By the California Alien Land Law, under which acquisition, use,
or control of agricultural land is forbidden to aliens not eligible
to citizenship under the laws of the United States and interests
which such persons cannot take are to escheat to the state when
conveyed with intent to avoid that result, it is provided that a
prima facie presumption that conveyance is made with that
intent shall arise upon proof of the taking of the property in the
name of a person not inhibited if the consideration is paid, or
Page 268 U. S. 259
agreed or understood to be paid, by an alien of the disqualified
classes. In a prosecution for conspiracy to violate the statute,
where the conveyance as taken by an American citizen and the
consideration paid by an ineligible Japanese, but with intent, as
it was claimed, that the interest should be held for his children,
who were American citizens by birth,
held that the
statutory presumption of intent is consistent with the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and with
the provision of the treaty with Japan guaranteeing lo the subjects
of the parties to it protection of persons and property and
enjoyment in that respect of the rights and privileges granted
native citizens. Pp.
268 U. S.
261-262.
62 Cal. App. 22 affirmed.
Error to a judgment of the California district court of appeal
affirming a sentence for conspiracy to violate the Alien Land Law
of that state. The Supreme Court of California had refused a
petition for review.
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiffs in error were convicted in the superior court of
Sonoma county, California, of conspiracy to effect a transfer of
real property in violation of the Alien Land Law of that state.
Judgment was affirmed by the district court of appeal.
People
v. Cockrill, 62 Cal. App. 22. A petition to have the case
heard and determined in the Supreme Court of California was denied.
The case is here on writ of error. § 237, Judicial Code.
Under the Alien Land Law, Japanese subjects who are not eligible
to citizenship under the laws of the United
Page 268 U. S. 260
States are not permitted to acquire, use, or control
agricultural lands in California. Statutes of California 1921, p.
lxxxiii; Treaty of February 21, 1911 (37 Stat. 1504);
Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U. S. 225;
Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U. S. 313;
Frick v. Webb, 263 U. S. 326;
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197.
Section 9 provides:
"Every transfer of real property, or of an interest therein,
though colorable in form, shall be void as to the state and the
interest thereby conveyed or sought to be conveyed shall escheat to
the state if the property interest involved is of such a character
that an alien mentioned in section two hereof [one not eligible to
citizenship under the laws of the United States] is inhibited from
acquiring, possessing, enjoying or transferring it, and if the
conveyance is made with intent to prevent, evade. or avoid escheat
as provided for herein. A
prima facie presumption that the
conveyance is made with such intent shall arise upon proof of . . .
the taking of the property in the name of a person other than the
persons mentioned in section two hereof if the consideration is
paid or agreed or understood to be paid by an alien mentioned in
section two hereof. . . ."
Section 10 provides that, if two or more persons conspire to
effect a transfer of real property or of any interest therein in
violation of the provisions of the statute, they shall be
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.
Plaintiff in error Cockrill is an American, and Ikada is a
Japanese subject not eligible to citizenship. They entered into an
agreement to purchase certain agricultural lands and to take title
in the name of Cockrill. Ikada furnished the money which was paid
on account of the purchase price, and, upon the making of the
contract, took possession of the property. Cockrill had no interest
in the land, and the prosecution maintained that he made the
contract with the seller and intended to take the deed and hold the
land in trust for Ikada. But
Page 268 U. S. 261
plaintiffs in error represented that the land was being acquired
for, and was to be owned by, the children of Ikada, who are natives
of the United States and entitled to take and hold such lands.
See Estate of Tetsubumi Yano, 188 Cal. 645, 649. The court
included in its charge to the jury the above quoted provisions of §
9. Plaintiffs in error assert that the rule of evidence so declared
violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and also the treaty between the United States and Japan.
It is not, and could not reasonably be, suggested that the
statute is repugnant to the due process clause. It does not operate
to preclude any defense. The inference that payment of the purchase
price by one from whom the privilege of acquisition is withheld,
and the taking of the land in the name of one of another class, are
for the purpose of getting the control of the land for the
ineligible alien is not fanciful, arbitrary, or unreasonable. There
is a rational connection between the facts and the intent
authorized to be inferred from them. The statute involves no
attempt to relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. It merely creates a presumption which may
be overcome by evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt.
See Yee Hem v. United States, ante, p.
268 U. S. 178;
Mobile, J. & K.C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S.
35,
219 U. S. 43;
People v. Rodriquez, 182 Cal. 197.
The statute is not repugnant to the equal protection clause. The
rule of evidence applies equally and without discrimination to all
persons -- to citizens and eligible aliens as well as to the
ineligible. In the application of the law at the trial, no
distinction was made between the citizen and the Japanese.
Plaintiffs in error maintain that invalidity results from the fact
that, where payment of the purchase price is made by an ineligible
alien, the law creates a presumption of a purpose to prevent,
Page 268 U. S. 262
evade, or avoid escheat, while no such presumption arises where
such payment is made by a citizen or eligible alien. But there are
reasonable grounds for the distinction. Conveyances to ineligible
Japanese are void as to the state, and the lands conveyed escheat.
Payment by such aliens for agricultural lands taken in the names of
persons not of that class reasonably may be given a significance as
evidence of intent to avoid escheat not attributable to like acts
of persons who have the privilege of owning such lands. The equal
protection clause does not require absolute uniformity, or prohibit
every distinction in the laws of the state between ineligible
aliens and other persons within its jurisdiction. The state has a
wide discretion, and may classify persons on bases that are
reasonable and germane having regard to the purpose of the
legislation.
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.
S. 312,
257 U. S. 337.
This is well illustrated by the Alien Land Laws.
Terrace v.
Thompson, supra, 263 U. S. 218;
Porterfield v. Webb, supra, 263 U. S. 233;
Webb v. O'Brien, supra, 263 U. S. 324;
Frick v. Webb, supra, 263 U. S. 333.
The fact that, in California, all privileges in respect of the
acquisition, use, and control of the land for agricultural purposes
are withheld from ineligible Japanese constitutes a reasonable and
valid basis for the rule of evidence.
It is the third paragraph of Article I of the Treaty that
plaintiffs in error contend is violated. The treaty provision
is:
"The citizens or subjects of each of the high contracting
parties shall receive, in the territories of the other, the most
constant protection and security for their persons and property,
and shall enjoy in this respect the same rights and privileges as
are or may be granted to native citizens or subjects, on their
submitting themselves to the conditions imposed upon the native
citizens or subjects. It is plain that the treaty does not furnish
any protection to Japanese subjects in this country against the
application of a rule of evidence created
Page 268 U. S. 263
by state enactment that is not given them by the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. As the law
does not contravene these constitutional provisions, it must be
held not to violate the treaty."
Judgment affirmed.