1. Assuming that a private corporation engaged in producing oil
from public lands as lessee of the United States under the Leasing
Act of February 25, 1910, is a governmental agency, means or
instrumentality such that an annual license tax measured by a
Page 268 U. S. 46
percentage of the gross value of the annual production cannot
without the consent of Congress be imposed by the state in which
the operation are conducted,
held that consent was given
by the Act, § 32, in the proviso
"That nothing in this Act shall be construed or held to affect
the rights of the states or other local authority to exercise any
rights which they may have, including the right to levy and collect
taxes upon improvements, output of mines, or other rights,
property, or assets of any lessee of the United States."
P.
268 U. S.
48.
2.
Ejusdem generis is a rule of construction, to be
used to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers, and not to subvert
it when ascertained. P.
268 U. S.
49.
65 Mont. 414, 68
id. 550, affirmed.
Error to a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Montana
sustaining a state license tax in a suit brought by the oil company
to enjoin its enforcement.
Page 268 U. S. 47
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit was brought by the oil company to enjoin the
enforcement of an annual license tax imposed by a state statute
(Rev.Codes Mont.1921, §§ 2397-2408)
*
upon persons producing petroleum, etc., equal to one percentum of
the gross value of the oil produced during the year. The statute,
as applied to the company, is assailed as invalid upon the ground
that the company, by assignment of the original leases, is a lessee
of the United States of certain public lands entered as homesteads,
but not yet granted by patent, upon which it
Page 268 U. S. 48
is engaged in prospecting for and producing crude petroleum
under the provisions of the Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, c.
85, 41 Stat. 437, and therefore "is a governmental agency, means or
instrumentality whose operations cannot be taxed by the state." The
state supreme court held otherwise. 65 Mont. 414, 68 Mont. 550.
Whether the company under its leases is an agency, means, or
instrumentality of the United States, or, in the absence of
congressional consent, would be outside the reach of state taxation
we need not stop to consider, since we are of opinion that the
authority of the state exists in virtue of such consent. Section 32
(41 Stat. 450) of the act contains the following proviso:
"
Provided, that nothing in this Act shall be construed
or held to affect the rights of the states or other local authority
to exercise any rights which they may have, including the right to
levy and collect taxes upon improvements, output of mines, or other
rights, property, or assets of any lessee of the United
States."
The contention on behalf of the company is that this proviso,
which saves from the effect of any possible adverse construction of
the act, rights of the states "which they may have" relates to, and
is confirmatory of, existing rights only -- that is to say, rights
existing when the act was passed. But we find nothing in the body
of the act which, by any stretch of meaning, purports to detract
from or render less certain any such preexisting rights, and, in
that view, the theory advanced fails for want of material upon
which to operate. It fairly cannot be supposed that Congress would
indulge in the altogether idle ceremony of enacting a law to save
rights which, being in no way challenged or affected, stood in no
need of being saved. The more natural view, and the one we adopt,
is that Congress, having provided for leasing the public lands to
private corporations and persons whose
Page 268 U. S. 49
property, income, business, and occupations ordinarily were
subject to state taxation, meant by the proviso to say in effect
that, although the act deals with the letting of public lands and
the relations of the government to the lessee thereof, nothing in
it shall be so construed as to affect the right of the states, in
respect of such private persons and corporations, to levy and
collect taxes as though the government were not concerned. In other
words, the purpose of Congress was to remove altogether from the
field of controversy, among other questions, the very question
which is here presented, and to put beyond doubt the authority of
the states to impose taxes upon lessees in respect of their
property, although arising from, and in respect of their taxable
rights, although exercised under the act, without regard to the
origin thereof or to the interest of the United States in the lands
or leases.
Further, it is said that the enumeration of particular objects
of taxation causes it to be necessary to limit the general words,
"or other rights," to things of the same nature in accordance with
the doctrine of
ejusdem generis, and that, thus limited,
the right or privilege of carrying on a business or following an
occupation is not included. These general words follow the more
particular words, "improvements [and] output of mines," and are
followed by the equally general words, "property or assets," the
entire clause being "improvements, output of mines, or other rights
[other] property, or [other] assets." The doctrine invoked is a
rule of construction, to be used as an aid in the ascertainment of
the intention of the lawmakers, and not for the purpose of
subverting such intention when ascertained. Here, the enumeration
of taxable things, including the general classes, property, and
assets, is so comprehensive that nothing remains to which the
phrase in question can apply, unless to rights like the one here
taxed, and to construe it as contended, would
Page 268 U. S. 50
in effect, therefore, nullify it altogether.
Mason v. United
States, 260 U. S. 545,
260 U. S.
553-554. No doubt what Congress immediately had in mind
was the necessity of making it clear that, notwithstanding the
interest of the government in the leased lands, the right of the
states to tax improvements thereon and the output thereof should
not be in doubt; but the intention likewise to save the authority
of the states in respect of all other taxable things is made
evident by the addition of the three general categories, "other
rights, property, or assets." We think the proviso plainly
discloses the intention of Congress that persons and corporations
contracting with the United States under the act should not, for
that reason, be exempt from any form of state taxation otherwise
lawful.
Decree affirmed.
*
"2398. Oil License Tax. Every person engaging in or carrying on
the business of producing, within this state, petroleum, . . .
must, for the year 1921, and each year thereafter, when engaged in
or carrying on any such business in this state, pay to the state
treasurer, for the exclusive use and benefit of the State of
Montana, license tax for engaging in and carrying on such business
in an amount equal to one percentum of the total gross value of all
petroleum and other mineral or crude oil produced by such person
within this state during such year. . . ."