1. Judgment of state court
held reviewable by writ of
error. P.
271 U. S.
247.
2. Since the enactment of the Transportation Act, 1920, the
jurisdiction to determine whether a junction may be established
between the main lines of two railroads, both engaged in interstate
as well as local commerce, is exclusively in the Interstate
Commerce Commission. P.
271 U. S.
249.
136 Miss. 726 reversed.
Error and certiorari to a judgment of the Supreme Court of
Mississippi, which affirmed a dismissal of the bill in a suit by
the Alabama & Vicksburg Railway Company to enjoin proceedings
in condemnation, instituted by the Jackson & Eastern Railway
Company to accomplish a connection between its main line and that
of the other company.
See also 129 Miss. 437; 131
id. 857, 874.
Page 271 U. S. 245
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Alabama & Vicksburg Railway and the Jackson &
Eastern Railway are both Mississippi corporations. Each owns and
operates in intrastate and interstate commerce a railroad within
that state. The latter instituted a proceeding under a state law to
secure by eminent domain a connection with the former's line at a
point east of the City of Jackson called Curran's Crossing. Prior
to instituting the eminent domain proceeding, the Jackson &
Eastern had secured from the Interstate Commerce Commission a
certificate under paragraphs 18-20 of § 1, Interstate Commerce Act,
authorizing the extension of its road from Sebastopol, Mississippi,
to Jackson. The order made no reference to Curran's Crossing, or to
any connection with the Alabama & Vicksburg. Public Convenience
Certificate of Jackson & Eastern Ry. Co., 70 I.C.C. 110, 495.
Thereafter, but also before instituting the eminent domain
proceeding and before building the extension authorized, the
Jackson & Eastern applied to the Commission for an order
authorizing it to connect with the main line of the Alabama &
Vicksburg at Curran's Crossing, and requiring the latter to grant a
joint use of its main line from that point into the City of
Jackson. This application, which had apparently been filed under
paragraph 9 of § 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act, was withdrawn
without a hearing.
Compare United States v. Baltimore & O.
S.W. R. Co., 226 U. S. 14. No
further application was made to the Commission.
Page 271 U. S. 246
By the constitution and statutes of Mississippi, a railroad
corporation organized under the laws of that state may
"cross, intersect, join, or unite its railroad with any other
railroad heretofore or hereafter constructed at any points on their
routes, and upon the ground of such other railroad company, with
the necessary and proper turn-outs, sidings, switches, and other
conveniences, and [may] exercise the right of eminent domain for
that purpose."
Constitution of 1890, §§ 184, 190; Hemingway's Code, §§ 6722,
6725, 6728. This right of eminent domain is exercised by
proceedings in a special court which has jurisdiction to determine
only the amount of the damages payable. The special court cannot
pass upon the right of a plaintiff to institute the proceeding or
upon any defense or other objection. Nor can any such question be
raised upon an appeal from the judgment of the special court. The
sole remedy of the objecting railroad is a separate proceeding to
be brought in a court of equity. Hemingway's Code, § 1492;
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 234 U. S. 369,
234 U. S.
378-380;
Vinegar Bend Lumber Co. v. Oak Grove &
G. R. Co., 89 Miss. 84;
Alabama & Vicksburg R. Co. v.
Jackson & Eastern Ry. Co., 131 Miss. 857, 874.
This suit was brought by the Alabama & Vicksburg in the
appropriate chancery court of the state to enjoin the Jackson &
Eastern from pursuing the eminent domain proceeding. The bill
alleged willingness to permit a junction, but asserted that the
point selected by the defendant was an improper one, would imperil
the safety of life and property, would burden interstate commerce,
and would be prejudicial to the plaintiff's interests. It asserted,
among other grounds of relief, the claim that the Interstate
Commerce Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the
establishment of junctions or physical connections between
railroads engaged in interstate commerce, that the Commission had
not authorized the connection
Page 271 U. S. 247
here in question, and that the institution of eminent domain
proceedings was therefore in violation of the federal law. A
restraining order issued upon the filing of the bill. Later, the
chancellor sustained a demurrer to the bill for want of equity,
dissolved the injunction, and denied supersedeas pending an appeal
to the supreme court of the state. That court allowed a
supersedeas, 129 Miss. 437, overruled the demurrer, reversed the
decree, and remanded the case for further proceedings. It did this
on the ground that, while under the state law the connection might
ordinarily be made at such point on the other's line as the
railroad seeking the junction might desire, the place selected must
be a proper one, and the bill alleged that the particular junction
sought was not. 131 Miss. 857, 874. Upon that issue, the chancellor
then heard the case on the evidence, found that the proposed
connection was a proper one, dissolved the injunction, and
dismissed the bill. That decree was affirmed upon a second appeal
to the supreme court. 136 Miss. 726. In affirming the decree, the
highest court of the state overruled the contention of the Alabama
& Vicksburg that the Interstate Commerce Commission had
exclusive jurisdiction over the establishment of junctions between
railroads engaged in interstate commerce, held that Congress had
not taken full control of the subject, and concluded that the
authority granted by the state law to secure junctions did not
interfere with interstate commerce to an appreciable degree, if at
all. The case is here on writ of error with supersedeas granted by
the chief justice of the state. A petition for writ of certiorari
was also filed, consideration of which was postponed. As the case
is properly here on writ of error, the petition is dismissed.
In
Wisconsin, Minnesota & Pacific R. Co. v.
Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287,
decided in 1900, this Court sustained an
Page 271 U. S. 248
order of a state commission which, at the instance of shippers,
had directed two railroads of the state engaged in interstate and
intrastate commerce to provide a physical connection between their
lines. The state commission had found that the connection was
required for intrastate commerce, and this Court concluded that the
connection ordered could not prejudice interstate commerce. Since
then, the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission has been
greatly enlarged, and the power of the states over interstate
carriers correspondingly restricted. Prominent among the enlarged
powers of the federal Commission is the control conferred over
construction and equipment of railroads, over their use by other
carriers and, generally, over the relation of carriers to one
another. While none of the amendments in specific terms confer upon
the Commission exclusive power over physical connections between
railroads engaged in interstate commerce, it is clear that the
comprehensive powers conferred extend to junctions between main
lines like those here in question.
The Act to Regulate Commerce of February 4, 1887, c. 104, 24
Stat. 379, provided, by what is now paragraph 3 of § 3, that
carriers shall "afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities
for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines," but
it did not confer upon the Commission authority to permit and to
require the construction of the physical connection needed to
effectuate such interchange. Paragraph 9 of § 1, introduced by Act
of June 18, 1910, c. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 547, required a
carrier engaged in interstate commerce to construct a switch
connection "upon application of any lateral, branch line," and
empowered the Commission to enforce the duty; but that provision
was held applicable only to a line already constituting a lateral
branch road.
United States v. Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern
R. Co., 226 U. S. 14. The
Act of August 24, 1912, c. 390, § 11, 37
Page 271 U. S. 249
Stat. 560, 568, amending § 6 of the Act to Regulate Commerce,
empowered the Commission to require railroads to establish physical
connection between their lines and the docks of water carriers, but
the provision did not extend to connections between two rail lines.
It was not until Transportation Act 1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456,
conferred upon the Commission additional authority that it acquired
full power over connections between interstate carriers. By
paragraphs 18-20 added to § 1, it vested in the Commission power to
authorize constructions or extensions of lines, although the
railroad is located wholly within one state, and by paragraph 21
authorized the Commission to require the carrier "to extend its
line or lines." By paragraph 4 of § 3, it empowered the Commission
to require one such carrier to permit another to use its terminal
facilities, "including main line track or tracks for a reasonable
distance outside of such terminal."
The only limitation set by Transportation Act of 1920 upon the
broad powers conferred upon the Commission over the construction,
extension, and abandonment of the lines of carriers in interstate
commerce is that introduced as paragraph 22 of § 1, which excludes
from its jurisdiction
"spur, industrial, team, switching or side tracks, located . . .
wholly within one state, or of street, suburban, or interurban
electric railways, which are not operated as a part or parts of a
general steam railroad system of transportation."
It is clear that the connection here in question is not a track
of this character.
Compare Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Gulf,
Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 270 U.
S. 266. The proposed junction is between the main lines
of the two railroads. The point of junction is on the main line of
the Alabama & Vicksburg, near its entrance into the City of
Jackson. In support of the objection that a junction there would be
dangerous, it was shown that the connection would be located
between two trestles,
Page 271 U. S. 250
near a highway crossing, on a curve, on a fill, and within the
flood area of Pearl River. The establishment of the junction at
that point would, if the objection is well founded, obviously
imperil interstate commerce. The fact that it may do so shows that
the jurisdiction of the Commission over such connections must be
exclusive if the duty imposed upon it to develop and control an
adequate system of interstate rail transportation is to be
effectively performed. Moreover, the establishment of junctions
between the main lines of independent carriers is commonly
connected with the establishment of through routes and the
interchange of car services, and is often but a step toward the
joint use of tracks. Over all of these matters the Commission has
exclusive jurisdiction.
It is true that, in this case, the state court found that the
place selected for the junction was a proper one. But the power to
make the determination whether state action will obstruct
interstate commerce inheres in the United States as an incident of
its power to regulate such commerce.
Compare Colorado v. United
States, ante, p.
271 U. S. 153. In
matters relating to the construction, equipment, adaptation and use
of interstate railroad lines, with the exceptions specifically set
forth in paragraph 22, Congress has vested in the Commission the
authority to find the facts and thereon to exercise the necessary
judgment. The Commission's power under paragraph 3 of § 3 to
require the establishment of connections between the main lines of
carriers was asserted by it in Pittsburg & West Virginia Ry.
Co. v. Lake Erie, Alliance & Wheeling R. Co., 81 I.C.C. 333, a
case decided after the withdrawal by the Jackson & Eastern of
its application to the Commission for leave to make the junction at
Curran's Crossing, and in Breckenridge Chamber of Commerce v.
Wichita Falls, Ranger & Fort Worth R. Co., 109 I.C.C. 81. That
its jurisdiction is exclusive was held in
People v. Public
Service Commission, 233 N.Y. 113,
Page 271 U. S. 251
119, 121.
Compare Lake Erie, Alliance & Wheeling R. Co.
v. Public Utilities Commission, 109 Ohio St. 103.
Writ of certiorari denied.
Decree reversed.