1. Transportation Act, 1920, amending par. 3, § 16, of the
Interstate Commerce Act, provides:
"All actions at law by carriers subject to this Act for recovery
of their charges, or any part thereof, shall be begun within three
years from the time the cause of action accrues and not after."
Held not applicable retroactively to causes of action
existing at the date of the Transportation Act. P
270 U. S. 3.
2. The Act of June 7, 1924, which further amended par. 3, § 16,
of the Interstate Commerce Act, among other things by adding that
its provisions
"shall extend to and embrace cases in which the cause of action
has heretofore accrued as well as cases in which the cause of
action may hereafter accrue,"
was not intended to defeat claims on which suits duly brought
were then pending, or in which judgment had already been entered.
Id.
59 Ct.Cls. 322 affirmed.
Page 270 U. S. 2
Appeals from judgments recovered in the Court of Claims by two
railroads for transportation service rendered to the
government.
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases, which were argued together, present on similar
facts the same question of law. In each, the railroad had, prior to
federal control, rendered to the War Department transportation
service, payment for which was disallowed by the Auditor. Each
company commenced suit therefor in the Court of Claims more than
three years, but within six years, from the time when the cause of
action accrued, and after the lapse of three years from the
enactment of Transportation Act Feb. 28, 1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456.
That Act, amending paragraph 3 of § 16 of the Interstate Commerce
Act, provides:
"All actions at law by carriers subject to this Act for recovery
of their charges, or any part thereof, shall be begun within three
years from the time the cause of action accrues, and not
after."
The government defended these suits solely on the ground that
the right to sue had been lost by lapse of time. It contended that
the three-year limitation applies
Page 270 U. S. 3
to claims against the government prosecuted in the Court of
Claims, as well as to actions brought against other shippers in
other courts; that it applies to claims which arose prior to the
passage of the 1920 Act; that the three-year period began at the
date when the cause of action accrued, provided there remained at
the passage of the Act a reasonable time before the expiration of
the three years within which suit could have been brought, and
that, in any event, suit on such claims is barred where, as in the
cases at bar, the suit is commenced more than three years after the
passage of the 1920 Act. In each of these cases, judgment was
entered for the plaintiff.
Wabash Ry. Co. v. United
States, 59 Ct.Cls. 322;
see also Schaff, Receiver v.
United States, 59 Ct.Cls. 318. An appeal to this Court, under
§§ 242 and 243 of the Judicial Code, was taken in each case before
June 7, 1924.
That a statute shall not be given retroactive effect unless such
construction is required by explicit language or by necessary
implication is a rule of general application. It has been applied
by this Court to statutes governing procedure,
United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States, 209 U.
S. 306, and specifically to the limitation of actions
under another section of Transportation Act of 1920,
Fullerton-Krueger Lumber Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co.,
266 U. S. 435.
There is nothing in the language of paragraph 3 of § 16, or in any
other provision of the Act, or in its history, which requires us to
hold that the three-year limitation applies under any circumstances
to causes of action existing at the date of the Act.
The government contends that, even if the suits were not barred
by Transportation Act of 1920, they were barred by the Act of June
7, 1924, c. 325, 43 Stat. 633, which amended paragraph 3, among
other things, by making the following addition thereto:
Page 270 U. S. 4
"(h) The provisions of this paragraph (3) shall extend to and
embrace cases in which the cause of action has heretofore accrued,
as well as cases in which the cause of action may hereafter accrue.
. . ."
The Senate and House reports accompanying the bill (S. 2704)
state that the purpose of the amendment was to revive claims barred
under the existing law as interpreted in
Kansas City Ry. Co. v.
Wolf, 261 U. S. 133. It
is not to be assumed that Congress intended by that amendment to
defeat claims on which suits duly brought were then pending, or on
which, as in the cases at bar, judgment had already been entered
below.
Compare Herrick v. Boquillas Land & Cattle Co.,
200 U. S. 96.
As we hold that paragraph 3 does not apply to any cause of
action existing at the date of the passage of Transportation Act of
1920, we have no occasion to consider whether, under any
circumstances, it is applicable to claims against the government
brought in the Court of Claims pursuant to § 145, Judicial Code.
See Western Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 59 Ct.Cls.
67, 81.
Affirmed.