1. The right of a shipper to an award by the Interstate Commerce
Commission of the damages resulting from misrouting of his goods by
a carrier is both created and limited by the Interstate Commerce
Act. P.
268 U. S.
635.
2. The limitation of the Act, (§ 16(3)) that such complaints
shall be filed within two years from the time the cause of action
accrues, and not after, enters into the cause of action, so that
lapse of that time not only bars the remedy afforded, but destroys
the liability of the defendant to the plaintiff. P.
268 U. S.
636.
3. Section 206(f) of the Transportation Act, 1920,
providing:
"The period of Federal control shall not be computed as a part
of the periods of limitation in actions against carriers or in
claims for reparation to the Commission for causes of action
arising prior to Federal control,"
is not to be construed retroactively to recreate a liability
destroyed by lapse of the two-year period,
supra, before
the Transportation Act was passed; this would deprive the carrier
of property without due process in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. P.
268 U. S.
637.
Affirmed.
Page 268 U. S. 634
Error to a judgment of the district court sustaining a demurrer
and dismissing the complaint in an action against a carrier to
recover damages awarded by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiff in error brought this action to recover the amount of
damages awarded against defendant in error by the Interstate
Commerce Commission. August 30, 1917 at Lyman, Mississippi, the
Ingram-Day Lumber Company delivered to defendant in error a carload
of lath consigned to the V. W. Long Lumber Company at Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania. The shipment was directed to be moved via a line of
the Norfolk & Western Railway Company through Hagerstown,
Maryland. On the day the shipment was made, plaintiff bought the
lath, and in due time received the bill of lading. Defendant
misrouted the car, and in consequence plaintiff suffered damages.
February 14, 1921, after the expiration of the two-year period
prescribed for filing claims for damages, plaintiff made complaint
for reparation to the Interstate Commerce Commission against
defendant and three connecting carriers. May 18, 1922, the
commission made its report and order. The contention on the part of
the carriers, that plaintiff's right expired before the passage of
Transportation Act 1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456, and was not revived
by § 206(f), was overruled. The Commission's order authorized and
directed the defendant, on or before August 2, 1922, to pay
$307.15, with interest, to plaintiff as reparation for damages
sustained in consequence of the misrouting. Defendant failed to pay
the award, and this suit was brought May 7, 1923. The complaint set
forth the facts above
Page 268 U. S. 635
stated. Defendant demurred on the ground, among others, that §
206(f), as construed and applied by the Commission, was
unconstitutional, and that so to renew or revive the cause of
action, which had expired before the passage of the Transportation
Act, was to take defendant's property without due process of law in
contravention of the Fifth Amendment. The district court sustained
the demurrer and gave judgment for defendant. The case is here on
writ of error. Section 238, Judicial Code.
Plaintiff's cause of action was created and limited by the
Interstate Commerce Act. That act imposes upon the initial and
other carriers the duty to route and transport freight in
accordance with the shipper's instructions. § 15(8). And the
carrier is liable to any person injured for the full amount of
damages sustained in consequence of a breach of that duty. § 8. Any
person claiming to be damaged by any carrier may make complaint to
the Commission. §§ 9, 13. "All complaints for the recovery of
damages shall be filed with the Commission within two years from
the time the cause of action accrues, and not after. . . ." §
16(2).
"The period of federal control shall not be computed as a part
of the periods of limitation in actions against carriers or in
claims for reparation to the Commission for causes of action
arising prior to federal control."
§ 206(f). If, after hearing, the Commission shall determine that
complainant is entitled to damages under the act, it is required to
make an order directing the carrier to pay the amount so awarded on
or before a day named. And, if the carrier fails to comply, the
person for whose benefit the order was made, within one year from
the date of the order, may file petition in the United States
district court, setting forth briefly the causes for which he
claims damages and the order of the Commission in the premises,
and, subject to some provisions which are not important here, the
suit proceeds like other suits for damages. §§ 16(2), (3).
Page 268 U. S. 636
Plaintiff's right to file his claim with the Commission had
expired several months before the passage of the Transportation
Act. But, if the period of federal control is to be excluded, the
complaint was filed within time. During the period between such
expiration and the passage of the Transportation Act, plaintiff had
no right to file a claim with the Commission, and had no cause of
action. It is settled by the decisions of this Court that the lapse
of time not only barred the remedy, but also destroyed the
liability of defendant to plaintiff.
Phillips v. Grand Trunk
Ry., 236 U. S. 662,
236 U. S. 666;
Louisville Cement Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission,
246 U. S. 638,
246 U. S. 642;
Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Wolf, 261 U.
S. 133,
261 U. S. 139.
On the expiration of the two-year period, it was as if liability
had never existed. And this Court, applying the rule of
construction that all statutes are to be considered prospective
unless the language is express to the contrary, or there is a
necessary implication to that effect, recently has held that §
206(f) does not apply to causes of action which were barred by a
state statute of limitations before the passage of the
Transportation Act.
Fullerton Co. v. Northern Pacific,
266 U. S. 435,
266 U. S.
437.
Plaintiff suggests that the only period of limitations
applicable to claims for reparation is that prescribed by § 16(2),
and argues that, as the period of federal control exceeded two
years, § 206(f) must be construed retrospectively or given no
effect.
We need not reexamine the doctrine of
Campbell v. Holt,
115 U. S. 620, as
it is plain that case does not apply . That was an action on a
contract for the recovery of money. By a state statute of
limitations, the right of action had been barred. The statute was
repealed before the action was commenced. It was held that the
action could be maintained, and that such repeal did not deprive
the debtor of his property without due process of law in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision
Page 268 U. S. 637
rests on the conception that the obligation of the debtor to pay
was not destroyed by lapse of time, and that the statute of
limitations related to the remedy only, and that the removal of the
bar was not unconstitutional. The opinion distinguishes the case
from suits to recover real and personal property. That case
belonged to the class where statutory provisions fixing the time
within which suits must be brought to enforce an existing cause of
action are held to apply to the remedy only. But such provisions
sometimes constitute a part of the definition of a cause of action
created by the same or another provision, and operate as a
limitation upon liability. Such, for example, are statutory causes
of action for death by wrongful act,
The Harrisburg,
119 U. S. 199,
119 U. S. 214,
and those arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35
Stat. 65, c. 149,
Central Vermont Ry. v. White,
238 U. S. 507,
238 U. S. 511;
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Burnette, 239 U.
S. 199,
239 U. S. 201;
Kannellos v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 151 Minn. 157, 160;
Jones v. D., L. & W. R. Co., 96 N.J.L. 197.
See
also Davis v. Mills, 194 U. S. 451,
194 U. S. 454.
This case belongs to the latter class. Section 206(f) will not be
construed retroactively to create liability. To give it that effect
would be to deprive defendant of its property without due process
of law in contravention of the Fifth Amendment.
Cf. Levy v.
Wardell, 258 U. S. 542,
258 U. S. 544;
Forbes Boat Line v. Board of Commissioners, 258 U.
S. 338,
258 U. S. 340;
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards, 231 U.
S. 190,
231 U. S. 200;
Winfree v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 227 U.
S. 296,
227 U. S.
301.
Judgment affirmed.