1. In extradition proceedings, form is not to be insisted upon
beyond the requirements of safety and justice, and the competent
evidence establishing reasonable grounds for extradition is not
necessarily evidence competent to convict. P.
268 U. S.
312.
2. Habeas corpus cannot be used to rehear the findings of a
magistrate in extradition, but only to inquire whether he had
jurisdiction, whether the offense is within the treaty, and whether
there was any evidence warranting the finding of reasonable ground
to believe the accused guilty. P.
268 U. S.
312.
3. Complaint in extradition filed by an Assistant United States
Attorney, upon information,
held sufficient where it
appeared at the hearing that it was ordered by the Attorney General
upon request of the Secretary of State based on a request and a
record of judicial proceedings from the foreign country. P.
268 U. S.
312.
4. Embezzlement or peculation of public funds by a public
officer is a crime in Mexico within the extradition treaty. P.
268 U. S.
313.
5. Warrant in extradition (if required)
held good in
habeas corpus, over the objection of misnomer of the accused, where
the name in the warrant was one of two applied to him in the
proceedings and he was identified by the testimony.
Affirmed.
Appeal from a judgment of the district court remanding the
appellant in a habeas corpus case.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellant is charged with embezzlement of public funds while
a public officer of the United States of Mexico.
Page 268 U. S. 312
He was held for surrender to that government after a hearing
before a district judge who found that there was probable cause to
believe that he was guilty and that he was a fugitive from justice.
Writs of habeas corpus and certiorari were issued by another
district judge who came to the same conclusion and remanded the
appellant. The case is brought here directly upon the somewhat
strained assumption that the construction of our treaty with Mexico
is involved. Being here, out of a natural anxiety to save the
appellant if possible from being sent from New Hampshire to Mexico
for trial, it has been presented as if this were the final stage
and every technical detail were to be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. This is not the law. Form is not to be insisted upon beyond
the requirements of safety and justice.
Glucksman v.
Henkel, 221 U. S. 508,
221 U. S. 512.
Competent evidence to establish reasonable grounds is not
necessarily evidence competent to convict.
See, e.g., Bingham
v. Bradley, 241 U. S. 511,
241 U. S. 517;
Collins v. Loisel, 259 U. S. 309,
259 U. S. 317.
1 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., ยง 4(6), p. 21.
The foregoing are general principles relating to extradition,
but there are further limits to habeas corpus. That writ, as has
been said very often, cannot take the place of a writ of error. It
is not a means for rehearing what the magistrate already has
decided. The alleged fugitive from justice has had his hearing, and
habeas corpus is available only to inquire whether the magistrate
had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty
and, by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any
evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to
believe the accused guilty.
Benson v. McMahon,
127 U. S. 457;
Re Luis Oteiza y Cortes, 136 U. S. 330;
Bryant v. United States, 167 U. S. 104,
167 U. S. 105;
Elias v. Ramirez, 215 U. S. 398,
215 U. S. 406.
We pass to the consideration of the specific objections urged.
It is objected in the first place that the complaint and warrant
are defective. The complaint was filed by an Assistant
Page 268 U. S. 313
District Attorney of the United States for the District of New
Hampshire. It alleged that the complaint was informed "through
diplomatic channel" that the appellant was duly and legally charged
by the United States of Mexico with the crime, and on behalf of
that government prayed the arrest. Of course, whatever form of
words was used, the complaint necessarily was upon information,
but, as appeared at the hearing, it was filed by order of the
Attorney General, upon request of the Secretary of State, enclosing
a request for the extradition from the Mexican government and a
copy of proceedings in a Mexican court finding that the crime was
duly proved against the appellant and ordering his arrest, many
pages of evidence being appended. This was enough.
Yordi v.
Nolte, 215 U. S. 227,
215 U. S.
231-232;
Rice v. Ames, 180 U.
S. 371,
180 U. S.
375-376;
Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.
S. 508,
221 U. S. 514. The
crime charged is embezzlement or peculation of the public funds
between May, 1922, and February 1, 1923, while a public officer of
the United States of Mexico, to-wit, the Cashier of the Department
of Special Taxes. The crime is within the treaty, and sufficiently
alleged. The warrant is said to be bad because it names Mariana
Viamonte, and not Mariana Viamonte Fernandez, the appellant. He is
named both ways in the proceedings, and is identified by testimony.
There is nothing in this objection, if a warrant is required.
The final objection is that there is no evidence that the
defendant is guilty of the crime charged. This is rather a bold
contention, seeing that, upon the evidence, the appellant was
Cashier in the Department of Special Taxes, had sole charge of the
money, kept the books in his own handwriting, that those books
disclose a considerable deficit in the cash, and that he fled the
country. He is said to have gambled . On his books, the appellant
mingled two classes of accounts, and by so doing made detection
difficult if he was guilty. First there are the items
Page 268 U. S. 314
of cash actually received and paid out entered respectively
under the heads ingress and egress. But besides these were other
transactions, called virtual, in which he did not receive the cash,
but was to enter a series of debits and credits. These concerned
the petroleum tax, which was a stamp tax. The taxpayers handed to
the national treasurer their tax returns, called manifestations,
paid their tax, and received from him a memorandum receipt. The
manifestation and receipt then were handed to the appellant. He
forwarded the receipt to the comptroller and entered the amount in
his egress column. He should then send the manifestation to the
stamp department, which put on the proper stamps and returned it to
appellant, the amount being entered as ingress. In the interval
between the egress and the ingress, he appeared as having paid out
so much money, and could use that amount until it was necessary to
enter the cross item. As the taxpayers were not very prompt in
calling for their papers, it was possible for him to keep their
manifestations for a time without charging himself, withdraw the
amount with which he should charge himself for them, and present an
account that was correct upon its face. By repeating the process,
it was possible to disguise an embezzlement for a considerable
time. This is what, from his books, he seems to have done. It is
unnecessary to go into greater detail. We are of opinion that
probable cause to believe the defendant guilty was shown by
competent evidence, and that the judgment remanding the appellant
must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND was absent and took no part in this
decision.