1. A state statute attempting to tax the transfer of tangible
personal property having an actual situs in other states transcends
the power of the state so attempting and contravenes the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. P.
268 U. S.
488.
2. The power to regulate the transmission, administration, and
distribution of tangible personal property on the death of the
owner rests with the its situs, the laws of other states having no
bearing save as that state expressly or tacitly adopts them, and
then their bearing is attributable to such adoption, and not to any
force of their own. P.
268 U. S.
491.
3. A law of Pennsylvania (Act No. 258, Ls. of 1919, 521)
provides that, where a person domiciled in the state dies seized
and possessed of real or personal property, its transfer by will or
intestate laws, whether the property be in that state or elsewhere,
shall be taxed at specified percentages of the clear value of the
property transferred, such value to be ascertained by deducting
debts and expenses of administration from the gross value of the
estate, but without making any deduction for taxes paid to the
United States or any other state.
Held: (1) That the law
is not an escheat, but a tax, law. P.
268 U.S. 492. (2) That a tax so levied
was void insofar as based on transfer of decedent's tangible
personal property in New York and Massachusetts, where
Page 268 U. S. 474
ancillary letters were granted, the property administered, and
transfer taxes imposed and collected. P.
268 U. S.
496.
4. A state, being without power to tax directly the transfer of
tangible personal property in another state, cannot accomplish the
same thing indirectly by taking the whole of the decedent's estate,
including that foreign property, as the basis for measuring the tax
on the transfer of that part of the estate which lies within its
jurisdiction.
Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.
S. 525, and
Plummer v. Coler, 178 U.
S. 115, distinguished. P.
268 U. S.
494.
5. The state which created a corporation has power to tax the
transfer of its stock on death of a stockholder, and to enforce the
tax by means practically making the state a lienor in possession,
irrespective of the decedent's domicil and the actual situs of the
stock certificates. P.
268 U. S.
497.
6. This power being superior to the jurisdiction over the stock
of another state in which the decedent stockholder resided, the tax
imposed by the the corporation must be paid before the stock can be
brought into administration in the his domicil, and a statute of
the domiciliary state (Penna. Ls.1919, 521,
supra) which
does not allow the value paid out of his estate for this purpose to
be deducted in computing the domiciliary transfer tax in effect
taxes what is not within the state's jurisdiction, and violates the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
7. The federal "estate" tax and the Pennsylvania "transfer" tax
both are imposed as excises on the transfer of property from a
decedent, and both take effect at the instant of transfer, so that
neither has priority in time over the other. P.
268 U. S.
498.
8. The taxing power of federal and state governments is
generally so far concurrent as to render it admissible for both to
tax the same subject at the same time. P.
268 U. S.
499.
9. Neither the United States nor the state, in determining the
amounts of its transfer tax, is under any constitutional obligation
to make any deduction on account of the tax of the other. Whether,
if the estate were insufficient to pay both, the United States
should be preferred is not here involved. P.
268 U. S.
500.
277 Pa. 242 reversed.
Error to judgments of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
sustaining taxes assessed under the state transfer tax law.
Petitions for writs of certiorari in these cases are denied.
Page 268 U. S. 486
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
These four cases involve the constitutional validity of
particular features of a statute of Pennsylvania imposing a tax on
the transfer of property by will or intestate laws. Act No. 258,
Pa.Laws 1919, p. 521; Pa.St.1920, §§ 20465-20499.
Page 268 U. S. 487
Henry C. Frick, domiciled in Pennsylvania, died testate December
2, 1919, leaving a large estate. By his will, he disposed of the
entire estate, giving about 53 percent for charitable and public
purposes and passing the rest to or for the use of individual
beneficiaries. Besides real and personal property in Pennsylvania,
the estate included tangible personalty having an actual situs in
New York, tangible personalty having a like situs in Massachusetts,
and various stocks in corporations of states other than
Pennsylvania. The greater part of the tangible personalty in New
York, [
Footnote 1] having a
value of $13,132,391, was given to a corporation of that state for
the purposes of a public art gallery, and the other part, [
Footnote 2] having a value of
$77,818.75, to decedent's widow. The tangible personalty in
Massachusetts, [
Footnote 3]
having a value of $325,534.25, was also given to the widow. The
will was probated in Pennsylvania, and letters testamentary were
granted there. It was also proved in New York and Massachusetts,
and ancillary letters were granted in those states. Under the laws
of the United States, the executors were required to pay to it, and
did pay, an estate tax of $6,338,898.68, and under the laws of
Kansas, West Virginia, and other states, they were required to pay
to such states, and did pay, large sums in taxes imposed as a
prerequisite to an effective transfer from a nonresident deceased
of stocks in corporations of those states.
The Pennsylvania statute provides that, where a person domiciled
in that state dies seised or possessed of
Page 268 U. S. 488
property, real or personal, a tax shall be laid on the transfer
of the property from him by will or intestate laws, whether the
property be in that state or elsewhere; that the tax shall be 2
percent of the clear value of so much of the property as is
transferred to or for the use of designated relatives of the
decedent and 5 percent of the clear value of so much of it as is
transferred to or for the use of others, and that the clear value
shall be ascertained by taking the gross value of the estate and
deducting therefrom the decedent's debts and the expenses of
administration, but without making any deduction for taxes paid to
the United States or to any other state.
In applying this statute to the Frick estate, the taxing
officers included the value of the tangible personalty in New York
and Massachusetts, in the clear value on which they computed the
tax, and, in fixing that value, refused to make any deduction on
account of the estate tax paid to the United States or the stock
transfer taxes paid to other states. In proceedings which reached
the supreme court of the state, the action of the taxing officers
and the resulting tax were upheld by that court. 277 Pa. 242. The
matter was then brought here on writs of error under § 237 of the
Judicial Code.
The plaintiffs in error are the executors and an interested
legatee. They contended in the state court, and contend here, that
insofar as the Pennsylvania statute attempts to tax the transfer of
tangible personal property having an actual situs in states other
than Pennsylvania it transcends the power of that state, and
thereby contravenes the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
This precise question has not been presented to this Court
before, but there are many decisions dealing with cognate questions
which point the way to its solution. These decisions show, first,
that the exaction by a state of a tax which it is without power to
impose is a taking
Page 268 U. S. 489
of property without due process of law in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment; secondly, that, while a state may so shape
its tax laws as to reach every object which is under its
jurisdiction, it cannot give them any extraterritorial operation;
and thirdly, that, as respects tangible personal property having an
actual situs in a particular state, the power to subject it to
state taxation rests exclusively in that state, regardless of the
domicile of the owner.
Cleveland, Painesville &
Ashtabula R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 300,
82 U. S. 319,
82 U. S. 325;
Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky,
188 U. S. 385,
188 U. S. 396;
Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.
S. 299;
Delaware, Lackawana & Western R. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 341,
198 U. S. 356;
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.
S. 194;
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas,
216 U. S. 1,
216 U. S. 38;
International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.
S. 135,
246 U. S.
142.
In
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, the
question presented was whether, consistently with the restriction
imposed by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the State of Kentucky could tax a corporation of that
state upon its tangible personal property having an actual situs in
other states. The question was much considered, prior cases were
reviewed, and a negative answer was given. The grounds of the
decision are reflected in the following excerpts from the
opinion:
"It is also essential to the validity of a tax that the property
shall be within the territorial jurisdiction of the taxing power.
Not only is the operation of state laws limited to persons and
property within the boundaries of the state, but property which is
wholly and exclusively within the jurisdiction of another state
receives none of the protection for which the tax is supposed to be
the compensation. This rule receives its most familiar illustration
in the cases of land which, to be taxable, must be
Page 268 U. S. 490
within the limits of the state. Indeed, we know of no case where
a legislature has assumed to impose a tax upon land within the
jurisdiction of another state, much less where such action has been
defended by any court. It is said by this Court, in the
Foreign-held Bond Case, 15
Wall. 300,
82 U. S. 319, that no
adjudication should be necessary to establish so obvious a
proposition as that property lying beyond the jurisdiction of a
state is not a subject upon which her taxing power can be
legitimately exercised. The argument against the taxability of land
within the jurisdiction of another state applies with equal cogency
to tangible personal property beyond the jurisdiction. It is not
only beyond the sovereignty of the taxing state, but does not and
cannot receive protection under its laws. . . ."
"The arguments in favor of the taxation of intangible property
at the domicile of the owner have no application to tangible
property. The fact that such property is visible, easily found, and
difficult to conceal, and the tax readily collectible, is so cogent
an argument for its taxation at its situs that, of late, there is a
general consensus of opinion that it is taxable in the state where
it is permanently located and employed, and where it receives its
entire protection, irrespective of the domicile of the owner. . .
."
"The adoption of a general rule that tangible personal property
in other states may be taxed at the domicile of the owner involves
possibilities of an extremely serious character. Not only would it
authorize the taxation of furniture and other property kept at
country houses in other states or even in foreign countries, [and]
of stocks of goods and merchandise kept at branch establishments
when already taxed at the state of their situs, but of that
enormous mass of personal property belonging to railways and other
corporations which might be taxed in the state where they are
incorporated, though their charters
Page 268 U. S. 491
contemplated the construction and operation of roads wholly
outside the state, and sometimes across the continent, and when in
no other particular they are subject to its laws and entitled to
its protection."
In
United States v. Bennett, 232 U.
S. 299,
232 U. S. 306,
where this Court had occasion to explain the restrictive operation
of the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as
applied to the taxation by one state of property in another, and to
distinguish the operation of the like clause of the Fifth
Amendment, as applied to the taxation by the United States of a
vessel belonging to one of its citizens and located in foreign
waters, it was said:
"The application to the states of the rule of due process relied
upon comes from the fact that their spheres of activity are
enforced and protected by the Constitution, and therefore it is
impossible for one state to reach out and tax property in another
without violating the Constitution, for where the power of the one
ends, the authority of the other begins. But this has no
application to the government of the United States so far as its
admitted taxing power is concerned. It is coextensive with the
limits of the United States; it knows no restriction except where
one is expressed in or arises from the Constitution, and therefore
embraces all the attributes which appertain to sovereignty in the
fullest sense. Indeed, the existence of such a wide power is the
essential resultant of the limitation restricting the states within
their allotted spheres."
Other decisions show that the power to regulate the
transmission, administration, and distribution of tangible personal
property on the death of the owner rests with the state of its
situs, and that the laws of other states have no bearing save as
that state expressly or tacitly adopts them, their bearing then
being attributable to such adoption, and not to any force of their
own.
Mager
Page 268 U. S. 492
v. Grima, 8 How. 490,
49 U. S. 493;
Crapo v.
Kelly, 16 Wall. 610,
83 U. S. 630;
Kerr v. Moon,
9 Wheat. 565,
22 U. S. 571;
Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189,
188 U. S. 204;
Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625,
240 U. S. 631;
Bank of Augusta v.
Earle, 13 Pet. 519,
38 U. S. 589;
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113,
159 U. S. 163,
159 U. S.
166.
The Pennsylvania statute is a tax law, not an escheat law. This
is made plain by its terms and by the opinion of the state court.
The tax which it imposes is not a property tax, but one laid on the
transfer of property on the death of the owner. This distinction is
stressed by counsel for the state. But, to impose either tax, the
state must have jurisdiction over the thing that is taxed, and to
impose either without such jurisdiction is mere extortion, and in
contravention of due process of law. Here, the tax was imposed on
the transfer of tangible personalty having an actual situs in other
states -- New York and Massachusetts. This property, by reason of
its character and situs, was wholly under the jurisdiction of those
states ,and in no way under the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania. True,
its owner was domiciled in Pennsylvania, but this neither brought
it under the jurisdiction of that state nor subtracted anything
from the jurisdiction of New York and Massachusetts. In these
respects, the situation was the same as if the property had been
immovable realty. The jurisdiction possessed by the states of the
situs was not partial, but plenary, and included power to regulate
the transfer both
inter vivos and on the death of the
owner, and power to tax both the property and the transfer.
Mr. Justice Story said, in his work on Conflict of Laws, §
550:
"A nation within whose territory any personal property is
actually situate has as entire dominion over it while therein, in
point of sovereignty and jurisdiction, as it has over immovable
property situate there. It may regulate its transfer, and subject
it to process and execution, and provide for and control the uses
and disposition
Page 268 U. S. 493
of it, to the same extent that it may exert its authority over
immovable property."
"And in
Pullman's Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S.
18,
141 U. S. 22, where this Court
held the actual situs of tangible personalty, rather than the
domicile of its owner, to be the true test of jurisdiction and of
power to tax, it was said:"
"No general principles of law are better settled or more
fundamental than that the legislative power of every state extends
to all property within its borders, and that only so far as the
comity of that state allows can such property be affected by the
law of any other state. The old rule expressed in the maxim
mobilia sequuntur personam, by which personal property was
regarded as subject to the law of the owner's domicile, grew up in
the Middle Ages, when movable property consisted chiefly of gold
and jewels, which could be easily carried by the owner from place
to place, or secreted in spots known only to himself. In modern
times, since the great increase in amount and variety of personal
property not immediately connected with the person of the owner,
that rule has yielded more and more to the
lex situs, the
law of the place where the property is kept and used."
In support of the tax, counsel for the state refer to statutes
of New York and Massachusetts evidencing an election by those
states to accept and give effect to the domiciliary law regulating
the transfer of personal property of owners dying while domiciled
in other states, and from this they contend that the transfer we
are considering was brought under the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania
and made taxable there. We think the contention is not sound. The
statutes do not evidence a surrender or abandonment of
jurisdiction, if that were admissible. On the contrary, they in
themselves are an assertion of jurisdiction and an exercise of it.
They declare what law shall apply, and require the local courts to
give effect to it. And it should be observed that here, the
property was
Page 268 U. S. 494
administered in those courts, and none of it was taken to the
domiciliary state. Obviously the accepted domiciliary law could
not, in itself, have any force or application outside that state.
Only in virtue of its express or tacit adoption by the states of
the situs could it have any force or application in them. Through
its adoption by them, it came to represent their will, and this was
the sole basis of its operation there. Burdick on American
Constitution, § 257. In keeping with this view, New York and
Massachusetts both provide for the taxation of transfers under the
adopted domiciliary law, and they have imposed and collected such a
tax on the transfer we are now considering.
Counsel for the state cite and rely on
Blackstone v.
Miller, 188 U. S. 189, and
Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625.
Both cases related to intangible personalty, which has been
regarded as on a different footing from tangible personalty. When
they are read with this distinction in mind, and also in connection
with other cases before cited, it is apparent that they do not
support the tax in question.
We think it follows from what we have said that the transfer of
the tangible personalty in New York and Massachusetts occurred
under and in virtue of the jurisdiction and laws of those states,
and not under the jurisdiction and laws of Pennsylvania, and
therefore that Pennsylvania was without power to tax it.
One ground on which the state court put its decision was that,
in taxing the transfer of the property which the decedent owned in
Pennsylvania, it was admissible to take as a basis for computing
the tax the combined value of that property and the property in New
York and Massachusetts. Of course, this was but the equivalent of
saying that it was admissible to measure the tax by a standard
which took no account of the distinction between what the state had
power to tax and what it had
Page 268 U. S. 495
no power to tax, and which necessarily operated to make the
amount of the tax just what it would have been had the state's
power included what was excluded by the Constitution. This ground,
in our opinion, is not tenable. It would open the way for easily
doing indirectly what is forbidden to be done directly, and would
render important constitutional limitations of no avail. If
Pennsylvania could tax according to such a standard, other states
could. It would mean, as applied to the Frick estate, that
Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts could each impose a tax
based on the value of the entire estate, although severally having
jurisdiction of only parts of it. Without question, each state had
power to tax the transfer of so much of the estate as was under its
jurisdiction, and also had some discretion in respect of the rate;
but none could use that power and discretion in accomplishing an
unconstitutional end, such as indirectly taxing the transfer of the
part of the estate which was under the exclusive jurisdiction of
others.
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Foster,
247 U. S. 105,
247 U. S. 114,
and cases cited;
Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U.
S. 178,
245 U. S. 188;
International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.
S. 135,
246 U. S. 141;
Air-Way Appliance Co. v. Day, 266 U. S.
71,
266 U. S. 81;
Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66,
253 U. S. 69;
Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky,
188 U. S. 385,
188 U. S.
395.
The state court cited in support of its view
Maxwell v.
Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525,
250 U. S. 539.
The case is on the border line, as is evidenced by the dissent of
four members of the court. But it does not go so far as its
citation by the state court suggests. The tax there in question was
one imposed by New Jersey on the transfer of stock in a corporation
of that state. The stock was part of the estate of a decedent who
had resided elsewhere. The state statute, described according to
its essence, provided for a tax graduated in rate according to the
value of the entire estate, and required that, where the estate
was
Page 268 U. S. 496
partly within and partly without the state, the transfer of the
part within should bear a proportionate part of what according to
the graduated rate would be the tax on the whole. The only bearing
which the property without the state had on the tax imposed in
respect of the property within was that it affected the rate of the
tax. Thus, if the entire estate had a value which put it within the
class for which the rate was three percent, that rate was to be
applied to the value of the property within the state in computing
the tax on its transfer, although its value separately taken would
put it within the class for which the rate was 2 percent. There was
no attempt, as here, to compute the tax in respect of the part
within the state on the value of the whole. The court sustained the
tax, but distinctly recognized that the state's power was subject
to constitutional limitations, including the due process of law
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and also that it would be a
violation of that clause for a state to impose a tax on a thing
within its jurisdiction "in such a way as to really amount to
taxing that which is beyond its authority."
Another case cited by the state court is
Plummer v.
Coler, 178 U. S. 115,
where it was held that a state, in taxing the transfer by will or
descent of property within its jurisdiction, might lawfully measure
the tax according to the value of the property, even though it
included tax exempt bonds of the United States, and this because
the tax was not on the property, but on the transfer. We think the
case is not in point here. The objection to the present tax is that
both the property and the transfer were within the jurisdiction of
other states, and without the jurisdiction of the taxing state.
For the reasons which have been stated, it must be held that the
Pennsylvania statute, insofar as it attempts to tax the transfer of
tangible personalty having an actual situs in other states,
contravenes the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and is invalid.
Page 268 U. S. 497
The next question relates to the provision which requires that,
in computing the value of the estate for the purpose of fixing the
amount of the tax, stocks in corporations of other states shall be
included at their full value without any deduction for transfer
taxes paid to those states in respect of the same stocks.
The decedent owned many stocks in corporations of states, other
than Pennsylvania, which subjected their transfer on death to a tax
and prescribed means of enforcement which practically gave those
states the status of lienors in possession. [
Footnote 4] As those states had created the
corporations issuing the stocks, they had power to impose the tax
and to enforce it by such means, irrespective of the decedent's
domicile, and the actual situs of the stock certificates.
Pennsylvania's jurisdiction over the stocks necessarily was
subordinate to that power. Therefore, to bring them into the
administration in that state, it was essential that the tax be
paid. The executors paid it out of moneys forming part of the
estate in Pennsylvania, and the stocks were thereby brought into
the administration there. We think it plain that such value as the
stocks had in excess of the tax is all that could be regarded as
within the range of Pennsylvania's taxing power.
Estate of
Henry Miller, 184 Cal. 674, 683. So much of the value as was
required to release the superior claim of the other states was
quite beyond Pennsylvania's control. Thus, the inclusion of the
full value in the computation on which that state based its tax,
without any deduction for the tax paid to the other states, was
nothing short of applying that state's taxing power to what was not
within its range. That the stocks, with their full value, were
ultimately brought into the administration in that state does
not
Page 268 U. S. 498
help. They were brought in through the payment of the tax in the
other states out of moneys of the estate in Pennsylvania. The
moneys paid out just balanced the excess in stock value brought in.
Yet, in computing the tax in that state, both were included.
We are of opinion that, insofar as the statute requires that
stocks of other states be included at their full value, without
deducting the tax paid to those states, it exceeds the power of the
state, and thereby infringes the constitutional guaranty of due
process of law.
The remaining question relates to the provision declaring that,
in determining the value of the estate for the purpose of computing
the tax, there shall be no deduction of the estate tax paid to the
United States. The plaintiffs in error contend that this provision
is invalid, first, as being inconsistent with the constitutional
supremacy of the United States, and, secondly, as making the state
tax in part a tax on the federal tax.
In support of the contention, we are referred to several cases
in which state courts have held that the federal tax should be
deducted in determining the value on which such a state tax is
computed. But the cases plainly are not in point. In them, the
state courts were merely construing an earlier type of statute
requiring that the state tax be computed on the clear or net value
of the estate, and containing no direction respecting the deduction
of the federal tax. An earlier Pennsylvania statute of that type
was so construed. Later statutes in the same states expressly
forbidding any deduction of the federal tax have been construed
according to their letter. This is true of the present Pennsylvania
statute. The question here is not how the statute shall be
construed, but whether, as construed by the state court, it is open
to the constitutional objections urged against it.
While the federal tax is called an estate tax and the state tax
is called a transfer tax, both are imposed as
Page 268 U. S. 499
excises on the transfer of property from a decedent and both
take effect at the instant of transfer. Thus, both are laid on the
same subject, and neither has priority in time over the other.
Subject to exceptions not material here, the power of taxation
granted to the United States does not curtail or interfere with the
taxing power of the several states. This power in the two
governments is generally so far concurrent as to render it
admissible for both, each under its own laws and for its own
purposes, to tax the same subject at the same time. A few citations
will make this plain. In
Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,
22 U. S. 199,
Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for this Court, said:
"Congress is authorized to lay and collect taxes, etc., to pay
the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare
of the United States. This does not interfere with the power of the
states to tax for the support of their own governments, nor is the
exercise of that power by the states an exercise of any portion of
the power that is granted to the United States. In imposing taxes
for state purposes, they are not doing what Congress is empowered
to do. Congress is not empowered to tax for those purposes which
are within the exclusive province of the states. When, then, each
government exercises the power of taxation, neither is exercising
the power of the other."
Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, §
1068, said:
"The power of Congress in laying taxes is not necessarily or
naturally inconsistent with that of the state. Each may lay a tax
on the same property without interfering with the action of the
other."
And in
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S.
41,
178 U. S. 58-60,
Mr. Justice White, speaking for this Court, said that
"under our constitutional system, both the national and state
governments, moving in their respective orbits, have a common
authority to tax many and diverse objects,"
and he further pointed out that the transfer of property on
death "is a usual subject of taxation," and one which falls within
that common authority.
Page 268 U. S. 500
With this understanding of the power in virtue of which the two
taxes are imposed, we are of opinion that neither the United States
nor the state is under any constitutional obligation in determining
the amount of its tax to make any deduction on account of the tax
of the other. With both, the matter of making such a deduction
rests in legislative discretion. In their present statutes, both
direct that such a deduction be not made. It is not as if the tax
of one, unless and until paid, presented an obstacle to the
exertion of the power of the other. Here, both had power to tax,
and both exercised it as of the same moment. Neither encroached on
the sphere or power of the other. The estate out of which each
required that its tax be paid is much more than ample for the
payment of both taxes. No question of supremacy can arise in such a
situation. Whether, if the estate were not sufficient to pay both
taxes, that of the United States should be preferred
(
See Lane County v.
Oregon, 7 Wall. 71,
74 U. S. 77) need
not be considered. That question is not involved here.
The objection that, when no deduction is made on account of the
federal tax, the state tax becomes to that extent a tax on the
federal tax and not a tax on the transfer is answered by what
already has been said. But, by way of repetition, it may be
observed that what the state is taxing is the transfer of
particular property, not such property depleted by the federal tax.
The two taxes were concurrently imposed, and stand on the same
plane, save as the United States possibly might have a preferred
right of enforcement if the estate were insufficient to pay
both.
In conclusion we hold: first, that the value of the tangible
personalty in New York and Massachusetts should not have been
included in determining the clear value on which the Pennsylvania
tax was computed; secondly, that, in determining such clear value,
the stocks in corporations
Page 268 U. S. 501
of other states should not have been included at their full
value without deducting the transfer tax paid to such states in
respect of those stocks; and thirdly, that there was no error in
refusing to make any deduction from the clear value on account of
the estate tax imposed by the United States.
Petitions for certiorari were presented in these cases, but as
the cases are properly here on writs of error, the petitions will
be denied.
Judgments reversed on writs of error.
Petitions for certiorari denied.
[
Footnote 1]
This consisted of rare paintings, rugs, furniture, bronzes,
porcelains, and other art treasures known as "The Frick Collection"
and housed in a building in New York City especially constructed
for the purpose.
[
Footnote 2]
This consisted of furniture, household furnishings, automobiles,
tools, etc., in Mr. Frick's New York house and garage.
[
Footnote 3]
This consisted of paintings, other objects of art, furniture,
household furnishings, farming implements, etc., of Mr. Frick's
estate at Prides Crossing.
[
Footnote 4]
The nature of the tax and the provisions adopted for enforcing
it are illustrated by c. 357, §§ 1, 2, 13, Laws Kansas 1915, p.
452; c. 33, §§ 1, 6, 7, Barnes' West Virginia Code, p. 586.