1. The effect of a judgment as
res judicata between
adverse parties is not dependent on the arrangement of the parties
in the record or on which of them was the actor. P.
270 U. S.
615.
2. A judgment on the same cause of action may be availed of as a
bar in an action pending in another jurisdiction which began before
the one in which the judgment was recovered.
Id.
3. A judgment fixing the compensation recoverable on account of
the death of a railroad employee due to an accident in Iowa was
rendered by an Iowa court in proceedings under the Iowa
compensation act brought by the railroad, and was pleaded by the
railroad in an action brought against it for the same cause in
Minnesota under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
Held
that both courts had jurisdiction to decide whether the deceased
was engaged in intrastate or interstate commerce, and that the Iowa
judgment, being the earlier one rendered, was
res judicata
in the other action, although the other was brought first. P.
270 U. S.
616.
Page 270 U. S. 612
4. Whenever an action may be properly maintained or defended by
a trustee in his representative capacity without joining the
beneficiary, the latter is bound by the judgment. P.
270 U. S.
620.
5. The question of identity of parties in two action is of
substance; parties nominally the same may be in legal effect
different, and parties nominally different may be in legal effect
the same.
Id.
6. Identity of parties exist between two proceedings to fix
compensation or damages against a railroad for the accidental death
of an employee, in one of which the state compensation law was
invoked against the widow upon the ground that the deceased's
employment was intrastate, while in the other the administrator
sued under the Federal Employers' Liability Act upon the ground
that it was interstate, the widow being the sole beneficiary in
both cases.
Troxell v. Delaware, etc. R. Co., 227 U.
S. 434, distinguished. P.
270 U. S.
617.
7. A decision fixing compensation, under the Iowa statute, made
by the Deputy Industrial Commissioner, acting by stipulation in
lieu of a board of arbitration, but pending on appeal to the
Commissioner, is not final, and could not be invoked a an estoppel
in another action. P.
270 U. S.
623.
163 Minn. 460 reversed.
Ibid., 457, affirmed.
Certiorari to judgments of the Supreme Court of Minnesota
affirming judgments for damages in actions brought under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act.
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases grow out of an accident on the line of the railway
company in Iowa, in which Hope was killed and Elder was injured,
under circumstances establishing the negligence of the railway
company and its consequent liability for damages. The defense in
each case was that the controlling issue had become
res
judicata. In the
Hope case, petitioner pleaded a
final judgment, entered,
Page 270 U. S. 613
under the Iowa Workmen's Compensation Law, by an Iowa state
court of record possessing general jurisdiction, and, in the
Elder case, a decision made by a deputy industrial
commissioner appointed under the same law. In both cases, the full
faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution was invoked. At
the trial in the Minnesota district court, the judgment in the one
case and the decision in the other, together with a copy of the
Iowa Workmen's Compensation Law, all properly authenticated, were
offered in evidence in support of the plea, but, upon objection,
excluded. Verdicts against the railway company were rendered, and
judgments entered accordingly. Appeals to the state supreme court
followed. The action of the Minnesota district court in refusing to
give effect to the Iowa judgment and decision was assigned as
error, and duly challenged as denying them the full faith and
credit enjoined by the federal Constitution; but the Minnesota
Supreme Court, upon full consideration, sustained the trial court
in that respect and affirmed both judgments. 163 Minn. 457,
460.
The Iowa Workmen's Compensation Law is elective in form. Hope
and Elder were residents of Iowa and employees of the railway
company, and it is not in dispute that they and the company had
elected to be bound by its provisions. The statute will be found in
Code of Iowa 1924, § 1361
et seq. It adopts a schedule of
compensation, creates the office of industrial commissioner, and
authorizes him to appoint a deputy, make rules and regulations not
inconsistent with the act, summon witnesses, administer oaths,
etc., and contains other provisions, not necessary to be stated,
for its administration and enforcement. If the parties fail to
reach an agreement in regard to the compensation, the commissioner,
at the request of either party, is directed to form a committee of
arbitration to consist of three persons, one of whom shall be the
commissioner, the others to be named
Page 270 U. S. 614
by the parties, respectively. The arbitrators are directed to
hear the case and decide the matter. Their decision, together with
a statement of the evidence, findings of fact, rulings of law, and
other pertinent matters, must then be filed with the commissioner.
At the end of five days after such filing, unless a review is
sought in the meantime, the decision becomes enforceable. Upon the
application of any party in interest, the commissioner may review
the decision, and, if any party be aggrieved by reason of his order
or decree thereon, such party may appeal to the state district
court having jurisdiction, in the manner and upon the grounds set
forth in the act. The judgment of that court is given the same
effect as though rendered in a suit duly heard and determined
therein, and an appeal from it lies to the supreme court of the
state.
No. 683
In the
Hope case, the action was brought in the
Minnesota district court on February 21, 1923, under the Federal
Employers' Liability Law, for the sole benefit of the surviving
widow. Thereafter, on March 2, 1923, the railway company instituted
a proceeding before the Iowa Industrial Commissioner under the Iowa
Workmen's Compensation Act. To this proceeding the decedent's widow
was made a party, as the sole beneficiary under the act. The
railway company asked for an arbitration. The widow answered,
asserting that the Compensation Act did not apply, because the
company and the deceased were both engaged in interstate commerce
at the time of the accident. Arbitrators were appointed, though the
widow did not join in their appointment. The arbitrators found that
deceased was engaged in intrastate commerce, and that the case was
governed by the Compensation Act, and awarded compensation to the
widow. Thereupon, the widow filed an application in review with the
commissioner. That officer reviewed the facts, specifically
found
Page 270 U. S. 615
that the deceased was engaged in intrastate commerce, and
approved the award. The widow then appealed to the District Court
of Lucas county, Iowa, and that court, on June 2, 1923,
specifically held that the deceased was engaged in intrastate
commerce, and entered final judgment affirming the award.
Thereafter, on March 4, 1924, the present action was heard in the
Minnesota district court, and verdict and judgment rendered for
respondent.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the plea of
res
judicata was bad for two reasons: (1) that
"the substantive right given the employee or his representative
by Congress under express constitutional grant, with the courts to
which he may go for its enforcement pointed out to him, is a
superior substantive right, and that, when he or his representative
has chosen the forum to which to submit his cause, he cannot,
against his objection and upon the initiative of his employer, be
required to submit it in a summary proceeding commenced later under
a Compensation Act;"
and (2) that there was a lack of identity of parties, since,
under the Iowa statute, the right of recovery is in the
beneficiary, while, under the federal act ,the right is in the
personal representative.
1. It is evident from the opinion that the court formulated the
first reason with some hesitation. It is elementary, of course,
that in any judicial proceeding, the arrangement of the parties on
the record, so long as they are adverse, or the fact that the party
against whom the estoppel is pleaded was an objecting party, is of
no consequence. A judgment is as binding upon an unwilling
defendant as it is upon a willing plaintiff. Nor is it material
that the action or proceeding, in which the judgment set up as an
estoppel is rendered was brought after the commencement of the
action or proceeding in which it is pleaded. Where both are
in
personam, the second action or proceeding
"does not tend to impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court
in which a prior action for
Page 270 U. S. 616
the same cause is pending. Each court is free to proceed in its
own way and in its own time, without reference to the proceedings
in the other court. Whenever a judgment is rendered in one of the
courts and pleaded in the other, the effect of that judgment is to
be determined by the application of the principles of
res
judicata by the court in which the action is still pending in
the orderly exercise of its jurisdiction, as it would determine any
other question of fact or law arising in the progress of the case.
The rule therefore has become generally established that, where the
action first brought is
in personam, and seeks only a
personal judgment, another action for the same cause in another
jurisdiction is not precluded."
Kline v. Burke Constr. Co.,260
U.S. 226,
260 U. S.
230.
It is urged in behalf of respondent that the federal act is
supreme, and supersedes all state laws in respect of employers'
liability in interstate commerce. That is quite true, but it does
not advance the solution of the point in dispute, since it is
equally true that, in respect of such liability arising in
intrastate commerce, the state law is supreme. Judicial power to
determine the question in a case brought under a state statute is
in no way inferior or subordinate to the same power in a case
brought under the federal act.
The Iowa proceeding was brought and determined upon the theory
that Hope was engaged in intrastate commerce; the Minnesota action
was brought and determined upon the opposite theory that he was
engaged in interstate commerce. The point at issue was the same.
That the Iowa court had jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding
and decide the question under the state statute cannot be doubted.
Under the federal act, the Minnesota court had equal authority, but
the Iowa judgment was first rendered. And, upon familiar
principles, irrespective of which action or proceeding was first
brought, it is the first final judgment rendered in one
Page 270 U. S. 617
of the courts which becomes conclusive in the other as
res
judicata. Boatmen's Bank v. Fritzlen, 135 F. 650,
667;
Merritt v. American Steel Barge Co., 79 F. 228, 234;
Williams v. Southern Pac. Co., 54 Cal. App. 571, 575.
And see Insurance Co. v. Harris, 97 U. S.
331,
97 U. S. 336,
where the rule as stated was recognized.
The Iowa court, under the Compensation Law, in the due exercise
of its jurisdiction, having adjudicated the character of the
commerce in which the deceased was engaged, that matter, whether
rightly decided or not, must be taken as conclusively established
so long as the judgment remains unmodified.
United States v.
Moser, 266 U. S. 236,
266 U. S. 241,
and cases cited. And, putting aside for the moment the question in
respect of identity of parties, the judgment upon the point was
nonetheless conclusive as
res judicata because it was
rendered under the state Compensation Law, while the action in
which it was pleaded arose under the federal Liability Law.
Dennison v. Payne, 293 F. 333, 341-342;
Williams v.
Southern P. Co., supra, pp. 574, 575.
2. In the Iowa proceeding, the widow of the deceased was a party
in her own right, and clearly was bound by the judgment. The action
in Minnesota, however, was brought by the administrator, and the
state supreme court, on the authority of
Dennison v. Payne,
supra, pp. 342-343, held that there was a want of identity of
parties. The decision in the
Dennison case rests entirely
on
Troxell v. Del., Lack. & West. R. Co., 227 U.
S. 434. The effect of the last-named case we pass for
later consideration.
Hope's death as the result of the negligence of the railroad
company gave rise to a single cause of action, to be enforced
directly by the widow under the state law or in the name of the
personal representative for the sole benefit of the widow under the
federal law, depending upon the character of the commerce in which
the deceased and the company were engaged at the time of the
accident.
Page 270 U. S. 618
In either case, the controlling question is precisely the same
-- namely, was the deceased engaged in intrastate or interstate
commerce?, and the right to be enforced is precisely the same --
namely, the right of the widow, as sole beneficiary, to be
compensated in damages for her loss. The fact that the party
impleaded, under the state law, was the widow, and, under the
federal law, was the personal representative, does not settle the
question of identity of parties. That must be determined as a
matter of substance, and not of mere form. The essential
consideration is that it is the right of the widow, and of no one
else, which was presented and adjudicated in both courts. If a
judgment in the Minnesota action in favor of the administrator had
been first rendered, it does not admit of doubt that it would have
been conclusive against the right of the widow to recover under the
Iowa compensation law. And it follows as a necessary corollary that
the Iowa judgment, being first, is equally conclusive against the
administrator in the Minnesota action; for if, in legal
contemplation, there is identity of parties in the one situation,
there must be like identity in the other.
The first proposition finds support in
Heckman v. United
States, 224 U. S. 413,
224 U. S.
445-446, where this Court held that the United States
had capacity to maintain a suit to set aside conveyances made by
Indian allottees of allotted lands, and that the allottees need not
be joined. The defendant in that case insisted that, unless the
allottees who had executed the conveyances were brought in as
parties, he was in danger of being subjected to a second suit by
the allottees. Answering that contention, this Court said:
"But if the United States, representing the owners of restricted
lands, is entitled to bring a suit of this character, it must
follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but
the Indians whom it represents in the litigation. This consequence
is involved in the representation.
Page 270 U. S. 619
Kerrison v. Stewart, 93 U. S. 155,
93 U. S.
160;
Shaw v. Railroad Co., 100 U. S.
605,
100 U. S. 611;
Beals v.
Ill., etc., R. Co., 133 U. S. 290,
133 U. S.
295. And it could not, consistently with any principle,
be tolerated that, after the United States, on behalf of its wards,
had invoked the jurisdiction of its courts to cancel conveyances in
violation of the restrictions prescribed by Congress, these wards
should themselves be permitted to relitigate the question."
And, conversely, in
United States v. Des Moines Valley R.
Co., 84 F. 40, where a suit in the name of the government was
brought to enforce the right of a private party, it was held that a
prior adverse adjudication by a state court in a suit against him
personally, determining the same issues, was available as an
estoppel against the government. The ground of the decision was
thus stated (pp. 44-45):
"Inasmuch, then, as the government sues for the sole benefit of
Fairchild, and for the professed purpose of reinvesting him with a
title which he has lost, we are of opinion that, whether the
present action be regarded as brought under the Act of March 3,
1887 or as brought in pursuance of its general right to sue, the
government should be held estopped by the previous adjudications
against the real party in interest in the state court. The subject
matter and the issue to be tried being the same in this proceeding
as in the former actions, the losing party on the former trials
ought not to be permitted to renew the controversy in the name of a
merely nominal plaintiff, and thereby avoid the effect of the
former adjudications.
Southern Minnesota Railway Extension Co.
v. St. Paul & S.C. R. Co., 12 U.S.App. 320, 325, 5 C.C.A.
249, and 55 F. 690. This doctrine was applied by this Court in the
case of
Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. U.S., 32 U.S.App. 311, 319,
15 C.C.A. 123, which was a suit brought by the United States under
the Act of March 3, 1887, wherein we
Page 270 U. S. 620
held that the United States was bound by an estoppel which might
have been invoked against the real party in interest if the suit
had been brought in his name, because it appeared that the United
States had no substantial interest in the controversy, and was
merely a nominal plaintiff."
Since the statutory authority of the administrator is to sue not
in his own right or for his own benefit, or that of the estate, but
in the right and for the sole benefit of the widow, the same
principles are applicable in accordance with the general rule
that
"whenever an action may properly be maintained or defended by a
trustee in his representative capacity without joining the
beneficiary, the latter is necessarily bound by the judgment."
1 Freeman on Judgments (5th ed.) § 500. Identity of parties is
not a mere matter of form, but of substance. Parties nominally the
same may be, in legal effect, different, Bigelow on Estoppel, 6th
ed., 145, and parties nominally different may be, in legal effect,
the same,
Calhoun's Lessee v. Dunning, 4 Dall. 120, 121
[omitted];
Follansbee v. Walker, 74 Pa. 306, 309;
In
re Estate of Parks, 166 Iowa 403.
In the
Follansbee case, a judgment against Joshua
Follansbee alone was held available as an estoppel in another
action brought by Walker & Follansbee for the use of Joshua.
Justice Sharswood, speaking for the court, said:
"The parties in that suit and in the action tried below were
substantially the same. In the former, Joshua Follansbee was the
legal, in the latter he is the equitable, plaintiff. The subject
matter of the two suits appeared by the record to be identical. The
presumption would be upon the issues, that the merits had been
passed upon in the former proceeding. Such being the case, if no
technical objection appeared to have been raised upon the record to
the right of Joshua Follansbee to maintain the action as legal
plaintiff, the judgment in that action would be a bar to a
subsequent action by him as equitable plaintiff.
Page 270 U. S. 621
If it appeared that only the equitable, not the legal, right was
in Joshua Follansbee, it would be presumed that the defendant had
waived that purely technical objection. It would be very
unreasonable, and contrary to the settled rules upon the subject,
to permit the plaintiff, having once been defeated on the merits,
to try the same question over again in a different form."
In the
Parks case, a judgment against the sole
beneficiary of an estate in her individual capacity was held
conclusive in a subsequent action by the same plaintiff against the
same defendant as administratrix, on the ground that, while
theoretically the former suit was not against the same defendant as
administratrix, nevertheless she was the sole beneficiary of the
estate, and represented only herself in each case.
In
Corcoran v. Chesapeake, etc., Canal Co.,
94 U. S. 741,
94 U. S. 745,
this Court, holding that a judgment against a trustee for
bondholders was conclusive in a suit involving the same subject
matter, brought by him in his individual character, said:
"It would be a new and very dangerous doctrine in the equity
practice to hold that the
cestui que trust is not bound by
the decree against his trustee in the very matter of the trust for
which he was appointed."
See also Kerrison, Assignee v. Stewart et al.,
93 U. S. 155,
93 U. S. 160;
Spokane & Inland R. Co. v. Whitley, 237 U.
S. 487,
237 U. S. 496;
Estate of Bell, 153 Cal. 331, 344;
Chandler v. Lumber,
Co., 131 Tenn. 47, 51.
Upon facts almost identical with those now under review, it was
held in
Williams v. Southern P. Co., supra, pp. 571, 576,
that there was a substantial identity of parties and that a
judgment for the widow under the California Compensation Act was
available as an estoppel in a prior action brought by her as
administratrix under the federal act.
It remains only to consider the bearing of the
Troxell
case,
supra, upon this point. Mrs. Troxell, the widow
of
Page 270 U. S. 622
a deceased employee, sued the railroad company under a state
statute, for the benefit of herself and minor children, to recover
for the death of her husband resulting from a negligent failure to
provide safe instrumentalities. There was a judgment against her.
She then brought suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
as administratrix, averring the negligence of a fellow servant, a
ground of recovery which was not available to her in the action
under the state statute. It was held, following the general rule,
that, the cause of action in the two cases being different and the
issue determined in the first not being involved in the second,
there was no estoppel. This was decisive of the case, but the Court
proceeded to say that, furthermore, there was not an identity of
parties in the two actions. Two former decisions of this Court are
cited,
Brown v. Fletcher's Estate, 210 U. S.
82, and
Ingersoll v. Coram, 211 U.
S. 335. Both cases, following the well established rule,
simply decide that there is no privity between administrators
appointed in different states, since the authority of an executor
or administrator appointed in one state does not extend to the
property or administration in another state.
Whether, in the light of the foregoing views, we now should hold
that where, as in the
Troxell case, the rights of
additional beneficiaries, not actual parties to the first judgment,
are involved, the requirement of identity of parties is
unsatisfied, is a question we do not feel called upon here to
reexamine, since we are clear that such requirement is fully met in
the situation now under consideration, where the sole beneficiary
was an actual party to the proceeding under the state law, and
present by her statutory representative in the action under the
federal law, and no other rights were involved.
No. 684
In the
Elder case, as in the case just considered, the
railway company began a proceeding before the industrial
Page 270 U. S. 623
commissioner. Elder answered, averring that he was engaged in
interstate commerce at the time of the injury. The parties
stipulated that the commissioner or his deputy should take the
place of the arbitration committee, and the deputy commissioner,
pursuant to the stipulation, heard the matter and filed his
decision. Thereupon Elder applied for a review by the commissioner,
under the statute, but no action had been taken upon that
application by the commissioner at the time the judgment was
rendered in the Minnesota court. Under the Iowa statute, therefore,
the decision had not ripened into an enforceable award, and we are
not called upon to determine what, in that event, would have been
its effect as an estoppel. The proceeding being still
in
fieri when the Minnesota case was tried and determined, the
doctrine of
res judicata is not applicable. There must be
a final judgment. Bigelow on Estoppel (6th ed.) p. 64;
Webb v.
Buckelew et al., 82 N.Y. 555, 559, 560.
It follows that the judgment in the
Hope case must be
reversed, and that in the
Elder case affirmed.
No. 683: Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
No. 684: Judgment affirmed.