1. Where a federal statute excludes jurisdiction in state well
as federal courts, judgment of a district court dismissing the case
for that reason is not reviewable here directly under Jud.Code §
238. P.
267 U. S. 467.
2. The Dent Act, which provides for adjustment of certain
classes of claims against the United States through the Secretary
of War and by suit in the Court of Claims, did not purport to
confer jurisdiction on that court over a suit against the United
States Spruce Production Corporation, which, though a federal
agency, is a corporation of the State of Washington. P.
267 U. S.
466.
3. An action against the Spruce Corporation to recover for work
done, materials furnished or destroyed, and profits lost in
consequence of a government requisition prior to the Dent Act
held within the jurisdiction of the state court and of the
district court on removal, whatever the merits.
Id.
Reversed.
Error to a judgment of the district court dismissing an action
for want of jurisdiction as a federal court.
Page 267 U. S. 466
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case comes here directly from the district court by a writ
of error and a certificate that the action was dismissed upon the
ground that the Court had no jurisdiction.
The suit was begun in a Court of the State of Oregon and
removed. It was brought against the corporation described in
Clallam County v. United States, 263 U.
S. 341, to recover for work done, materials furnished or
destroyed, and profits lost, during the year 1918 in consequence of
a requisition by the government that the plaintiffs should devote
their logging camp to the production of airplane timber alone. The
declaration is long, and suggests throughout an effort to state a
case under the Dent Act of March 2, 1919, c. 94, 40 Stat. 1272, and
to account for this suit by the fact that the plaintiffs' claim
under that Act was disallowed. The assurances and promises relied
upon seem to have been the assurances and promises of successive
agents of the United States that the United States would pay for
what the plaintiffs were asked to do.
The Court below seems to have regarded the Dent Act as giving
the only remedy in cases like this, although the supposed cause of
action arose before that Act was passed, and, according to the
certificate, treated the statute as excluding jurisdiction
elsewhere. If the suit were against the United States, as no Court
has jurisdiction over the
Page 267 U. S. 467
United States except when it is granted, the ruling might have
been correct. But this suit is against a corporation of the State
of Washington, brought originally in a court of Oregon to enforce a
supposed liability in contract. Even if a statute of the United
States created a bar, it would be unusual if the act went to the
jurisdiction, rather than to the merits,
Fauntleroy v.
Lum, 210 U. S. 230,
210 U. S. 235,
and if the statute went further, it would be more likely to exclude
jurisdiction in all other courts, rather than merely in courts of
the United States as such. If the statute excluded jurisdiction in
state as well as United States courts, the case could not be
certified under § 238 of the Judicial Code.
Fore River
Shipbuilding Co. v. Hagg, 219 U. S. 175,
219 U. S. 178.
But the Dent Act does not contemplate suits against corporations in
the Court of Claims, and we perceive no ground for the ruling as
certified. It well may be that the Court was right in deciding that
the allegations were not sufficient to justify a suit against the
corporation, and our judgment is without prejudice to a judgment
dismissing the case upon the merits. But it was error to decide
that there was a want of jurisdiction, and therefore the judgment
must be reversed.
Judgment reversed.
