Where the government erected and used buildings on leased land
with the oral permission of the lessee, and subsequently removed
them, although the lessors contended that the right to do so had
expired by the terms of the lease,
held (a) that, in the
absence of proof that the government had knowledge of the terms of
the lease or of the lessors' acquiescence in the user, no
relation
Page 267 U. S. 424
of landlord and tenant existed between the lessors and the
United States under the lease from which an agreement of the latter
to pay for the property could be implied. P.
267 U. S.
426.
(b) The government having removed the buildings under claim of
right, no agreement to pay as for property taken for public use
could be implied. P.
267 U. S. 427.
58 Ct.Cls. 485 affirmed.
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing the
petition on demurrer.
MR. JUSTICE SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action was brought by Margaret W. Pearson and her husband
under the Tucker Act [
Footnote
1] to recover the value of buildings and improvements erected
by the War Department on leased premises and removed after the
expiration of the lease. The United States demurred to the petition
on the ground that it did not state a cause of action within the
jurisdiction of the court. The demurrer was sustained, and the
petition dismissed. 58 Ct.Cls. 485.
The petition shows the following facts: on September 11, 1917,
the claimants leased to the Chamber of Commerce of Jacksonville,
Florida, a tract of land, to be used solely for federal camp
purposes, for the maximum term of three years. The lease provided
that all buildings and improvements placed upon the land during
said term by the lessee, its successors, or assigns should
remain
Page 267 U. S. 425
"the exclusive property of the lessee, its successors or
assigns," and might be removed within the period of three months
after the expiration of the lease. Shortly after the execution of
the lease, the Chamber of Commerce agreed "verbally" with the War
Department that the land might be used and occupied as a portion of
a training camp for United States troops, and the claimants
acquiesced in and consented to its use and occupancy by the United
States under and subject to the terms, conditions, and provisions
of the lease. The land was thereafter included in Camp Joseph E.
Johnston. The War Department erected thereon a base hospital, homes
for nurses, and other buildings, and placed extensive improvements
thereon. By a general provision in an act of March 3, 1919,
[
Footnote 2] this and other
Camp hospitals were "permanently transferred to the Treasury
Department for the use of the Public Health Service," with so much
of their equipment, sites, and leases and such other buildings and
land as might be required. The lease to the Chamber of Commerce
expired on September 11, 1920. On December 9, 1920, the plaintiff's
attorney wrote the Commanding Officer at Camp Johnston that, by the
terms of the lease, all right of occupation and of entry and
removal of buildings would cease on December 11, and that, on that
date, the property should be finally surrendered to the plaintiffs
without further removal or molestation of any of the property
remaining thereon, and suggesting a conference in reference to the
matter. The Commanding Officer replied to him that the hospital had
been transferred to the Public Health Service, to which his letter
had been referred, and with which the matter should be taken up.
After some further correspondence, the Surgeon General of the
Public Health Service, on March 28, 1921, wrote the claimants'
Page 267 U. S. 426
attorney describing the land as the Pearson Tract "occupied by
the United States," and stating that:
"[o]wing to the necessity of salvaging certain materials placed
upon the property by the government and now needed elsewhere for
hospital purposes, the use of the premises will be required until
about May 1, 1921."
On April 6, the claimants' attorney replied, reiterating the
claim that, under the terms of the lease, all buildings, etc., were
then part of the property and legally were no longer subject to
removal, and suggesting a conference and proper adjustment of the
matter. Without replying to this letter, the Public Health Service
continued to tear down and remove all the buildings and
improvements that had been placed upon the land, and completed such
removal by the end of June, 1921.
The petition alleges that the value of the buildings and
improvements thus removed exceeds $100,000, and prays judgment
against the United States for the full value of the property
"removed as aforesaid from said lands in violation of the rights of
petitioners."
1. The petition does not allege any contract by the United
States, either express or implied in fact, to pay the claimants the
value of the buildings and improvements removed by it. Nor does it
set forth facts on which such a contract will be implied. It does
not appear from the petition that the United States stood in any
contractual relation with the claimants, as an assignee of the
lease or otherwise. On the contrary, it appears that it merely used
the land under the oral permission of the Chamber of Commerce. And,
while the claimants allege in general terms that they acquiesced in
and consented to such use and occupancy subject to the terms of the
lease, it is not shown that the War Department either knew this
fact or had any knowledge of the terms of the lease. Therefore,
whatever may be the construction and effect of the lease as to the
right of
Page 267 U. S. 427
removing buildings and improvements, or the implied obligation
of the lessee or its assigns in regard thereto, the petition fails
to show that, as between the claimants and the United States, there
existed any relationship of landlord and tenant under the lease
from which an agreement to pay for the property can be implied.
2. The petition shows no ground of recovery on an implied
agreement upon the part of the government to pay the claimants for
property taken for public use. No recognition of the plaintiffs'
title is alleged in the petition. On the contrary, the facts shown
plainly indicate that the buildings and improvements were removed
by the government as its own property under the claim of right.
Under these circumstances, no agreement to pay for them can be
implied. Whether the government's claim was well or ill founded is
immaterial. If it was unfounded and the claimants' property rights
violated, the cause of action therefor would be one sounding in
tort, for which the Tucker Act affords no remedy.
Klebe v.
United States, 263 U. S. 188,
263 U. S. 191,
and cases cited.
The demurrer was rightly sustained, and the judgment is
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Act March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 505, c. 359, Judicial Code, §
145.
[
Footnote 2]
40 Stat. 1302, c. 98, § 2.