employees shall apply, and in case of the death of any seaman as a
result of any such personal injury, the personal representative of
such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the
right of trial by jury, and in such action, all statutes of the
United States conferring or regulating the right of action for
death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable.
Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the
district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his
principal office is located."
Engel, the petitioner, brought this action at law in January,
1923, in a superior court of California, against the respondent
Davenport, one of the owners of a vessel on which he had been
employed as a seaman, [
Footnote
1] to recover damages for personal injuries suffered, in April,
1921, while he was engaged in placing a chain lashing around part
of a cargo of lumber that had been taken on board the vessel at a
port of landing. The complaint alleged, in substance, that the
vessel had been negligently sent upon her voyage when unseaworthy
and equipped with
Page 271 U. S. 35
defective appliances, in that a pelican hook, which was a
necessary part of the chain lashing used in carrying the cargo, had
in it a flaw observable upon ordinary inspection; that this hook
was not inspected, and that it broke by reason of this flaw,
causing the injuries in question. Davenport demurred to the
complaint on the ground,
inter alia, that the cause of
action was barred by § 340, subd. 3, of the California Code of
Civil Procedure, which required an action for personal injury
caused by wrongful act or negligence to be commenced within one
year. This demurrer was sustained, without leave to amend, and
judgment was entered in favor of Davenport, which was affirmed, on
appeal by the supreme court of the state. 194 Cal. 344. This writ
of certiorari was then granted. 266 U.S. 600.
The petitioner contends that the suit is one founded on § 33 of
the Merchant Marine Act, of which the state courts have
jurisdiction concurrently with the federal courts, and that, by
virtue of § 6 of the Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, c. 149,
incorporated in the provisions of the Merchant Marine Act, it might
be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued,
irrespective of the state statute.
The respondent contends, on the other hand, that the suit is not
founded on the Merchant Marine Act, and its provisions therefore
have no application, and that, in any event, § 6 of the Employers'
Liability Act is not incorporated in the Merchant Marine Act and
does not determine the period of time within which an action may be
commenced in a state court.
It is settled by the decision in
Panama Railroad v.
Johnson, 264 U. S. 375,
that § 33 of the Merchant Marine Act is an exercise of the power of
Congress to alter or supplement the maritime law by changes that
are countrywide and uniform in operation; that it brings into the
maritime law new rules drawn from the Employers'
Page 271 U. S. 36
Liability Act and its amendments, adopted by the generic
reference to "all statutes of the United States Modifying or
extending the common law right or remedy in cases of personal
injuries to railway employees", and "extends to injured seamen a
right to invoke at their election, either the relief accorded by
the old rules or that provided by the new rules" -- that is, that
it grants them, as an alternative, the common law remedy of an
action "to recover compensatory damages under the new rules, as
distinguished from the allowances covered by the old rules," which,
as a modification of the maritime law, may be enforced through
appropriate proceedings
in personam on the common law side
of the courts.
1. The present suit is not brought merely to enforce the
liability of the owner of the vessel to indemnity for injuries
caused by a defective appliance, without regard to negligence, for
which an action of law could have been maintained prior to the
Merchant Marine Act,
Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger,
259 U. S. 255, and
we need not determine whether if it had been thus brought under the
old rules, the state statute of limitations would have been
applicable.
See Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.
S. 233. Here, the complaint contains an affirmative
averment of negligence in respect to the appliance. And, having
been brought after the passage of the Merchant Marine Act, we think
the suit is to be regarded as one founded on that Act, in which the
petitioner, instead of invoking, as he might, the relief accorded
him by the old maritime rules, has elected to seek that provided by
the new rules in an action at law based upon negligence, in which
he not only assumes the burden of proving negligence, but also,
under § 3 of the Employers' Liability Act, subjects himself to a
reduction of the damages in proportion to any contributory
negligence on his part. This conclusion is in harmony with the
Panama Railroad case, pp.
264 U. S.
382-383 in which the complaint charged that the
Page 271 U. S. 37
injuries resulted from negligence in providing a defective
appliance and in other respects, and it is not in conflict with the
Carlisle Packing Co. case, in which, as shown by the
original record, the suit was commenced in 1918, prior to the
Merchant Marine Act.
And see Lorang v. Steamship Co., 298
F. 547, and
Lynott v. Transit Corporation, 202 App.Div.
613.
2. It is clear that the state courts have jurisdiction
concurrently with the federal courts to enforce the right of action
established by the Merchant Marine Act as a part of the maritime
law. This was assumed in
Re East River Co., 266 U.
S. 355,
266 U. S. 368, and
expressly held in
Lynott v. Transit Corporation, supra,
affirmed without opinion in 234 N.Y. 626. And it has been implied
in various decisions in the district courts involving the question
of the right to remove to a federal court a suit that had been
commenced in a state court.
By a provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789, now embodied in §
24, subd. 3, and § 256, subd. 3, of the Judicial Code, giving
district courts original jurisdiction of civil causes of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction, there is saved to suitors in all cases
the right of a common law remedy where the common law is competent
to give it. In
Chelentis v. Steamship Co., 247 U.
S. 372,
247 U. S. 384,
where the suit had been commenced in a state court and removed to
the federal court, it was said that, under this saving clause, "a
right sanctioned by the maritime law may be enforced through any
appropriate proceeding recognized at common law." And the
jurisdiction of the state courts to enforce the new common law
right made a part of the maritime law is necessarily affirmed by
the provision contained in § 6 of the Employers' Liability Act
[
Footnote 2] -- plainly, we
think, incorporated in the Merchant Marine Act by the generic
reference -- that jurisdiction of the federal courts under the Act
shall be concurrent with that of the courts
Page 271 U. S. 38
of the several states, and no case arising thereunder when
brought in any state court of competent jurisdiction shall be
removed to any federal court. Nor is the jurisdiction in suits
under § 33 of the Merchant Marine Act limited to the federal
courts, as has been sometimes held in the district courts, by its
provision that jurisdiction "shall be under the court of the
district" in which the employer resides or his principal office is
located. This, as was held in the
Panama Railroad case, p.
264 U. S. 385,
was not intended to affect the general jurisdiction of the federal
courts, but only to prescribe the venue of actions brought in them
under the Act.
3. This brings us to the question whether a suit brought in a
state court to enforce the right of action granted by the Merchant
Marine Act may be commenced within two years after the cause of
action accrues, or whether a state statute fixing a shorter period
of limitation will apply. Section 6 of the Employers' Liability Act
provides that "no action shall be maintained under this Act unless
commenced within two years from the day the cause of action
accrued." This provision is one of substantive right, setting a
limit to the existence of the obligation which the Act creates.
Atlantic Coast Line v. Burnette, 239 U.
S. 199,
239 U. S. 201.
And it necessarily implies that the action may be maintained, as a
substantive right, if commenced within the two years.
The adoption of an earlier statute by reference makes it as much
a part of the later act as though it had been incorporated at full
length.
Kendall v. United
States, 12 Pet. 524,
37 U. S. 625;
In re Heath, 144 U. S. 92,
144 U. S. 94;
Interstate Railway v. Massachusetts, 207 U. S.
79,
207 U. S. 85. It
brings into the later act "all that is fairly covered by the
reference,"
Panama Railroad case, p. 392 -- that is to
say, all the provisions of the former act which, from the nature of
the subject matter, are applicable to the later act. It is clear
that the provision of the Employers' Liability
Page 271 U. S. 39
Act as to the time within which a suit may be instituted is
directly applicable to the subject matter of the Merchant Marine
Act, and covered by the reference. In the
Panama Railroad
case, p.
264 U. S. 392,
it was held that the contention that the Merchant Marine Act did
not possess the uniformity in operation essential to its validity
as a modification of the maritime law was unfounded, since the
Employers' Liability Act, which it adopted, had a uniform operation
which could not be deflected from "by local statutes or local views
of common law rules." The period of time within which an action may
be commenced is a material element in such uniformity of operation.
And plainly Congress, in incorporating the provisions of the
Employers' Liability Act into the Merchant Marine Act, did not
intend to exclude a provision so material, and to permit the
uniform operation of the Merchant Marine Act to be destroyed by the
varying provisions of the state statutes of limitation.
We conclude that the provision of § 6 of the Employers'
Liability Act relating to the time of commencing the action is a
material provision of the statutes "modifying or extending the
common law right or remedy in cases of personal injuries to railway
employees" which was adopted by and incorporated in the Merchant
Marine Act. And, as a provision affecting the substantive right
created by Congress in the exercise of its paramount authority in
reference to the maritime law, it must control in an action brought
in a state court under the Merchant Marine Act, regardless of any
statute of limitations of the state.
See Arnson v. Murphy,
109 U. S. 238,
109 U. S.
243.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of California is reversed, and
the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
[
Footnote 1]
Although other owners of the vessel were also named as
defendants in the complaint, the record does not indicate that any
of them were served with process or entered their appearance, the
suit apparently having been prosecuted against Davenport alone.
[
Footnote 2]
Inserted by the amendment of 1910 36 Stat. 291, c. 143.