1. A proper remedy for a state which claims that acts of a
federal official are without authority and derogate from its
quasi-sovereign authority is to by bill in equity in the
federal court to restrain him as an individual, without joining his
superior officers or the United States. P.
268 U. S.
230.
2. A decree of the district court dismissing a bill brought by a
state complaining of an infringement of its right in the highways
and of other reserved powers
held to involve construction
of the Constitution and to be appealable directly to this Court.
Id.
3. The Act of January 26, 1915, creating the Rocky Mountain
National Park did not authorize federal regulation of automobile
traffic inconsistent with the right of the State of Colorado over
traffic on her roads traversing the park area.
Id.
4. It will not be assumed, without proof and in face of the
state's bill to the contrary, that this right of the state has been
ceded to the United States. P.
268 U. S.
231.
Reversed.
Appeal from a decree of the district court dismissing a bill by
which the State of Colorado sought to enjoin the superintendent of
a national park from carrying out certain park regulations,
particularly with regard to automobile traffic, alleged to be
unauthorized by Congress and in derogation of the rights and powers
of the state.
Page 268 U. S. 229
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a bill brought in the district court by the Colorado to
enjoin the superintendent of the Rocky Mountain National Park from
enforcing certain regulations for the government of the park which
are alleged to be beyond the authority conferred by Acts of
Congress and to interfere with the sovereign rights of the state.
These regulations forbid any person to reside permanently, engage
in any business, or erect buildings in the park without permission
in writing from the Director of the National Parks Service, provide
for the removal of disorderly persons and forbid their return
without permission from the Director, and impose a fine or
imprisonment or both for violating these regulations, the
defendant, it seems, being the sole judge. The special subject of
complaint is a further regulation, subject to similar penalties,
that:
"The park is open to automobiles operated for pleasure, but not
to those carrying passengers who are paying, either directly or
indirectly, for the use of machines. (Excepting, however,
automobiles used by transportation lines operating under government
franchises.)"
It is alleged that the defendant and his superior officers
assert full authority over all highways in the park to the
exclusion of the state, and refuse permission to anyone operating
automobiles for hire except one corporation which has received a
permit. It is alleged that he asserts the right to exact a license
fee from privately owned vehicles, although it does not appear that
this has been done in this park. There are many thousands of acres
in the park owned by private persons, and there are houses and
hotels that were built before the park was laid out. It is feared
that the same jurisdiction
Page 268 U. S. 230
will be exercised over the forest reservations in the state, and
it is alleged that all the main highways connecting the eastern and
western parts of the state traverse either the reservations or the
park, which last contains about 400 square miles. The roads were
built by counties and the state under the grant of right in Revised
Statutes, § 2477, before the park was laid out. It is alleged that
the state never has ceded its power. The bill was dismissed for
want of equity by the district court.
The object of the bill is to restrain an individual from doing
acts that it is alleged that he has no authority to do and that
derogate from the
quasi-sovereign authority of the state.
There is no question that a bill in equity is a proper remedy, and
that it may be pursued against the defendant without joining either
his superior officers or the United States.
Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U. S. 416,
252 U. S. 431;
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.
S. 605,
223 U. S.
619-620. As the bill was dismissed upon the merits, it
is not necessary to say more upon this preliminary question. Also,
the direct appeal to this Court is proper, as the state complains
of an infringement of its right in the highways and of its other
reserved powers, and the case as made involves the construction of
the Constitution of the United States.
The park was created by the Act of January 26, 1915, c.19; 38
Stat. 798. By § 2, the Act is not to
"affect any valid . . . claim, location, or entry under the land
laws of the United States, whether for homestead, mineral, right of
way, or any other purpose whatsoever,"
and, by § 3,
"no lands located within the park boundaries now held in
private, municipal, or state ownership shall be affected by or
subject to the provisions of this Act."
By § 4, the park is put under the executive control of the
Secretary of the Interior, and it is made his duty to make such
reasonable regulations, not inconsistent with the laws of the
United States, as he deems proper for the management of the same,
such
"regulations being primarily
Page 268 U. S. 231
aimed at the freest use of the said park for recreation purposes
by the public and for the preservation of the natural conditions
and scenic beauties thereof. . . . The regulations governing the
park shall include provisions for the use of automobiles
therein."
There is no attempt to give exclusive jurisdiction to the United
States, but, on the contrary, the rights of the state over the
roads are left unaffected in terms. Apart from those terms, the
state denies the power of Congress to curtail its jurisdiction or
rights without an act of cession from it and an acceptance by the
national government.
Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe,
114 U. S. 525. The
statute establishing the park would not be construed to attempt
such a result.
Leavenworth, Lawrence & Galveston R. Co. v.
United States, 92 U. S. 733. As
the defendant is undertaking to assert exclusive control and to
establish a monopoly in a matter as to which, if the allegations of
the bill are maintained, the state has not surrendered its
legislative power, a cause of action is disclosed if we do not look
beyond the bill, and it was wrongly dismissed. The cases cited for
the defendant do not warrant any such extension of the power of the
United States over land within a state.
Utah Power & Light
Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389,
243 U. S. 404;
McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.
S. 353,
260 U. S. 359.
See Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.
S. 343.
It is said, although it does not appear in the record, that the
decision below was based upon
Robbins v. United States,
284 F. 39, in which these regulations were held to be justified by
a cession from the state. But the alleged cession is not in this
record, and the state denies it in the bill. In its argument, it
maintains that the Acts relied upon by the superintendent do not
have the scope attributed to them, and asserts that, if they had
purported to go so far, they would have been without authority. The
state is entitled to try the question and
Page 268 U. S. 232
to require the alleged grant to be proved. As the case can be
dealt with more satisfactorily when the exact facts are before the
Court, we go into no more elaborate discussion now.
Decree reversed.