1. Under § 51, Judicial Code, a suit brought by a nonresident in
the district court upon the basis of diverse citizenship, or
because it arises under the laws of the United States, must be
dismissed or want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
if the defendant be not a resident of the district and seasonably
assert his privilege. P.
270 U. S.
365.
2. A corporation (within the meaning of the jurisdictional
statutes) is a resident of the state in which it is incorporated,
and not a resident or inhabitant of any other state, even of one
within which it is engaged in business. P.
270 U. S.
366.
Page 270 U. S. 364
3. Section 28, Judicial Code, allowing removal of suit of which
the district courts "are given original jurisdiction," relates to
the general jurisdiction of those courts, and not to their local
jurisdiction over the defendant's person, dealt with in § 51, so
that the fact that a suit between nonresidents might have been
brought in the state court and removed to the district court does
not show that, if brought originally in the district court, it
could have been retained there over the defendant's objection. P.
270 U. S.
366.
Affirmed on motion.
Error to a judgment of the district court dismissing a action
for want of jurisdiction over the defendant.
MR. JUSTICE SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action at law brought by the milling company against
the railway company, in the District Court of the Eastern District
of Missouri, to recover the sum of $3,035.73 for damages alleged to
have been sustained through the negligence of the railway company,
the initial carrier, and its connecting carriers, in the interstate
transportation of rice shipped from Arkansas to New York. The
railway company, appearing specially, filed a plea to the
jurisdiction on the ground that neither it nor the milling company
was a resident or inhabitant of the district. This plea was
sustained without opinion, and the suit was dismissed for want of
jurisdiction. This direct writ of error was allowed, and the
jurisdictional question certified, in February, 1925, under § 238
of the Judicial Code.
The railway company has interposed a motion to affirm the
judgment upon the ground that the question
Page 270 U. S. 365
upon which the decision depends is so unsubstantial as not to
need further argument.
Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U.
S. 600,
261 U. S. 601.
This motion must be granted.
The declaration and the testimony heard upon the plea show that
the milling company is a corporation organized under the laws or
Texas, and that the railway company is a corporation organized
under the laws of Illinois and Iowa, having its principal office in
Chicago, but maintaining a branch office and operating a branch
line within the Eastern District of Missouri.
Section 51 of the Judicial Code, which deals with the venue of
suits originally begun in the district courts, reenacting in part a
similar provision in the Judiciary Act of 1888,
* provides,
subject to certain exceptions not material here, that
"no civil suit shall be brought in any district court against
any person by any original process of proceeding in any other
district than that, whereof he is an inhabitant; but where the
jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between
citizens of different states, suit shall be brought only in the
district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the
defendant."
That is to say, the suit must be brought within the district of
which the defendant is an inhabitant, unless the general federal
jurisdiction is founded upon diversity of citizenship alone, in
which case it must be brought either in that district or in the
district in which the plaintiff resides.
While this provision does not limit the general jurisdiction of
the district courts, it confers a personal privilege on the
defendant, which he may assert, or may waive at his election, if
sued in some other district.
Lee v. Chesapeake Railway,
260 U. S. 653,
260 U. S. 655,
and cases cited. If this privilege is seasonably asserted, the suit
must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant.
Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line,
215 U. S. 501,
215 U. S. 510,
and cases cited.
Page 270 U. S. 366
It is immaterial whether the general federal jurisdiction in the
present suit is founded upon diversity of citizenship alone or
whether the suit is also one arising under the laws of the United
States, since neither the milling company nor the railway company
is a resident of the Eastern District of Missouri, a corporation
being, within the meaning of the jurisdictional statutes, a
resident of the state in which it is incorporated, and not a
resident or inhabitant of any other state, although it may be
engaged in business within such other state.
In re Keasbey
& Mattison Co., 160 U. S. 221,
160 U. S. 229;
Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line, supra,
215 U. S. 509,
and cases cited.
The milling company contends, however, that since it might have
brought the suit originally in a state court of concurrent
jurisdiction within the Eastern District of Missouri, in which the
railway company is transacting business, and the railway company,
under the decisions in
General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore
Railway, 260 U. S. 261, and
Lee v. Chesapeake Railway, supra, might then have removed
it to the district court, this necessarily involves the conclusion
that the district court also has "original jurisdiction" of the
suit, since § 28 of the Judicial Code provides only for the removal
of suits of which the district courts "are given original
jurisdiction." The fallacy of this argument lies in the failure to
distinguish between the general jurisdiction of the district
courts, to which § 28 relates, and the local jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, to which § 51 relates. The same contention
was made, in a converse form, in the
General Investment
Co. case, in which it was argued that a suit could not be
removed from a state court to a district court in which, under §
51, it could not have been brought over the defendant's objection,
since it was not a suit of which the district court was given
"original jurisdiction," and it is completely answered by the
holding in that case, at p.
260 U. S. 275,
that the term
Page 270 U. S. 367
"original jurisdiction," as used in § 28, refers only to the
general jurisdiction conferred on the district courts, and does not
relate to the venue provision in § 51, there being "no purpose in
extending to removals the personal privilege accorded to defendants
by § 51, since removals are had only at the instance of
defendants." This was approved and followed in
Lee v.
Chesapeake Railway, supra, 260 U. S.
657.
Whether the suit be originally brought in the district court or
removed from a state court, the general federal jurisdiction is the
same, and the venue or local jurisdiction of the district court
over the person of the defendant is dependent, in the one case as
in the other, upon the voluntary action of the nonresident
defendant, being acquired in an original suit by his waiver of
objection to the venue, and in a removed suit by his application
for the removal to the district court.
Since the question does not require further argument, the motion
of the railway company is granted, and the judgment of the district
court is
Affirmed.
* 25 Stat. 433, 434, c. 866.