1. The right of action given by the Employers' Liability Act is
based wholly on tort. P.
268 U. S.
31.
2. Legislation is presumptively territorial, and, in the case of
this statute, an intention to give it extraterritorial effect is
neither disclosed in its words nor inferable from circumstances. P.
268 U. S.
31.
3. An employee of an American railroad company was fatally
injured while operating on its line in Canada, and his
administrator brought an action in this country for damages under
the Liability Act, alleging negligence. The plaintiff and the
decedent, like the carrier, were citizens of the United States.
Held, upon a construction of the Act, and without
considering the power of Congress to impose civil liability on
citizen of the United States for torts committed in alien
territory, that the action would not lie.
Question certified by the circuit court of appeals, arising on
review of a judgment for damages recovered in the district court by
the administrator of a deceased railway employee, in an action
under the Employers' Liability Act.
Page 268 U. S. 30
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
On November 9, 1920, McTier, a citizen of the United States,
while employed on a passenger train operated by the New York
Central Railroad Company between Malone, New York, and Montreal,
Canada, suffered fatal injuries at a point 30 miles north of the
international line. His administrator, also a citizen of the United
States, claiming damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
of April 22, 1908 (c. 149, 35 Stat. 65), as amended April 5, 1910
(c. 36 Stat. 291), brought an action in the United States District
Court for Massachusetts and recovered a judgment for $3,000. This
went for review to the court below, and it has asked instruction on
the question which follows.
"Judicial Code, ยง 239."
"Has the administrator of an employee of a common carrier, who
receives an injury in a foreign country resulting in his death --
the employee and the common carrier being at the time engaged in
foreign commerce and both citizens of the United States -- a right
of action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, or must he
rely on the law or statute of the foreign country where the alleged
act of negligence occurred or the cause of action arose?"
The Liability Act declares that every common carrier by
railroad, while engaging in interstate or foreign commerce, shall
be liable to any of its employees, or, in the case of his death, to
his personal representative for the benefit of his widow and
children, if any, if none, then for his parents, if none, then for
his next of kin dependent upon him, for all damages which may
result from the negligence of any of its officers, agents, or
employees, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency due to its
negligence in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track,
roadbed, ways or works.
Page 268 U. S. 31
And Section 6 provides:
"Under this Act, an action may be brought in a Circuit Court of
the United States, in the district of the residence of the
defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the
defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such
action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the Unites states under
this Act shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several
states, and no case arising under this Act and brought in any state
court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of
the United States."
It is unnecessary for us to consider the power of Congress to
impose civil liability upon citizens of the United States for torts
committed within the territory of another nation. The present case
presents nothing beyond a question of construction.
The statute under consideration lacks the essential
characteristics of those, now very common, which provide for
compensation to employees injured in the line of duty irrespective
of the master's fault. It only undertakes to impose liability for
negligence, which must be shown by proof (
Southern Ry. Co. v.
Gray, 241 U. S. 333,
241 U. S. 339;
New York Central R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.
S. 147,
244 U. S.
150), and demands under it are based wholly upon
tort.
It contains no words which definitely disclose an intention to
give it extraterritorial effect, nor do the circumstances require
an inference of such purpose.
United States v. Bowman,
260 U. S. 94,
260 U. S. 98.
"Legislation is presumptively territorial, and confined to limits
over which the lawmaking power has jurisdiction."
Sandberg v.
McDonald, 248 U. S. 185,
248 U. S.
195.
"The general and almost universal rule is that the character of
an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law
of the country where the act is done. . . . For another
jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to
treat him according to its
Page 268 U. S. 32
own notions, rather than those of the place where he did the
acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an interference with
the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of
nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent. . . .
The foregoing considerations would lead in case of doubt to a
construction of any statute as intended to be confined in its
operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the
lawmaker has general and legitimate power. 'All legislation is
prima facie territorial.'"
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.
S. 347,
213 U. S.
356-357.
In an action brought in a court of the United States to enforce
the liability of a Colorado corporation for injuries wrongfully
inflicted upon a citizen of Texas while within the territory of
Mexico, this Court said:
"But when such a liability is enforced in a jurisdiction foreign
to the place of the wrongful act, obviously that does not mean that
the act in any degree is subject to the
lex fori with
regard to either its quality or its consequences. On the other
hand, it equally little means that the law of the place of the act
is operative outside its own territory. The theory of the foreign
suit is that, although the act complained of was subject to no law
having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an
obligatio, which, like other obligations, follows the
person, and may be enforced wherever the person may be found. . . .
But, as the only source of this obligation is the law of the place
of the act, it follows that that law determines not merely the
existence of the obligation,
Smith v. Condry, 1 How. 28,
but equally determines its extent."
Slater v. Mexican National R. Co., 194 U.
S. 120,
194 U. S.
126.
Under the circumstances disclosed, the administrator had no
right of action based upon the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
The carrier was subject only to such obligations as were imposed by
the laws and statutes of the country where the alleged act of
negligence occurred, and the administrator could not rely upon any
others.