A wharfboat, in a river, used as an office, warehouse, and
wharf, but not used or capable of use as a means of transportation,
held not a "vessel " within the law allowing limitation of
liability. Rev.Stats. § 4283; Act of June 19, 1886, 24 Stat. 79. P.
271 U. S.
22.
Affirmed.
Appeal from a decree of the district court dismissing, for want
of jurisdiction, a petition in admiralty for limitation of
liability.
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant owned a wharfboat in the Ohio River at Evansville,
Indiana. May 14, 1922, it sank, causing damage
Page 271 U. S. 20
to appellee's merchandise thereon. Appellant filed a petition in
admiralty for limitation of liability. Appellees answered, and
after a trial at which much evidence as to the character of the
structure was given, the district court found that it was not a
vessel within the meaning of the statutes sought to be invoked,
held that the court was without jurisdiction, and dismissed the
cause. The appeal is under § 238, Judicial Code, and the question
of jurisdiction alone is certified.
Section 4283, Revised Statutes, provides:
"The liability of the owner of any vessel, for any embezzlement,
loss, or destruction, by any person, of any property, goods, or
merchandise, shipped or put on board of such vessel, or for any
loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or
thing, lost [loss], damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or
incurred, without the privity, or knowledge of such owner or owners
shall in no case exceed the amount or value of the interest of such
owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending."
Section 3, Revised Statutes, provides:
"The word 'vessel' includes every description of watercraft or
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a
means of transportation on water."
The Act of June 19, 1886, c. 421, § 4, 24 Stat. 79, 80, makes
the provisions relating to limitation of liability apply to "all
vessels used on lakes or rivers or in inland navigation, including
canal boats, barges, and lighters."
Appellant was engaged in operating steamboats between Evansville
and places on the Green River in Kentucky. The wharfboat in
question was built in 1884, and was used at Hopefield, Arkansas, on
the Mississippi River. In 1901, it was towed to Madison, Indiana,
where it was overhauled, and then to Louisville, Kentucky, where it
was used. In 1910, after more repairs at Madison, it was taken to
Evansville. Appellant acquired it in 1915. Each winter, it was
towed to Green River harbor to protect it
Page 271 U. S. 21
from ice. While in use at Evansville, it was secured to the
shore by four or five cables, and remained at the same point,
except when moved to conform to the stage of the river. The lower
part of the structure was rectangular, 243 feet long, 48 feet wide,
and 6 feet deep. It was built of wood, and, to strengthen it and
keep the water out, was lined around the sides and ends, extending
18 or 20 inches from the bottom, with concrete eight inches thick.
It had no machinery or power for propulsion, and was not subject to
government inspection, as are vessels operated on navigable waters.
There was plumbing in the structure, and it was connected with the
city water system; it obtained current for electric light from the
city plant, and had telephone connections. Appellant's office and
quarters for the men in charge were located in one end of the
structure. There were floats and an apron making a driveway between
the land and a door near each end. The wharfboat was used to
transfer freight between steamboats and land and from one steamboat
to another. Some shippers paid fixed monthly charges for storage of
their goods on the structure and for services in transferring them
to and from steamboats. Charges made for services performed by its
use were for storage and handling, and not for transportation.
The rule of limited liability of owners of vessels is an ancient
one. It has been administered in the courts of admiralty in Europe
from time immemorial, and by statute applied in England for nearly
two centuries.
See Providence & New York S.S. Co. v. Hill
Mfg. Co., 109 U. S. 578,
109 U. S. 593;
The Main v. Williams, 152 U. S. 122,
152 U. S. 127.
Our statutes establishing the rule were enacted to promote the
building of ships, to encourage the business of navigation, and in
that respect to put this country on the same footing with other
countries.
See Moore v. American Transportation
Co., 24 How. 1,
65 U. S. 39;
Norwich Co. v.
Wright, 13 Wall. 104,
80 U. S. 121.
The rule should be
Page 271 U. S. 22
applied having regard to the purposes it is intended to subserve
and the reasons on which it rests.
The only question presented is whether appellant's wharfboat was
a "vessel" at the time it sank. It was an aid to river traffic, but
it was not used to carry freight from one place to another. It was
not practically capable of being used as a means of transportation.
It served at Evansville as an office, warehouse, and wharf, and was
not taken from place to place. The connections with the water,
electric light, and telephone systems of the city evidence a
permanent location. It performed no function that might not have
been performed as well by an appropriate structure on the land and
by a floating stage or platform permanently attached to the land.
It did not encounter perils of navigation to which craft used for
transportation are exposed. There appears to be no reason for the
application of the rule of limited liability. Many cases, involving
a determination of what constitutes a vessel within the purview of
the statute have been before the courts, but no decision has been
cited, and we have found none, that supports the contention that
this wharfboat was a vessel.
Cf. Cope v. Valette Dry Dock
Co.,119 U.S.
625,
119 U. S. 629;
The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U. S. 17,
191 U. S. 30;
Ruddiman v. A Scow Platform, 38 F. 158;
Patton-Tully
Transportation Co. v. Turner, 269 F. 334, 337.
Decree affirmed.