1. Congress has power to prohibit the importation of opium and,
as a measure reasonably calculated to aid in the enforcement of the
prohibition, to make its concealment, with knowledge of its
unlawful importation, a crime. P.
268 U. S.
183.
2. The Act of February 9, 1909, §§ 1 and 2, as amended, January
17, 1914, prohibited the importation of smoking opium after April
1, 1909, made it an offense to conceal such opium knowing it to
have been imported contrary to law, and provided that possession by
the defendant "shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize
conviction unless the defendant shall explain the possession to the
satisfaction of the jury." Section 3 provided that, on and after
July 1, 1913, all smoking opium within the United States should be
presumed to have been imported after April 1, 1909, and that the
burden of proof should be on the claimant or accused to rebut the
presumption.
Held that the presumptions thus created are
reasonable, and do not contravene the due process of law and the
compulsory self-incrimination clauses of the Fifth Amendment. P.
268 U. S.
183.
Affirmed.
Error to a sentence upon conviction of the offense of concealing
smoking opium with knowledge that it had been illegally
imported.
Page 268 U. S. 181
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiff in error was convicted in the court below of the
offense of concealing a quantity of smoking opium after importation
with knowledge that it had been imported in violation of Act Feb.
9, 1909, c. 100, 35 Stat. 614, as amended by Act Jan. 17, 1914, c.
9, 38 Stat. 275. Sections 2 and 3 of the act as amended are
challenged as unconstitutional, on the ground that they contravene
the due process of law and the compulsory self-incrimination
clauses of the Fifth Amendment of the federal Constitution.
Section 1 of the act prohibits the importation into the United
States of opium in any form after April 1, 1909, except that opium
and preparations and derivatives thereof, other than smoking opium
or opium prepared for
Page 268 U. S. 182
smoking, may be imported for medicinal purposes only, under
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. Section 2
provides, among other things, that if any person shall conceal or
facilitate the concealment of such opium, etc., after importation,
knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law, the
offender shall be subject to fine or imprisonment or both. It
further provides that, whenever the defendant on trial is shown to
have, or to have had, possession of such opium, etc.,
"such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to
authorize conviction unless the defendant shall explain the
possession to the satisfaction of the jury."
Section 3 provides that, on and after July 1, 1913:
"all smoking opium or opium prepared for smoking found within
the United States shall be presumed to have been imported after the
first day of April, nineteen hundred and nine, and the burden of
proof shall be on the claimant or the accused to rebut such
presumption."
The plaintiff in error, at the time of his arrest in August,
1923, was found in possession of and concealing a quantity of
smoking opium. The lower court overruled a motion for an instructed
verdict of not guilty, and, after stating the foregoing statutory
presumptions, charged the jury in substance that the burden of
proof was on the accused to rebut such presumptions, and that it
devolved upon him to explain that he was rightfully in possession
of the smoking opium -- "at least explain it to the satisfaction of
the jury." The court further charged that the defendant was
presumed to be innocent until the government had satisfied the
minds of the jurors of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; that
the burden to adduce such proof of guilt beyond the existence of a
reasonable doubt rested on the government at all times and
throughout the trial, and that a conviction could not be had "while
a rational doubt remains in the minds of the jury."
Page 268 U. S. 183
The authority of Congress to prohibit the importation of opium
in any form and, as a measure reasonably calculated to aid in the
enforcement of the prohibition, to make its concealment with
knowledge of its unlawful importation a criminal offense is not
open to doubt.
Brolan v. United States, 236 U.
S. 216;
Steinfeldt v. United States, 219 F.
879. The question presented is whether Congress has power to enact
the provisions in respect of the presumptions arising from the
unexplained possession of such opium and from its presence in this
country after the time fixed by the statute.
In
Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S.
35,
219 U. S. 42-43,
this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Lurton, said:
"The law of evidence is full of presumptions either of fact or
law. The former are, of course, disputable, and the strength of any
inference of one fact from proof of another depends upon the
generality of the experience upon which it is founded. . . ."
"Legislation providing that proof of one fact shall constitute
prima facie evidence of the main fact in issue is but to
enact a rule of evidence, and quite within the general power of
government. Statutes, national and state, dealing with such methods
of proof in both civil and criminal cases abound, and the decisions
upholding them are numerous. . . ."
"That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of
another may not constitute a denial of due process of law or a
denial of the equal protection of the law, it is only essential
that there shall be some rational connection between the fact
provided and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of
one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to
be a purely arbitrary mandate. So also it must not, under a guise
of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to preclude the
party from the right to present his defense to the main fact thus
presumed. "
Page 268 U. S. 184
See also Luria v. United States, 231 U. S.
9,
231 U. S. 25;
State v. Moriarty, 50 Conn. 415, 417;
Commonwealth v.
Williams, 6 Gray (Mass.) 1, 3;
State v. Sheehan, 28
R.I. 160.
The legislative provisions here assailed satisfy these
requirements in respect of due process. They have been upheld
against similar attacks, without exception so far as we are
advised, by the lower federal courts.
Charley Toy v. United
States, 266 F. 326, 329;
Gee Woe v. United States,
250 F. 428;
Ng Choy Fong v. United States, 245 F. 305;
United States v. Yee Fing, 222 F. 154;
United States
v. Ah Hung, 243 F. 762, 764. We think it is not an illogical
inference that opium, found in this country more than 4 years (in
the present case, more than 14 years) after its importation had
been prohibited, was unlawfully imported. Nor do we think the
further provision, that possession of such opium in the absence of
a satisfactory explanation shall create a presumption of guilt, is
"so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate." By universal
sentiment and settled policy as evidenced by state and local
legislation for more than half a century, opium is an illegitimate
commodity, the use of which, except as a medicinal agent, is
rigidly condemned. Legitimate possession, unless for medicinal use,
is so highly improbable that to say to any person who obtains the
outlawed commodity,
"since you are bound to know that it cannot be brought into this
country at all, except under regulation for medicinal use, you must
at your peril ascertain and be prepared to show the facts and
circumstances which rebut, or tend to rebut, the natural inference
of unlawful importation, or your knowledge of it,"
is not such an unreasonable requirement as to cause it to fall
outside the constitutional power of Congress.
Every accused person, of course, enters upon his trial clothed
with the presumption of innocence. But that presumption may be
overcome not only by direct proof, but, in many cases, when the
facts standing alone are
Page 268 U. S. 185
not enough, by the additional weight of a countervailing
legislative presumption. If the effect of the legislative act is to
give to the facts from which the presumption is drawn an artificial
value to some extent, it is no more than happens in respect of a
great variety of presumptions not resting upon statute.
See
Dunlop v. United States, 165 U. S. 486,
165 U. S.
502-503;
Wilson v. United States, 162 U.
S. 613,
162 U. S. 619.
In the
Wilson case, the accused, charged with murder, was
found, soon after the homicide, in possession of property that had
belonged to the dead man. This Court upheld a charge of the trial
court to the effect that such possession required the accused to
account for it, to show that, as far as he was concerned, the
possession was innocent and honest, and that, if not so accounted
for, it became "the foundation for a presumption of guilt against
the defendant."
The point that the practical effect of the statute creating the
presumption is to compel the accused person to be a witness against
himself may be put aside with slight discussion. The statute
compels nothing. It does no more than to make possession of the
prohibited article
prima facie evidence of guilt. It
leaves the accused entirely free to testify or not as he chooses.
If the accused happens to be the only repository of the facts
necessary to negative the presumption arising from his possession,
that is a misfortune which the statute under review does not
create, but which is inherent in the case. The same situation might
present itself if there were no statutory presumption and a
prima facie case of concealment with knowledge of unlawful
importation were made by the evidence. The necessity of an
explanation by the accused would be quite as compelling in that
case as in this, but the constraint upon him to give testimony
would arise there, as it arises here, simply from the force of
circumstances, and not from any form of compulsion forbidden by the
Constitution.
Judgment affirmed.