1. Under the Eighteenth Amendment, Congress has power to prevent
or regulate the sale of denatured alcohol which is not usable as a
beverage. P.
268 U. S.
467.
2. The power of the federal government, granted by the
Amendment, to enforce the prohibition of the manufacture, sale, and
transportation of intoxicating liquor carries with it power to
enact any legislative measures reasonably adapted to promote the
purpose. P.
268 U. S.
468.
Affirmed.
Error to a judgment of the district court based on convictions
under two indictments, the one charging conspiracy to violate the
Prohibition Act and regulations, in offering denatured alcohol for
sale without the required labels, the other charging sale of it for
beverage purposes, etc.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT delivered the opinion of the Court.
Meyer Selzman was tried and convicted on two indictments in the
district court. The first charged him, Martin Bracker, Harry
Porter, and others with a violation of § 37 of the Criminal Code in
conspiring to violate
Page 268 U. S. 467
§ 15, Title III, of the National Prohibition Act (enacted
October 28, 1919, c. 85, 41 Stat. 305), and the regulations
relating to the manufacture and distribution of industrial alcohol
prescribed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue pursuant to the
provisions of Title III of the Act in that they knowingly offered
for sale completely denatured alcohol in packages containing less
than five wine gallons without having affixed to the packages a
label containing the words "Completely denatured alcohol," together
with the word "Poison" and a statement of the danger from its use.
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.
S. 506.
Selzman was also convicted under four counts of the second
indictment of violating § 4 of Title II of the Act, forbidding the
sale of denatured alcohol for beverage purposes or under
circumstances from which the seller may reasonably infer the
intention of the purchaser to use it for such purpose.
This is a writ of error under § 238 of the Judicial Code on the
ground that the provisions of the Prohibition Act in respect to
denatured alcohol under which these indictments were found exceed
the power of Congress. Whether this is a sound contention is the
only question for our decision.
It is said that the Eighteenth Amendment prohibits the
manufacture, sale, and transportation of intoxicating liquor for
beverage purposes only, and that, as denatured alcohol is not
usable as a beverage, the amendment does not give to Congress
authority to prevent or regulate its sale, and that such authority
remains with the states, and is within their police power
exclusively.
Reference is had to the part of § 1 of Title II of the
Prohibition Act (41 Stat. 307), as follows:
"Sec. 1. When used in Title II and Title III of this Act, (1)
the word 'liquor' or the phrase 'intoxicating liquor' shall be
construed to include alcohol, brandy,
Page 268 U. S. 468
whisky, rum, gin, beer, ale, porter, and wine, and in addition
thereto any spirituous, vinous, malt, or fermented liquor, liquids,
and compounds, whether medicated, proprietary, patented, or not,
and by whatever name called, containing one-half of 1 percentum or
more of alcohol by volume which are fit for use for beverage
purposes."
This, it is said, is a proper construction and limitation of
what the Eighteenth Amendment was intended to prohibit and excludes
denatured alcohol, although intoxicating, because not fit for
beverage purposes. The argument is without force.
In order that the uses of alcohol might not be lost to the arts
by reason of the then heavy internal revenue tax, Congress made
provisions (Act of June 7, 1906, c. 3047, 34 Stat. 217, Act of
March 2, 1907, c. 2571, 34 Stat. 1250, and Act of October 3, 1913,
c. 16, § IV, N, subsec. 2, 38 Stat. 114, 199) by which alcohol was
made tax-free if denatured so that it could not be used for a
beverage and evade the federal tax on the potable article. Any
attempt to recover the alcohol thus denatured for beverage purposes
was punished. The plaintiff in error's suggestion is that this was
then within the power of Congress because necessary to protect its
power of levying an excise tax on liquor under § 8, Art. I, of the
Constitution, but that, as there is now no tax upon alcohol to
protect, denatured alcohol has passed out of the domain of
Congressional action. But surely the denaturing of alcohol is now
as necessary in maintaining its use in the arts and prohibiting its
use as a beverage as it was formerly needed to permit its use in
the arts and to prevent its consumption as a beverage without
paying the tax. The power of the federal government, granted by the
Eighteenth Amendment, to enforce the prohibition of the
manufacture, sale, and transportation of intoxicating liquor
carries with it power to enact any legislative measures
Page 268 U. S. 469
reasonably adapted to promote the purpose. The denaturing in
order to render the making and sale of industrial alcohol
compatible with the enforcement of prohibition of alcohol for
beverage purposes is not always effective. The ignorance of some,
the craving and the hardihood of others, and the fraud and cupidity
of still others often tend to defeat its object. It helps the main
purpose of the Amendment, therefore, to hedge about the making and
disposition of the denatured article every reasonable precaution
and penalty to prevent the proper industrial use of it from being
perverted to drinking it. The conclusion is fully supported by the
decisions of this Court in
Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey,
251 U. S. 264,
251 U. S. 282,
and
National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.
S. 350, Par. 11.
See also Huth v. United
States, 295 F. 35, 38.
Affirmed.