1. Where transportation bills at land grant rates bore
endorsements sufficiently notifying government officers that
payment at those
Page 268 U. S. 272
rates to the railroad was not accepted in final settlement, the
railroad was not barred by acquiescence from further claiming the
difference between the amounts received and the lawful tariff fare.
See So. Pacific Co. v. United States, ante, p.
268 U. S. 263. P.
268 U. S.
274.
2. Claims accruing more than six years before beginning the
action in the Court of Claims are barred by Jud.Code § 16. P.
268 U. S.
275.
3. The provision of Rev.Stats. § 3477 that all transfers and
assignments of any claim against the United States shall be
absolutely null and void unless made after the allowance of such
claims and the ascertainment of the amount due does not apply to a
transfer of claims through a judicial sale under an order of court.
St. Paul Railroad v. United States, 112 U.
S. 733, distinguished. P.
268 U. S.
275.
59 Ct.Cls. 67 reversed.
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims rejecting claims
of a railroad for transporting passengers for the government.
MR. JUSTICE SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, which was heard with
Southern Pacific Co. v.
United States, ante, p.
268 U. S. 263, is
a similar action brought by the Western Pacific Railroad to recover
the difference between the land grant rates and the full tariff
rates for the transportation of passengers carried at the request
of the government. The Court of Claims, on its findings of fact,
entered judgment dismissing the petition. 59 Ct.Cls. 67.
The petition covers claims for transportation services alleged
to have been furnished between September 24,
Page 268 U. S. 273
1914, and June 18, 1916, [
Footnote 1] (a) by the Western Pacific Railway, a
predecessor in title of the claimant; (b) by receivers of the
property of said railway appointed in a suit brought against it by
a Trustee in a federal district court in California, and (c) by the
claimant, which became the purchaser of the property of said
railway under a sale made in the said suit.
The material facts, as found, are as follows: during the period
in question, the Western Pacific Railway, which had entered into
the so-called land grant equalization agreement [
Footnote 2] for the transportation of troops
of the United States at land grant rates, the receivers in the said
suit, and the claimant, successively carried as passengers, on
government requests, various discharged and retired soldiers,
discharged military prisoners, and other persons. Bills for the
transportation of such persons were presented by the railway, the
receivers, and the claimant, respectively on land grant vouchers,
claiming land grant rates, as in the
Southern Pacific
case,
supra. In all cases, however, there was typewritten
on the vouchers before they were presented, an indorsement in the
following form:
"As United States government accounting officers claim that they
have no authority to allow or pay for the transportation of [here
is typewritten the class of travel objected to] more than the fares
for troops of the United States, such fares are shown herein but
under protest, and the Western Pacific Railway Co., for itself and
connecting carriers does not waive [?] of its rights to full
publish-tariff fares, and payment of any less amount will be
accepted as part payment only for the services performed."
All these vouchers were presented to the government disbursing
officers, and were paid by
Page 268 U. S. 274
them in the amounts of the land grant rates, as claimed, and all
these payments were accepted by the railway, the receivers and the
claimant, respectively.
Pursuant to a sale made under a decree in the trustee's suit in
the district court, the claimant acquired by a special master's
deed all the property, assets, and choses in action belonging to
the Western Pacific Railway or to its receivers. In 1920, after
payment had been received of all the land grant vouchers, the
claimant presented to the proper accounting officers of the
government supplemental claims covering the balance of the full
passenger fares on all the transportation in question. These were
disallowed, and the claimant, on February 2, 1921, brought the
present action.
1. It is not questioned that, in the light of the decision in
United States v. United Pacific Railroad, 249 U.
S. 354, none of the classes of persons here in question
can be regarded as troops of the United States, and that the
claimant and its predecessors would have been entitled originally
to compensation at the full passenger rates. The government
contends, however, that, as was held by the Court of Claims, the
action of the claimant and its predecessors in voluntarily
presenting their bills at land grant rates and accepting payment
thereof precludes the recovery of the balance of the full rates to
which they would otherwise have been entitled. In this aspect, the
present case is in all respects similar to the
Southern Pacific
case, supra, and is controlled by the decision therein, and,
on the authority of that decision, we hold that the indorsements on
the vouchers sufficiently notified the government officers that the
payment of land grant rates was not accepted in final settlement of
the transportation claims, and that the government has not
established an acquiescence in the payment of such rates which
discharges the claims for the remainder of the full tariff
fares.
Page 268 U. S. 275
2. All the claims which accrued more than six years prior to the
beginning of the present action are, however, barred by the express
provision contained in § 156 of the Judicial Code. This was
recognized by the Court of Claims, and is not here questioned.
3. The government further contends that, as to the claims for
transportation furnished by the Western Pacific Railway and its
receivers which were acquired by the claimant under the special
master's deed, a recovery is precluded by § 3477 of the Revised
Statutes. This section provides,
inter alia, that all
transfers and assignments of any claim against the United States
shall be "absolutely null and void" unless made after the allowance
of such claims and the ascertainment of the amount due. The object
of this section is to protect the government and prevent frauds
upon the Treasury. It applies only to cases of voluntary assignment
of demands against the government, and does not embrace cases where
there has been a transfer of title by operation of law.
United
States v. Gillis, 95 U. S. 407,
95 U. S. 4163;
Erwin v. United States, 97 U. S. 392,
97 U. S. 397;
Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U. S. 556,
102 U. S. 560;
Price v. Forrest, 173 U. S. 410,
173 U. S. 421.
And see Seaboard Air Line v. United States, 256 U.
S. 655,
256 U. S. 657.
In
Price v. Forrest, supra, p.
173 U. S. 422,
it was specifically held that this section did not apply to the
assignment of a claim to a receiver under the order of a court,
this being "the act of the law." So here, the sale to the claimant
of so much of the claims as had accrued to the receivers for
transportation furnished by them was clearly a transfer by
operation of law, and did not come within the prohibition of the
statute.
As to the claims for the transportation that had been previously
furnished by the Western Pacific Railway, the government relies
upon
St. Paul Railroad v. United States, 112 U.
S. 733,
112 U. S. 736,
in which there was a general statement -- not necessarily involved
in the decision of the
Page 268 U. S. 276
case -- that a voluntary transfer of a claim against the United
States by way of mortgage, finally completed and made absolute by a
judicial sale, falls within the prohibition of § 3477. We need not
now determine the effect to be given to this general statement, nor
whether it could have any application where the mortgage does not
specifically transfer existing claims against the United States. In
any event, it has no application to the present case. The findings
of fact do not show that these claims were included in any mortgage
executed by the railway or were acquired by the claimant through
its foreclosure, but merely that they were acquired through a
judicial sale pursuant to a decree of the court. So far as appears
from the findings, this was merely a sale of assets of the railway
not covered by a mortgage, bringing the case in this aspect within
the doctrine of
Price v. Forrest, supra, as a transfer of
the claims by operation of law.
We conclude that, on the facts found § 3477 does not preclude
the recovery of any of the claims in suit.
The judgment of the Court of Claims is accordingly reversed, and
the cause remanded to that court for further proceedings in
conformity to this opinion.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
On the hearing, other claims covering transportation furnished
by the claimant after June 18, 1916, the effective date of the
so-called "interterritorial military arrangement" were
withdrawn.
[
Footnote 2]
Southern Pacific Co. v. United States, supra.