1. The "controversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings"
referred to in § 24a of the Bankruptcy Act include those matters
arising in the course of a bankruptcy proceeding which are not mere
steps in the ordinary administration of the bankrupt estate, but
present, by intervention or otherwise, distinct and separable
issues between the trustee and adverse claimants concerning the
right and title to the bankrupt's estate. P.
271 U. S.
180.
2. In such "controversies," the decrees of the court of
bankruptcy may be reviewed by appeals which bring up the whole
matter and open both the facts and the law for consideration. P.
271 U. S.
181.
3. The "proceedings" in bankruptcy referred to in § 24b are
those matters of an administrative character, including questions
between the bankrupt and his creditors, which are presented in the
ordinary course of the administration of the bankrupt's estate. In
such administrative matters -- as to which the courts of bankruptcy
proceed in a summary way in the final settlement, and distribution
of the estate -- their orders and decrees may be reviewed by
petitions for revision which bring up questions of law only. P.
271 U. S.
181.
4. The essential distinction between the different methods
provided for reviewing the orders and decrees of the courts of
bankruptcy is that "controversies" in bankruptcy proceedings,
arising between the trustee representing the bankrupt and his
creditors, on the one side, and adverse claimants, on the other,
affecting the extent of the estate to be distributed, may be
reviewed both as to fact and law, while "proceedings" in bankruptcy
affecting merely the administration and distribution of the estate
may be reviewed in matter of law only, except as to the three
classes of such "proceedings" enumerated in § 25a, as to which a
short right of appeal is given both as to fact and law. P.
271 U. S.
181.
5. Although a petition for revision cannot be treated as an
appeal for the purpose of enlarging the scope of the review so as
to extend to questions of fact, where a matter which is only
reviewable in law is taken up by an appeal, the circuit court of
appeals, if the question of law is sufficiently presented on the
record, may treat
Page 271 U. S. 177
the appeal as a petition for revision, and dispose of it
accordingly. P.
271 U. S.
182.
6. A petition filed by the trustee in the bankruptcy proceeding
to determine an adverse claim to an interest in the bankrupt's real
estate, based on the statutory rights of his wife, is a
"controversy" which may be reviewed by appeal under § 24a of the
Bankruptcy Act. P.
271 U. S.
182.
7. Section 4 of the Jurisdictional Act of 1916, providing that
no appellate court "shall dismiss a writ of error solely because an
appeal should have been taken, or dismiss an appeal solely because
a writ of error should have been sued out," cannot be extended by
implication to the special provisions of the Bankruptcy Act as to
appeals and petitions for revision. P.
271 U. S.
182.
8. In a "controversy" in a bankruptcy proceeding, when the facts
are undisputed or no longer in question, it is not necessary to
resort to an appeal under § 24a, but the controlling questions of
law may also be reviewed by a petition for revision under § 24b,
whether they relate merely to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court or to the merits of the controversy. P.
271 U. S.
182.
9. Such a review by petition for revision, is a concurrent
remedy merely, and cannot, irrespective of any other limitation, be
deemed an additional remedy which may be resorted to after the time
for an appeal has expired. P.
271 U. S.
187.
10. The right of inheritance, free from demands of creditors,
granted by Indiana Rev.Stats. (1881), §§ 2483, 2491, to a widow
upon the death of her husband, remains contingent during his life,
and cannot be held to mature at his bankruptcy upon the theory that
the adjudication brings about his "civil death." P.
271 U. S.
187.
11. The adjudication of a husband as a bankrupt, followed by
appointment of a trustee in bankruptcy, operates as a "judicial
sale" of his real estate within the meaning of the Indiana Judicial
Sales Act (Rev.Stats. 1887, §§ 2508, 2509) in virtue of which the
wife's inchoate interest in his real estate (not exceeding §20,000)
thereupon becomes absolute and free from the demands of creditors
as, and to the extent, provided by §§ 2483-2491 in case of his
death. P.
271 U. S.
188.
1 F.2d 149 reversed.
Certiorari to a judgment of the circuit court of appeals which
reversed, on a petition to revise, an order of the district court
sustaining the claim of Taylor, a testamentary trustee of a
bankrupt's deceased wife, to an
Page 271 U. S. 178
interest in her husband's real estate. The controversy was
initiated by a petition filed in the bankruptcy proceedings by the
trustee in bankruptcy, Voss.
MR. JUSTICE SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
In December, 1921, Wilbur Erskine, a married man, residing and
owning real estate in Indiana, was adjudged a bankrupt on his
voluntary petition in the federal district court for the state. In
February, 1922, the respondent Voss was appointed the trustee in
bankruptcy. In March, before any sale of the real estate, the
bankrupt's wife, Mary E. Erskine, died testate, leaving by her will
her entire property to the petitioner Taylor, as testamentary
trustee. In May, the trustee in bankruptcy, filed a petition in the
bankruptcy proceeding, alleging that the testamentary trustee
claimed an interest in the real estate of the bankrupt and praying
that he be required to set up this claim, and that such interest be
fixed by the court and the right to sell the real estate free from
such claim be declared. The testamentary trustee answered, alleging
that, upon the adjudication in bankruptcy, Mrs. Erskine had become
absolutely vested under the state laws and the Bankruptcy Act with
a wife's interest in the real estate of her husband, to which she
was entitled at the time of her death, and also praying that the
court fix this interest. Pending a hearing as to this claim, the
real estate was sold by the trustee in bankruptcy, by consent, for
$36,870; under an agreement that not less than one-fifth of the
proceeds should be held by
Page 271 U. S. 179
him to protect whatever rights the testamentary trustee might
have in the real estate, and that, if the final decision should be
in favor of the latter, the trustee in bankruptcy should pay over
to him the amount found to be due on account of his interest in the
real estate. Thereafter, the question as to the disposition of the
proceeds of sale was submitted to the referee under the foregoing
agreement and a stipulation as to the facts, as they have been set
out. Upon this hearing, the referee held that the testamentary
trustee was entitled to receive one-fifth of the proceeds of sale,
amounting to $7,374, and directed that this sum be paid to him by
the trustee in bankruptcy. This order was confirmed by the district
judge. Within two months thereafter, the trustee in bankruptcy
filed a petition in the circuit court of appeals for a revision of
this order in matter of law, under § 24b of the Bankruptcy Act.
[
Footnote 1] The testamentary
trustee moved to dismiss this petition on the ground that it
presented a controversy arising in the bankruptcy proceeding which
could be reviewed only by an appeal under § 24a of the Act. The
court of appeals denied this motion on the ground that, while the
petition presented such a controversy, the matter might
nevertheless be considered as though it had been brought up by
appeal in accordance with the provisions of § 4 of the
Jurisdictional Act of 1916. [
Footnote 2] And thus considering the matter, the court
held that, upon the death of Mrs. Erskine before the real estate
had been sold, all her right therein had been extinguished, and no
interest had passed to the testamentary trustee, and accordingly
reversed the order of the district court.
Voss v. Taylor,
1 F.2d 149. This writ of certiorari was then granted. 267 U.S.
588.
The contentions of the testamentary trustee are: (1) that the
circuit court of appeals had no jurisdiction to
Page 271 U. S. 180
review the order of the district court under the petition for
revision, and (2) that, even if such jurisdiction existed, the
decree reversing that order was erroneous as a matter of law.
1. The first of these contentions requires a consideration of
the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act dealing with the review of
proceedings in courts of bankruptcy in the exercise of the
appellate and supervisory jurisdiction of the circuit courts of
appeals.
By § 24a of the Act, the circuit courts of appeals are "invested
with appellate jurisdiction of controversies arising in bankruptcy
proceedings from the courts of bankruptcy." By § 24b, they are
given jurisdiction
"to superintend and revise in matter of law the proceedings of
the several inferior courts of bankruptcy . . . on due notice and
petition by any party aggrieved."
And by § 25a, it is provided that appeals "in bankruptcy
proceedings" may be taken to them, within ten days, from judgments
as to adjudications of bankruptcy, discharges, and claims of five
hundred dollars or over.
These provisions, which are to be read in the light of the
provision in § 23a giving the district courts, as the successors of
the circuit courts, general jurisdiction in plenary actions of
"controversies at law and in equity, as distinguished from
proceedings in bankruptcy, between trustees as such and adverse
claimants concerning the property acquired or claimed by the
trustees,"
have given rise to much conflict of opinion in the various
circuit courts of appeals in respect to the distinction between
"controversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings" and mere
"proceedings" in bankruptcy, and the procedure by which they may be
brought up for review.
It is now settled by the decisions of this Court that the
"controversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings" referred to in §
24a include those matters arising in the course of a bankruptcy
proceeding which are not mere
Page 271 U. S. 181
steps in the ordinary administration of the bankrupt estate, but
present, by intervention or otherwise, distinct and separable
issues between the trustee and adverse claimants concerning the
right and title to the bankrupt's estate.
Hewit v. Berlin
Machine Works, 194 U. S. 296,
194 U. S. 300;
Coder v. Arts, 213 U. S. 223,
213 U. S. 234;
Tefft & Co. v. Munsuri, 222 U.
S. 114,
222 U. S. 118;
Swift & Co. v. Hoover, 242 U.
S. 107,
242 U. S. 109.
In such "controversies," the decrees of the court of bankruptcy may
be reviewed by appeals which bring up the whole matter and open
both the facts and the law for consideration.
Duryea Power Co.
v. Sternbergh, 218 U. S. 299,
218 U. S. 302;
Houghton v. Burden, 228 U. S. 161,
228 U. S.
165.
On the other hand, the "proceedings" in bankruptcy referred to
in § 24b are those matters of an administrative character,
including questions between the bankrupt and his creditors, which
are presented in the ordinary course of the administration of the
bankrupt's estate.
Matter of Loving, 224 U.
S. 183,
224 U. S. 188.
In such administrative matters, as to which the courts of
bankruptcy proceed in a summary way in the final settlement and
distribution of the estate,
U.S. Fidelity Co. v.
Bray, 225 U. S. 205,
225 U. S. 218,
[
Footnote 3] their orders and
decrees may be reviewed by petitions for revision which bring up
questions of law only.
Duryea Power Co. v. Sternbergh,
supra, 218 U. S. 302.
It thus appears that the essential distinction between the
different methods provided for reviewing the orders and decrees of
the courts of bankruptcy is that "controversies" in bankruptcy
proceedings, arising between the trustee representing the bankrupt
and his creditors, on the one side, and adverse claimants, on the
other, affecting the extent of the estate to be distributed, may be
reviewed both as to fact and law, while "proceedings" in bankruptcy
affecting merely the administration and distribution of the estate
may be reviewed in matter of law only,
Page 271 U. S. 182
except as to the three classes of such "proceedings" enumerated
in § 25a, as to which a short right of appeal is given, both as to
fact and law. Furthermore, apart from the scope of the review
permitted by the Act, the distinction between an appeal and a
petition for revision in the mere matter of form is immaterial.
Thus, although a petition for revision cannot be treated as an
appeal for the purpose of enlarging the scope of the review so as
to extend to questions of fact,
Duryea Power Co. v. Sternbergh,
supra, 218 U. S. 302,
where a matter which is only reviewable in law is taken up by an
appeal, the circuit court of appeals, if the question of law is
sufficiently presented on the record, may treat the appeal as a
petition for revision, and dispose of it accordingly.
Bryan v.
Bernheimer, 181 U. S. 188,
181 U. S. 193;
Holden v. Stratton, 191 U. S. 115,
191 U. S.
118-119;
Duryea Power Co. v. Sternbergh, supra,
218 U. S.
301.
Coming, then, to the procedural question involved in the present
case, it is clear, in the first place, that, as was held by the
circuit court of appeals, the matter presented is a "controversy"
between the trustee in bankruptcy and the testamentary trustee, as
an adverse claimant, in respect to the title to the bankrupt's
estate which might have been reviewed by an appeal under § 24a of
the Bankruptcy Act.
Hewit v. Berlin Machine Works, supra,
194 U. S. 300;
Knapp v. Milwaukee Trust Co., 216 U.
S. 545,
216 U. S. 553;
Houghton v. Burden, supra, 228 U. S. 165;
Greey v. Dockendorff, 231 U. S. 513,
231 U. S. 514;
Globe Bank v. Martin, 236 U. S. 289,
236 U. S. 296;
Bailey v. Baker Machinery Co., 239 U.
S. 268,
239 U. S.
270,;
Moody v. Century Bank, 239 U.
S. 374,
239 U. S. 377;
Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U. S. 353,
268 U. S. 358.
And if, under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, an appeal was
the only method by which this "controversy" could be reviewed, we
think it is clear that there was no warrant for treating the
petition for revision as bringing the matter up on appeal, under
the provision of § 4 of the Jurisdictional Act of
Page 271 U. S. 183
1916, that no appellate court
"shall dismiss a writ of error solely because an appeal should
have been taken, or dismiss an appeal solely because a writ of
error should have been sued out."
This remedial provision, as plainly appears from the language
used and the entire context, was intended to apply only to the
general distinction between appeals and writs of error, obtaining
from the foundation of our judicial system, and cannot be extended
by implication to the special provisions of the Bankruptcy Act as
to appeals and petitions for revision, to which no reference
whatever was made.
On the question whether the method of reviewing a "controversy"
in bankruptcy provided by § 24a of the Bankruptcy Act is
necessarily exclusive of that provided by § 24b -- that is, whether
a controversy which may be reviewed both as to fact and law by an
appeal under § 24a may also, when the facts are undisputed, be
reviewed in matter of law by a petition for revision under § 24b --
there has been an irreconcilable conflict of decisions in the
various circuit courts of appeals. This has led to much confusion,
and to the determination of many cases upon the procedural question
merely, without reference to the merits.
See cases
collected in 8 Remington on Bankruptcy (3d ed.) §§ 3704, 3706,
3734. [
Footnote 4]
Page 271 U. S. 184
This precise question, in the broad form in which it is now
presented, has not been specifically decided by this Court. It is
true that in
Matter of Loving, supra, 224 U. S. 188,
there was general language, incidentally used, which, if taken
broadly, indicates that "controversies" which are appealable under
§ 24a cannot be reviewed by petitions for revision under § 24b.
But, according to a familiar rule, this language should be regarded
as limited by the circumstances in which it was used.
Cohens v.
Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264,
19 U. S. 399;
Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., supra, 239 U. S. 272.
The case did not present a "controversy" appealable under § 24a,
but, as was explicitly stated, a "proceeding" in bankruptcy
relating to a proof of claim filed by a creditor, with the
incidental assertion of a statutory lien, as to which a special
appeal was granted by § 25a, to be taken within ten days. The
trustee contested both the amount of the claim and the existence of
the lien. The bankruptcy court allowed the claim for its full
amount as a lien against the bankrupt estate. Thereupon, more than
ten days thereafter, the trustee filed a petition for a revision of
this order, abandoning his contest as to the amount of the claim
and insisting merely that there was error in matter of law in
allowing the lien as security. On a certificate from the circuit
court of appeals presenting the single question whether, under
these circumstances, the order of the bankruptcy court could be
reviewed upon a petition for revision, it was held that § 24b "was
not intended to give an additional remedy to those whose rights
could be protected by an appeal under § 25 of the act." And, since
no question as to the effect of § 24a was presented by the
certificate
Page 271 U. S. 185
or involved in the decision, it is clear that its effect must be
limited, as a controlling authority, to the holding that, when the
ten days had expired within which the special appeal might have
been taken under § 25a bringing up both the facts and the law, the
trustee could not thereafter, by abandoning his contention of fact,
obtain by a petition for revision a review of the question of law
which he might have obtained by an appeal taken within the
prescribed time, and thereby extend, as to the question of law, the
time within which he was entitled to obtain a review of the
order.
On the other hand, in
Hewit v. Berlin Machine Works,
supra, 194 U. S. 299,
presenting a "controversy" in a bankruptcy proceeding in which the
facts were not disputed that had been reviewed by an appeal under §
24a, it was distinctly recognized that a review might also have
been had in matter of law by a petition for revision under § 24b.
And it is well settled by other decisions of this Court that a
"controversy" in bankruptcy proceedings may be reviewed by a
petition for revision as to some matters of law at least. Thus,
where a trustee has instituted a summary proceeding in a bankruptcy
court for the recovery of property in the possession of a third
person asserting a claim adverse to the bankrupt estate, a petition
for revision will lie to bring up for review the question of law
whether the court of bankruptcy has jurisdiction to adjudicate the
merits of such controversy in a summary proceeding.
Louisville
Trust Co. v. Comingor, 184 U. S. 18,
184 U. S. 25;
Schweer v. Brown, 195 U. S. 171,
195 U. S. 172;
Galbraith v. Vallely, 256 U. S. 46,
256 U. S. 48;
Taubel Co. v. Fox, 264 U. S. 426,
264 U. S. 429.
An analogous rule was also applied in
Weidhorn v. Levy,
253 U. S. 268,
253 U. S. 270.
There, the trustee had filed in the bankruptcy suit a bill in
equity against an adverse claimant, thereby instituting a
"controversy" in the bankruptcy proceeding. The referee, over an
objection to his jurisdiction, had entertained the bill and
entered
Page 271 U. S. 186
a final decree in favor of the trustee. The district judge,
considering the jurisdictional question alone, dismissed the bill
upon the ground that the referee had exceeded his powers. This
question was taken to the circuit court of appeals by a petition
for revision, and while this Court said that, if the district court
had sustained the jurisdiction and passed upon the merits, the
decree could only have been reviewed by an appeal, evidently
referring to a review both of fact and law, it was held that,
"since the decision turned upon a mere question of law as to
whether the referee had authority to hear and determine the
controversy, in effect a question of procedure, it properly was
reviewable by petition to revise under § 24b."
And subsequently it was tacitly assumed by this Court, in two
decisions, without question, that, where trustees had instituted
summary proceedings in the bankruptcy courts involving
controversies with third persons asserting adverse claims to the
property of the bankrupts, the circuit courts of appeals had
jurisdiction under petitions for revision to determine all the
questions of law presented on the undisputed facts, both as to the
summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts and the merits of the
controversies, and this Court based its judgments upon a review of
the questions of law thus presented, both as to the existence of
summary jurisdiction and the merits.
Chicago Board of Trade v.
Johnson, 264 U. S. 1,
264 U. S. 6;
May v. Henderson, 268 U. S. 111,
268 U. S.
112.
In the light of these decisions, bearing in mind that the only
distinction in matter of substance between an appeal and a petition
for revision is that the one brings up for review questions both of
fact and law, and the other those of law merely, and finding
nothing in the letter of the Act which necessarily makes the
comprehensive remedy of an appeal as to both fact and law,
exclusive of the narrower remedy of a petition for revision in
matter
Page 271 U. S. 187
of law, we conclude that, in a "controversy" arising in a
bankruptcy proceeding, it is not essential to a review, when the
facts are undisputed or no longer questioned, that resort should be
had to an appeal under § 24a, but that, in such case, the
controlling questions of law may also be reviewed by a petition for
revision under § 24b, whether they relate merely to the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court or to the merits of the
controversy. Such a review, however, by petition for revision, is a
concurrent remedy merely, and, in conformity with the decision in
the
Loving case, cannot, irrespective of any other
limitation, be deemed an "additional remedy" which may be resorted
to after the time for an appeal has expired. This construction of
the Act is, we think consistent with its letter, accords with its
spirit and manifest purpose, and gives it a practical effect
removing in large measure the technical question of procedure which
has so greatly obstructed its efficient administration and served
in so many instances as a trap, not intended by Congress, to unwary
persons enmeshed in abstruse perplexities.
It results that, as the controversy in the present case was
presented in the bankruptcy proceeding by consent of the parties,
for determination as a matter of law on stipulated facts, it was
properly reviewable by the circuit court of appeals in such matter
of law under the petition for revision.
2. This brings us to the questions presented upon the merits --
whether Mrs. Erskine, at the time of her death, was vested with any
interest in the real estate of the bankrupt, and, if so, the extent
of such interest.
The testamentary trustee contends alternatively that, under the
statutes of Indiana, she became vested with a one-fifth interest in
all the real estate when her husband was adjudged a bankrupt, or,
if not, then with a lesser interest when the trustee in bankruptcy
was appointed.
Page 271 U. S. 188
The first contention is based upon the Indiana statute of
descent, which provides that:
"If a husband die . . . leaving a widow, one-third of his real
estate shall descend to her in fee-simple, free from all demands of
creditors:
Provided, however, That where the real estate
exceeds in value ten thousand dollars, the widow shall have
one-fourth only, and where the real estate exceeds twenty thousand
dollars, one-fifth only, as against creditors."
Ind.Rev.Stat. 1881, § 2483; also § 2491, to the same effect.
This contention lacks any substantial basis. The statute creates no
estate in the wife during her husband's lifetime, but merely an
inchoate and contingent interest, which depends upon her
survivorship and is extinguished if she dies before him.
Thompson v. McCorkle, 136 Ind. 484, 495, 497;
Fry v.
Hare, 166 Ind. 415, 420. The argument that the adjudication of
a husband as a bankrupt brings about his "civil death," so that his
wife is to be regarded as a "widow" within the meaning of the
statute, vested by virtue of the adjudication with the interest in
his real estate which would have descended to her if she had
survived him, is inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act, the language of the Indiana statute, and the decisions of the
courts of the state, and the contention was rightly denied by the
circuit court of appeals.
The alternative contention of the testamentary trustee is based
upon the Indiana Judicial Sales Act, which provides that:
"In all cases of judicial sales of real property in which any
married woman has an inchoate interest by virtue of her marriage, .
. . such interest shall become absolute and vest in the wife in the
same manner and to the same extent as such inchoate interest of a
married woman now becomes absolute upon the death of the husband,
whenever, by virtue of said sale, the legal title of the husband .
. . shall become absolute and vested in the purchaser thereof, but
this provision shall not
Page 271 U. S. 189
apply to so much of such real property as exceeds in value
twenty thousand dollars. Ind.Rev.Stat. 1881, §§ 2508, 2509.
[
Footnote 5]"
It is settled by repeated decisions of the Supreme Court of
Indiana that, under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, [
Footnote 6] a conveyance made by the judge or
register in bankruptcy of the real estate of an adjudged bankrupt
to his assignee in bankruptcy, was "a judicial sale" within the
meaning of the Indiana statute, and that the inchoate interest of
the bankrupt's wife in such real estate thereupon became absolute
and vested in her in the same manner as it would have done in case
of his death.
Roberts v. Shroyer, 68 Ind. 64, 67;
Ketchum v. Schicketanz, 73 Ind. 137, 143;
McCracken v.
Kuhn, 73 Ind. 149, 151;
Haggerty v. Byrne, 75 Ind.
499, 502;
Lawson v. De Bolt, 78 Ind. 563, 565;
Leary
v. Shaffer, 79 Ind. 567, 570;
Straughan v. White, 88
Ind. 242, 246;
Mattill v. Baas, 89 Ind. 220, 222;
Ragsdale v. Mitchell, 97 Ind. 458, 460;
Mayer v.
Haggerty, 138 Ind. 628, 634. This rule was also followed by
the federal court in Indiana in
Warford v. Noble, 2 F.
202, 203. In
Roberts v. Shroyer, supra, 67, it was said
that:
"The foundation of all subsequent proceedings in bankruptcy,
including the conveyance by the judge or register to the assignee,
is the previous adjudication of the debtor's bankruptcy. That
adjudication gives character to the conveyance made by the judge or
register to the assignee, and makes it a judicial sale. It is
judicial because it is founded on the judgment of the court . . .
That the conveyance thus made by the judge or register must be
regarded as a sale within the meaning of our statute we think it is
equally clear. "
Page 271 U. S. 190
In
Harlin v. American Trust Co., 67 Ind.App. 213, 220,
it was held by the Appellate Court of Indiana that these decisions
applied with full force to cases arising under the present
Bankruptcy Act, and that an adjudication in bankruptcy followed by
the appointment of a trustee, in whom, under § 70 of the Act, title
to the bankrupt's property was vested by operation of law, likewise
operated as a "judicial sale" within the meaning of the Indiana
statute, and made absolute the interest of the bankrupt's wife in
the real estate.
We see no substantial distinction, so far as the reasoning of
the Indiana courts is concerned, between the cases arising under
the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 and under the present Bankruptcy Act,
since, under both Acts, the transfer of title to the bankrupt's
property is based in its last analysis upon the adjudication in
bankruptcy -- that is, rests upon the judgment of the bankruptcy
court, carried into effect in the one case by a conveyance to the
assignee, and in the other by transfer to the trustee by operation
of the law.
In the absence of any conflicting provision in the Bankruptcy
Act, the question of a wife's interest in the bankrupt's property
is governed by the local law.
See Stellwagen v. Clum,
245 U. S. 605.
And, following the construction placed upon the Indiana statute by
the courts of that state, we conclude that the adjudication of
Erskine as a bankrupt, when followed by the appointment of the
trustee in bankruptcy, operated as a "judicial sale" of his real
estate within the meaning of the statute, and made absolute his
wife's interest therein.
Since, however, the application of this statute is expressly
limited to $20,000 in value of the husband's real estate, and, by
the statute of descent, the widow's share in real estate exceeding
$10,000 and not exceeding $20,000 in value is one-fourth, it
follows that the testamentary trustee was only entitled to receive,
out of the proceeds of
Page 271 U. S. 191
the sale, one-fourth of $20,000 -- that is, $5,000 and not the
one-fifth of the entire proceeds which was awarded to him by the
district court.
The decree of the circuit court of appeals is accordingly
reversed, and the cause remanded to the district court for further
proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
[
Footnote 1]
30 Stat. 544, c. 541.
[
Footnote 2]
39 Stat. 726, c. 448.
[
Footnote 3]
Many of these administrative matters are enumerated at p.
225 U. S.
207.
[
Footnote 4]
It was said in
Re Holmes, 142 F. 391, 392, that the
question whether the appellate and revisory jurisdiction of the
courts of appeals are exclusive of each other
"has resulted in such contrariety of decision relative to the
proper method of review of specific orders and such confusion and
uncertainty in the practice that it has become necessary for
lawyers in many instances to take an appeal and file a petition for
revision in the same case in order to be sure to obtain a review of
the ruling challenged. . . . Moreover, . . . a large share of the
time and labor of the judges of the courts of appeals, and of the
lawyers who assist them, and no insignificant portion of the means
of the litigants, all of which are imperatively demanded for the
decision of the merits of the questions the parties seek to
present, or of still more important issues of law, are consumed in
the litigation, determination, and preparation of opinions
concerning the question whether an order or proceeding in
bankruptcy which is clearly reviewable must be reviewed by appeal
or by petition for revision."
[
Footnote 5]
The circuit court of appeals, misapprehending, it appears, the
position taken by the testamentary trustee and thinking that he did
not claim any title under the Judicial Sales Act, did not pass upon
this contention.
[
Footnote 6]
14 Stat. 517, c. 176.