1. A rate-fixing order made by a commission acting under a state
statute is, for jurisdictional purposes in applying Jud.Code § 237,
as amended Sept. 6, 1916, an act of the legislature. P.
269 U. S.
356.
2. A judgment of a state supreme court sustaining such an order
held not reviewable here by writ of error under Jud.Code §
237, as amended Sept. 6, 1916, where the constitutionality of the
order itself was not definitely drawn in question before the state
court
Page 269 U. S. 355
prior to a petition for rehearing which was denied without more.
P.
269 U. S.
357.
3. In a case where the state court has decided a local question
adequate to support its judgment without regard to federal
questions, the better practice in this Court (generally, at least)
is to dismiss the writ rather than affirm the judgment. P.
269 U. S.
359.
Writ of error to 192 Cal. 192 dismissed.
Error to a Judgment of the Supreme Court of California
sustaining upon review an order of the state Railroad Commission
which increased the rates demandable by a public service
corporation for supplying water for irrigation purposes. Plaintiffs
in error were consumers of the water, and claimed that the order
conflicted with their rights under standing contracts with the
company.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Sutter-Butte Canal Company, a public service corporation of
California, has long supplied water for irrigation in the
Sacramento Valley. Before 1913, petitioners or their predecessors
severally contracted with it for water to be used during long
terms, on definitely described parcels of land at prices based upon
their total areas at specified rates per acre, whether actually
consumed or not. Payment of the stipulated sums was secured by
liens on the entire tracts; rights so acquired were appurtenant to
the land, and constituted a servitude upon the water. Other
stipulations concerned lateral ditches,
Page 269 U. S. 356
etc. Those who held these agreements are referred to as contract
customers. Other parties -- non-contract customers -- were supplied
and charged according to number of acres actually irrigated from
year to year.
In 1918, the Railroad Commission permitted a general increase of
rates, but gave contract customers somewhat lower ones than those
prescribed for others. Thereafter, the company continued to demand
and receive from all contract customers yearly sums reckoned
according to entire acreage.
April 26, 1922, the Commission granted another increase of
rates, again giving lower ones to contract customers. Plaintiffs in
error obtained from the court below a review of this order. Their
petition therefor asked:
"that, upon such review, such order and decision of said
Railroad Commission be annulled and set aside insofar as the same
makes provision for the collection of rates upon any acreage other
than that upon which water may be desired by these
petitioners."
That court first held the challenged order produced unlawful
inequalities between contract and non-contract customers, contrary
to the law of the state, and therefore should be set aside. 65
Cal.Dec. 69. Having granted a rehearing, it declared the
inequalities were not unreasonable, and affirmed the order. 192
Cal. 132.
The cause is here upon writ of error. Considering the
circumstances disclosed by the record, we have no jurisdiction
unless it affirmatively appears that, in the court below, there was
duly drawn in question the validity of a statute of or an authority
exercised under the state, because of repugnance to the
Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States. Judicial
Code, § 237, as amended September 6, 1916. Under repeated rulings
here, for jurisdictional purposes, the order of the Commission must
be treated as though an Act of the legislature.
Lake Erie &
West. R. Co. v. State Public Utilities Commission ex rel.
Cameron, 249 U. S. 422,
249 U. S. 424,
and cases there cited.
Page 269 U. S. 357
The brief for plaintiffs in error declares:
"The plaintiffs in error maintain that, by the judgment of the
Supreme Court of California, the obligations of their contracts
have been impaired, that their property has been taken without due
process of law, that they have been denied the equal protection of
the laws, and that the California court has denied and renounced
its power to protect the plaintiffs in error in their claims of
rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution of
the United States."
This statement shows no jurisdiction here under the writ of
error, although it specifies a federal question justiciable by
certiorari. Something more than a claim of federal right is
necessary; the attack must be upon the validity of the order, not
merely upon the court's judgment.
The brief further states that, by the application to the
Railroad Commission for rehearing, and in the petition to the
Supreme Court of California for review, plaintiffs in error set up
their federal claims. No citations to the record accompany this
statement, as our rules require. Rule 25, 2(c). A claim merely
presented to the Commission upon application for rehearing would
not suffice to give us jurisdiction. It must have been definitely
brought to the court's attention. Although a copy of the request
for rehearing addressed to the Commission is annexed to the
petition to the Supreme Court, this petition made no claim under
the federal Constitution with sufficient definiteness for us to say
that the court's attention was challenged thereto. Neither opinion
of the court shows that it considered or necessarily passed upon
any such question. After the second opinion, a petition for
rehearing dwelt much on federal rights, but this was denied,
without more, and is now without consequence.
Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 261 U. S. 114,
261 U. S.
117.
Under the heading,
"Authorities on Jurisdiction Relied on by Petitioners of
Rehearing (Addressed to the Chief
Page 269 U. S. 358
Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of
California),"
there are printed in the record before us extracts from the
written argument of counsel for the Water Users' Association and
others, wherein this appears:
"Three rights of the petitioners under the Constitution of the
United States are violated unless the order be annulled: (1) the
obligations of their contracts are impaired by a law passed after
the contracts were made; (2) the impairment of their contracts
makes their lands subject to a lien to which they never agreed, and
requires of them payment for the use of water not served, hence
their property is taken without due process of law, and (3) by
reason of the impairment of their contracts, they are classified as
consumers upon no real distinction of the character of the service,
and, known as citizens of the United States, they are denied the
equal protection of the laws."
In his brief here, counsel for plaintiffs in error has not
relied upon the foregoing as sufficient to show that the points
there suggested were duly raised and presented to the court below,
and we are not aware of any rule of practice in that court which
permits such questions to be thus raised in a proceeding upon
certiorari.
In
Zadig v. Baldwin, 166 U. S. 485,
166 U. S. 488,
here upon error to the Supreme Court of California, this Court
said:
"The contention that there was a federal question raised below
finds its only support in the fact that there has been printed in
the record, as filed in this Court, what purports to be an extract
from the closing brief of counsel presented to the supreme court of
the state, in which such a federal question is discussed, and it is
asserted orally at bar that, in the oral argument made in the
Supreme Court of California, a claim under the federal Constitution
was presented. But manifestly the matters
Page 269 U. S. 359
referred to form no part of the record, and are not adequate to
create a federal question, when no such question was necessarily
decided below and the record does not disclose that such issues was
set up or claimed in any proper manner in the courts of the
state."
As we interpret its opinion and judgment, the court below ruled
only that the order of the Commission fixed rated to be charged,
leaving all other questions subject to determination by the courts.
Counsel for the Commission affirmed this interpretation, and at the
bar agreed that judgment here might rest thereon. In printed
argument he said:
"Except as to rates, the Commission did not attempt (in fact
expressly disclaimed any attempt) to change any of the provisions
of these contracts, and the effect of this rate order, as a matter
of law, on those other provisions was left by the Commission for
determination by the courts as the occasion might arise."
The decision below upon this point of local law is enough to
support the judgment, and leaves no federal question open for our
determination.
In cases where the state court has decided a local question
adequate to support its judgment, this Court has sometimes
affirmed, and sometimes has dismissed, the writ of error.
Murdock v.
Memphis, 20 Wall. 590,
87 U. S.
634-636;
Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.
S. 361,
150 U. S. 370;
Southern Pacific Co. v. Schuyler, 227 U.
S. 601,
227 U. S. 610;
Howat v. Kansas, 258 U. S. 181;
Browne v. Union Pacific, 267 U. S. 255. We
have again considered the matter, and have concluded that,
generally at least, it is better practice to dismiss.
The writ of error must be
Dismissed.