1. The Uniform Bill of Lading Act of August 29, 1916, c. 415, §
23, presents no obstacle to garnishment of a carrier after the
order bill of lading has been surrendered; neither does that Act
confer a right of garnishment. P.
271 U. S.
256.
2. The fact that, by § 5 of the Uniform Bill of Lading, as
construed by this Court in
Michigan Central R. Co. v. Mark Owen
& Co., 256 U. S. 427, a
carrier may remain liable
qua carrier to the consignee of
an interstate carload shipment after surrender of the bill of
lading and payment of charges and while the car is on a train track
and turned over to the consignee for the purpose of unloading, and
partly unloaded by him, is not determinative of the carrier's
liability as garnishee in a suit by a stranger seeking to collect a
debt from the consignee. P.
271 U. S.
255.
3. The carrier's liability to garnishment in such circumstances
depends on the state law. P.
271 U. S.
257.
229 Mich. 468 reversed.
Certiorari to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan
holding the Railway Company liable as garnishee in a suit by Alvin
R. Durham Company to collect a debt from one Fred S. Larson, as
principal defendant.
See also 224 Mich. 477.
Page 271 U. S. 254
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
By an interstate shipment made under the uniform order bill of
lading, the Chicago & Northwestern Railway received in 1921 at
its yards in Ironwood, Michigan, a boxcar containing apples
consigned to the shipper's order "notify F. M. Larson." The car was
placed on the "team track," which is one of the public delivery
tracks used for unloading freight received in carload shipments and
is not connected in any manner with a railway freight warehouse.
The next morning at 8:20 o'clock, Larson surrendered the bill of
lading, duly indorsed, paid the freight charges, gave to the
railway his receipt for the apples, and commenced unloading the
car. On the same day, the Alvin R. Durham Company sued out a writ
of garnishment against the railway, which was served at 9:45 a.m.
At that time, about one-quarter of the apples had already been
taken from the car by Larson. In spite of the service of the writ
of garnishment, the railway did not prevent the further unloading.
This was not completed until four days later. Meanwhile, the car
was locked every night by Larson. During this period of
unloading,
Page 271 U. S. 255
the car was shifted several times by the railway for its own
convenience in the use of the team tracks.
The trial court directed a verdict for the garnishee on the
ground that the railway did not have the custody, control, or
possession of the shipment. The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed
that judgment, and held the carrier liable on the ground that,
"under the interpretation of § 5 of the uniform bill of lading,
as appears pears in
Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. [Mark] Owen [&
Co.], 256 U. S. 427, . . . the railway
did have the custody, control, and possession of the interstate
shipment."
Id., 229 Mich. 468.
See also Chicago & N.W. R.
Co. v. Durham Co., 265 U.S. 580. This Court granted a writ of
certiorari. 268 U.S. 684. The sole question for decision is whether
the railway is liable as garnishee.
The facts in the two cases are similar, but the legal questions
presented for decision are wholly different. In the
Mark
Owen case, it was sought to enforce under the federal law an
alleged liability in contract of an interstate carrier to the
consignee. Whether the railroad was liable depended upon the
construction to be given the contract for an interstate shipment
contained in the uniform bill of lading.
Compare Southern
Railway Co. v. Prescott, 240 U. S. 632. The
question was whether, in the absence of negligence, the railroad
was liable to the consignee for grapes stolen from the car while on
the team track after the unloading had begun, but before the
expiration of 48 hours after giving notice of arrival. [
Footnote 1] The
Page 271 U. S. 256
railroad contended that, under § 5 of the bill of lading, there
was no liability because the surrender of the car to the consignee,
followed by breaking the seals and commencement of unloading,
constituted a delivery, and that, in any event, its responsibility
for the unloaded part of the contents had become that of
warehouseman. This Court held that, since the theft occurred within
the 48-hour period, there had not been, under the contract of the
parties as expressed in § 5 of the bill of lading, such a delivery
as would terminate the carrier's liability as insurer or reduce the
liability to that of the warehouseman's exercise of reasonable
care.
In the case at bar, it is sought to hold the railroad liable as
garnishee to a stranger. It is not sought to enforce a liability
arising under a federal law. As the order bill of lading had been
surrendered, the Uniform Bill of Lading Act presented no obstacle
to garnishment. Act of August 29, 1916, c. 415, § 23, 39 Stat. 538,
543. But that Act obviously confers no right to garnishment. Nor is
there anything in the bill of lading which conceivably could be
construed as either conferring or denying the right of garnishment.
The plaintiff does not seek to enforce, as a derivative right, a
claim of the consignee against the carrier under the bill of
lading. It seeks to reach tangible property confessedly belonging
to the principal defendant and to which the carrier confessedly
makes no claim either of title or possession. Section 5 of the bill
of lading clearly does not authorize a carrier, who had surrendered
to the consignee control of the shipment upon surrender of the bill
of lading, payment of charges and signing of the usual receipt, any
right to recapture control of the unloaded part of the shipment in
the event that garnishee proceedings are commenced within 48 hours
after such surrender.
The liabilities consequent upon the character of the custody and
control exercised by carrier or consignee arise
Page 271 U. S. 257
from and are dependent upon the state statutes conferring the
right of garnishment, and as such are unaffected by the provisions
of the bill of lading. Thus, the question whether, under the
circumstances, the apples remaining in the car were subject to
garnishment is not one of uniform carrier liability, but,
primarily, of procedure, and as such governed by varying views of
local policy, legislation, and practice. Thus, a garnishee may be
under no liability, because the property could have been reached by
direct levy. [
Footnote 2] He
may be under no liability because of the nature of the claim sought
to be enforced, [
Footnote 3] or
because of the character of the plaintiff, [
Footnote 4] of the principal defendant, [
Footnote 5] of the garnishee, [
Footnote 6] or of the property sought
Page 271 U. S. 258
to be reached. [
Footnote 7]
And, although no objection may exist upon any of these grounds, the
garnishee may be held immune from liability, because the highest
court of the state had declared that to allow garnishment under the
circumstances would be against public policy, as where a carrier
having possession, custody, and control of property is held not
chargeable by garnishment because the goods were in process of
transportation. [
Footnote
8]
Whether, under the law of Michigan, the railway was liable as
garnishee we have no occasion to inquire. There is nothing in the
uniform bill of lading which would prevent the state court from
holding that, although the freight car was in the carrier's
possession, it was not liable as garnishee of the contents, because
the apples were in the consignee's possession, although not
unloaded. A person breaking open and taking the contents of a chest
in his custody has been held guilty of larceny.
Union Trust Co.
v. Wilson, 198 U. S. 530,
198 U. S. 537.
The state court, however, reversed the judgment of the trial court
because it assumed that the liability of the garnishee was fixed by
the federal law, and that, under the rule declared in the
Mark
Owen case, the railroad was liable. As this was error, the
judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Ebert v.
Poston, 266 U. S. 548.
Compare Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Corp.,
259 U. S. 263;
Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.
S. 109.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 1 of the uniform bill of lading provides:
"The carrier or party in possession of any of the property
herein described shall be liable for any loss thereof or damage
thereto, except as hereinafter provided. . . ."
Section 5:
"Property not removed by the party entitled to receive it within
forty-eight hours . . . after notice of its arrival has been duly
sent or given may be kept in car, depot, or place of delivery of
the carrier or warehouse subject to a reasonable charge for storage
and to carrier's responsibility as warehouseman only. . . ."
[
Footnote 2]
Madden v. Union Pacific R. Co., 89 Kan. 282;
Wood
v. Edgar, 13 Mo. 451;
Gleason v. South Milwaukee
Bank, 89 Wis. 534.
Compare Hooper v. Day, 19 Me. 56;
Balkham v. Lowe, 20 Me. 369.
[
Footnote 3]
Nesbitt v. Ware, 30 Ala. 68;
Cunningham v.
Baker, 104 Ala. 160;
Holcomb v. Winchester, 52 Conn.
447;
Clark v. Brewer, 6 Gray 320;
Martz v. Detroit
Fire Ins. Co., 28 Mich. 201;
Thorp v. Preston, 42
Mich. 511;
Weil v. Tyler, 38 Mo. 545;
Selheimer v.
Elder, 98 Pa. 154.
[
Footnote 4]
Davis v. Millen, 111 Ga. 451;
Shivers v.
Wilson, 5 Har. & J. 130.
Compare Disconto Gesellschaft
v. Umbreit, 208 U. S. 570.
[
Footnote 5]
Edmondson v. De Kalb County, 51 Ala. 103;
Danley v.
State Bank, 15 Ark. 16;
Lovejoy v. Albee, 33 Me.
414.
[
Footnote 6]
Buchanan v.
Alexander, 4 How. 20;
Fischer v.
Daudistal, 9 F. 145;
Pringle v. Guild, 118 F. 655;
Moscow Hardware Co. v. Colson, 158 F. 199;
Allen-West
Commission Co. v. Grumbles, 161 F. 461;
In re Argonaut
Shoe Co., 187 F. 784;
Glass v. Woodman, 223 F. 621;
Forbes v. Thompson, 2 Penn. 530;
Columbia Brick Co. v.
District of Columbia, 1 App.D.C. 351;
Millison v.
Fisk, 43 Ill. 112;
Bivens v. Harper, 59 Ill. 21;
Wallace v.Lawyer, 54 Ind. 501;
Allen v. Wright,
134 Mass. 347; 136 Mass.193;
School District v. Gage, 39
Mich. 484;
White v. Ledyard, 48 Mich. 264;
Hudson v.
Saginaw Circuit Judge, 114 Mich. 116;
McDougal v. Hennepin
County, 4 Minn. 184;
Clarksdale Compress Co. v. Caldwell
County, 80 Miss. 343;
Ross v. Allen, 10 N.H. 96;
Burnham v. City of Fond du Lac., 15 Wis. 193.
Compare
Dunkley v. City of Marquette, 157 Mich. 339.
[
Footnote 7]
Compare Smith v. Gilbert, 71 Conn. 149;
Stowe v.
Phinney, 78 Me. 244;
Massachusetts National Bank v.
Bullock, 120 Mass. 88;
Rozelle v. Rhodes, 116 Pa.
129.
[
Footnote 8]
Stevenot v. Eastern Ry. Co., 61 Minn. 104;
Bates v.
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co., 60 Wis. 296.
Compare Adams v. Scott, 104 Mass. 164;
Rosenbush v.
Bernheimer, 211 Mass. 146;
Clifford v. Brockton Transp.
Co., 214 Mass. 466;
Landa v. Holck & Co., 129 Mo.
663.