Relator, having been indicted in the state court separately for
each of two closely connected murders, was given a single trial on
both indictments, in which he was deprived of the full number of
challenges he would have had if tried separately on each.
Conviction on both indictment was sustained by the state supreme
court. He was discharged by habeas corpus in the federal district
court.
Held:
1. The state trial court had jurisdiction even if the joinder
was contrary to state law. P.
270 U. S.
425.
2. The decision of the state supreme court on state law, with
respect to the trial and the challenges, was not rexaminable.
Id.
3. The joint trial of the two charges, and limitations of the
challenges, was within the constitutional power of the state.
Id.
4. The interference by habeas corpus was unwarranted. P.
270 U. S. 426.
2 F.2d 735 reversed.
Appeal from an order of the district court, in habeas corpus,
discharging the relator Valotta from the custody of the appellant,
by whom he was held for execution of a death sentence pursuant to a
judgment of a state court.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from an order on a writ of habeas corpus
discharging the relator, Valotta, from the custody
Page 270 U. S. 425
of the appellant, by whom he was held under a sentence of death.
Valotta shot a man in a street brawl -- we will assume, in
circumstances that suggest considerable excuse -- and then killed a
policeman who pursued him, within a short distance from the first
act. He was indicted separately for the murder of each man, tried
in a court of Pennsylvania, found guilty of murder in the second
degree for the first killing and guilty of murder in the first
degree for the second, and was sentenced to death. The judgment was
affirmed by the supreme court of the state.
No writ of error or certiorari was applied for, Valotta having
no funds and his counsel being ignorant of the statute authorizing
proceedings in such cases without prepayment of fees or costs. But
when the time for such proceedings had gone by, a writ of habeas
corpus was obtained from a judge of the district court of the
United States, with the result that we have stated. The grounds of
the order seem to have been that Valotta was tried upon two
indictments for felony at the same time and was deprived of the
full number of challenges that he would have had if he had been
tried separately upon each.
There is no question that the state court had jurisdiction. But
the much abused suggestion is made that it lost jurisdiction by
trying the two indictments together. Manifestly this would not be
true even if the trial was not warranted by law. But the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has said that there was no mistake of law,
and, so far as the law of Pennsylvania was concerned, it was most
improper to attempt to go behind the decision of the Supreme Court,
to construe statutes, as opposed to it and to hear evidence that
the practice of the state had been the other way. The question of
constitutional power is the only one that could be raised, if even
that were open upon this collateral attack, and as to that we
cannot doubt that Pennsylvania could authorize the whole story
Page 270 U. S. 426
to be brought out before the jury at once, even though two
indictments were involved, without denying due process of law. If
any question was made at the trial as to the loss of the right to
challenge twenty jurors on each indictment, the only side of it
that would be open here would be again the question of
constitutional power. That Pennsylvania could limit the challenges
on each indictment to ten does not admit doubt.
There was not the shadow of a ground for interference with this
sentence by habeas corpus.
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.
S. 309,
237 U. S. 326.
Extraordinary cases where there is only the form of a court under
the domination of a mob as was alleged to be the fact in
Moore
v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86,
offers no analogy to this. In so delicate a matter as interrupting
the regular administration of the criminal law of the state by this
kind of attack, too much discretion cannot be used, and it must be
realized that it can be done only upon definitely and narrowly
limited grounds.
Order reversed.
