1. A decree of a state supreme court enforcing special
assessments despite objection that the underlying statute, as
construed and applied, deprived the landowners of property without
due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is
reviewable by writ of error. P.
268 U. S.
644.
2. A state cannot impose special taxes on lands acquired by
private owners from the United States on account of benefits
resulting from a road improvement made before the United States
parted with its title. P.
268 U. S.
645.
3. When a tax is beyond the constitutional powers of a state,
its exaction is a taking of property without due process of law in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. P.
268 U. S. 646.
162 Ark. 4 reversed.
Error to a decree of the Supreme Court of Arkansas which
affirmed a decree foreclosing a statutory lien to pay special
reassessments on lands in a road improvement district.
Page 268 U. S. 644
MR. JUSTICE SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Osceola & Little River Road Improvement District brought
this suit in a Chancery Court of Arkansas against Lee and the other
plaintiffs in error to collect an assessment of taxes that had been
made against them for the benefit accruing to their lands by the
improvements. The Chancellor found the issues in favor of the
District, and decreed that the statutory lien for the assessments
be foreclosed and the lands sold to pay the same. This decree was
affirmed by the Supreme Court. 162 Ark. 4. The case is properly
here on writ of error, and a pending petition for certiorari is
accordingly denied.
The sole question presented is whether the Arkansas statute
under which the taxes in question were assessed, as construed and
applied in this case, deprives the land owners of their property
without due process of law in violation of the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
When the District was originally organized, the lands involved
in this suit, which are known as "lake lands, or sunk lands" were
included in it. The benefits accruing from the improvements were
then assessed against all the landowners, including various persons
who were supposed to be the riparian owners of the lake lands. It
was subsequently ascertained, before the completion of the
improvements, that the United States was the owner of these lake
lands. It was recognized, however, that it was not liable to
assessment, and no attempt was made to collect from it any part of
the assessed benefits. After the improvements had been completed,
the United States conveyed these lake lands, under the Homestead
Act (12 Stat. 392), to the present owners. Thereafter, the Board of
Commissioners of the district caused a reassessment to be made of
the benefits accruing to all the lands within the district,
including the lake lands which had formerly belonged to the
Page 268 U. S. 645
United States. This reassessment was made under a section of the
Arkansas statute which provided that:
"The board of commissioners may not oftener than once a year
order a reassessment of the benefits, which shall be made,
advertised, revised and confirmed as in the case of the original
assessment and with like effect."
Crawford & Moses' Digest of Arkansas Statutes, ยง 5430. It is
the reassessment of benefits thus made which the District by this
suit has sought to collect.
It was settled many years ago that the property of the United
States is exempt by the Constitution from taxation under the
authority of a state so long as title remains in the United States.
Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.
S. 151,
117 U. S. 180.
This is conceded. It is urged, however, that this rule has no
application after the title has passed from the United States, and
that it may then be taxed for any legitimate purposes. While this
is true in reference to general taxes assessed after the United
States has parted with its title, we think it clear that it is not
the case where the tax is sought to be imposed for benefits
accruing to the property from improvements made while it was still
owned by the United States. In the
Van Brocklin case,
supra, p.
117 U. S. 168,
it was said that the United States has the exclusive right to
control and dispose of its public lands, and that "no state can
interfere with this right, or embarrass its exercise." Obviously,
however, the United States will be hindered in the disposal of
lands upon which local improvements have been made if taxes may
thereafter be assessed against the purchasers for the benefits
resulting from such improvements. Such a liability for the future
assessments of taxes would create a serious incumbrance upon the
lands, and its subsequent enforcement would accomplish indirectly
the collection of a tax against the United States which could not
be directly imposed. In
Nevada National Bank v. Poso Irr.
Dist., 140 Cal. 344, 347, in which it was held that the state
could not
Page 268 U. S. 646
include lands of the United States in an irrigation district so
as to impose an assessment for benefits which would become a
liability upon a subsequent purchaser, it was said that,
"if the grantee of the United States must take the land burdened
with the liability of an irrigation district made to include it
without the assent of the government or the purchaser, it attaches
a condition to the disposal of the property of the government
without its sanction or consent, . . . which must, in such cases,
interfere with its disposal."
There is nothing leading to a contrary conclusion in
Seattle
v. Kelleher, 195 U. S. 351, and
Wagner v. Baltimore, 239 U. S. 207,
which involved merely questions as to the assessment of benefits
for local improvements after they had been completed, upon lands
which at no time had been the property of the United States.
We find that the provision of the Arkansas statute under which
the reassessment of benefits was made, as construed and applied in
the present case, was beyond the constitutional authority of the
state, and, there being no power to impose such a tax, its exaction
is a taking of property without due process of law in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Frick v. Pennsylvania, ante, p.
268 U. S. 473.
The decree of the Supreme Court of Arkansas is reversed, and the
cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
Reversed.