1. Where a corporation was an "enemy" within the definition of
the Trading with the Enemy Act because doing business in Germany,
the enemy status of its property then seized in this country was
not changed by a subsequent cessation of such business. P.
267 U. S.
44.
2. The fact that an enemy corporation ceased to be an enemy when
the war was ended by the Joint Resolution of July 2, 1921, did not
entitle it to a return of its seized property, for, by § 12 of the
Trading with the Enemy Act, such claims were to be settled by
future direction of Congress.
Id.
3. Clause 1 of § 9-b of the Trading with the Enemy Act, as
amended June 5, 1920, c. 241, 41 Stat. 977, which provides for
return of seized enemy property whose owner was and remains a
"citizen or subject" of a nation other than Germany, Austria,
Hungary, or Austria-Hungary, cannot be construed as including
corporations. So
held in view of the use of "citizen or
subject" in other clauses of the section relating only to natural
persons, and more particularly because the 6th clause of the same
section makes a special classification of partnerships,
associations, and corporations, allowing return of property if they
were and remain entirely owned by subjects or citizens of nations
other than those above mentioned. P.
267 U. S.
45.
4. Whether the terms "citizen or subject" are broad enough to
include corporations depends upon the intent to be gathered from
the legislation in which they occur. P.
267 U. S.
46.
Page 267 U. S. 43
5. Clause 11 of § 9-b of the Trading with the Enemy Act, added
by the amendment of March 4, 1923, c. 285, 42 Stat. 1511, amounts
to a legislative construction of clause 1 as above construed. P.
267 U. S.
48.
53 App.D.C. 173 (289 F. 571) affirmed.
Appeal from a decree of the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia affirming a decree of the Supreme Court of the District
which dismissed the appellant's bill against the Alien Property
Custodian and the Treasurer of the United States to recover
securities seized and held under the Trading with the Enemy
Act.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia under § 250 of the Judicial Code.
The Swiss National Insurance Company filed a bill in equity
against the Alien Property Custodian and the Treasurer of the
United States in the Supreme Court of the District to recover
securities to the value of about $1,000,000. These it had before
the war deposited in the various state treasuries because required
by the state laws as a condition of doing insurance therein. The
Alien Property Custodian had seized them in November, 1918, as
property of an enemy under the definition of § 2, par.(a), of the
Trading with the Enemy Act, approved October 6, 1917, c. 106, 40
Stat. 411, that the word "enemy" should be deemed to mean and
include, for the purpose of the act, "any . . . corporation . . .
incorporated within any country other than the United States and
doing business within" the "territory (including
Page 267 U. S. 44
that occupied by the military and naval forces) of any nation
with which the United States is at war." The plaintiff's petition
admitted that, at the time of the seizure, the plaintiff was doing
business in Germany, and was then an enemy of the United States
under the definition, and that the seizure was lawful. It is
further conceded in argument that the stock of the plaintiff
corporation was largely held by Germans, and a failure to aver the
contrary in the petition makes this fact a part of the case on the
motion of defendants to dismiss the bill.
The grounds stated in the bill for its recovery of the
securities were threefold -- first, that, since the seizure, the
company had ceased to do business in Germany; second, that the war
had been officially declared ended; and, third, that, by virtue of
the amendment of the Trading with the Enemy Act, approved June 5,
1920, c. 241, 41 Stat. 977, the plaintiff became expressly entitled
to the recovery sought.
The motion of defendants was granted, and the bill dismissed.
The decree of the District Supreme Court was affirmed by the
District court of Appeals.
The first contention, that, because the company had ceased to do
business in Germany after the seizure, the Alien Property Custodian
lost his right to continue to hold the property, cannot be
sustained. A change like this could not take away the status of the
seized property as enemy property. The withdrawal from business in
Germany might well involve a transfer of something of value from
the plaintiff to enemy citizens or subjects and strengthen the
enemy resources.
Second, it is argued that, as the war ended by joint resolution
of July 2, 1921, 42 Stat. 105, the plaintiff thereby ceased to be
an enemy, and was entitled to a return of its property without
express legislation giving such a right. It is clear from § 12 of
the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 411, 424, that Congress
did
Page 267 U. S. 45
not intend that such a right should exist. One clause of that
section provides:
"After the end of the war, any claim of any enemy or of an ally
of enemy to any money or other property received and held by the
Alien Property Custodian or deposited in the United States Treasury
shall be settled as Congress shall direct."
The argument for the appellant is that, when the war ended, it
ceased to be an enemy, and so the words quoted do not apply to it.
This is an impossible construction of the section. After the end of
the war, there could be no enemy in the sense in which the
appellant argues. The word "enemy," used in § 12, of course, refers
to the person who or corporation which fulfilled the definition of
an enemy during the war. It follows that the right of the appellant
to recover its property must depend on the congressional direction
subsequent to the original Act. This brings us, then, to the
amendment to the Trading with the Enemy Act of June 5, 1920, 41
Stat. 977.
The third argument of the appellant is then directed to the
question whether the appellant comes within the class of enemies
given the right to recover their property from the Alien Property
Custodian by the 1920 amendment. Section 9, paragraph (a), of that
amendment, provides for a return by order of the President to a
person not an enemy claiming an interest in property seized by the
Custodian, and, failing such order, allows a suit in equity to
recover the property or money due. Paragraph (b) gives a similar
opportunity to anyone who is the owner of property seized and held
by the custodian if the President finds the owner to have been in
one of eight defined classes at the time of the seizure. The first
class among these is:
"A citizen or subject of any nation or state or free city other
than Germany or Austria or Hungary or Austria-Hungary, and [who]
is, at the time of the return
Page 267 U. S. 46
of such money or other property hereunder, a citizen or subject
of any such nation or state or free city."
The sixth class is this:
"A partnership, association, or other unincorporated body of
individuals outside the United States, or a corporation
incorporated within any country other than the United States, and
[which] was entirely owned at such time by subjects or citizens of
nations, states, or free cities other than Germany or Austria or
Hungary or Austria-Hungary, and is so owned at the time of the
return of its money or other property hereunder."
It urged for appellant that it is a citizen of Switzerland, and
is thus included with those favored in the first class. Section 2
of the original Trading with the Enemy Act, approved October 6,
1917, c. 106, 40 Stat. 411, and unrepealed, provides that
"the word 'person,' as used herein, shall be deemed to mean an
individual, partnership, association, company, or other
unincorporated body of individuals, or corporation or body
politic,"
and the word "enemy" is declared to be equally inclusive. But
there is in the Act and its amendments no such definition of the
words "citizen or subject." The term "citizen or subject" may be
broad enough to include corporations of the country whose citizens
are in question.
Paul v.
Virginia, 8 Wall. 168;
Selover v. Walsh,
226 U. S. 112;
Western Turf Association v. Greenberg, 204 U.
S. 359. Whether it is so inclusive in any particular
instance depends upon the intent, to be gathered from the context
and the general purpose of the whole legislation in which it
occurs.
United States v. Northwestern Express Co.,
164 U. S. 686,
164 U. S. 689.
The first clause of paragraph (b) refers to a citizen or subject
who may change his nationality which could hardly refer to a
corporation. The second and third clauses describing the second and
third classes refer to married women, and obviously the term
citizen or subject in them includes only natural persons. Clause
4
Page 267 U. S. 47
concerns a citizen or subject of Germany accredited to the
United States as the wife or child of a diplomatic officer -- of
course, a natural person. Clause 5 describes a citizen or subject
transferred after arrest to the custody of the War Department,
evidently only a natural person. In clause 6, the subjects or
citizens therein referred to are the owners of partnerships,
associations, or incorporated bodies, indicating that they, too,
are natural persons. The context would therefore seem to show that
the words are not used in the paragraph to include more than
individuals. Where, as in the amendment to § 9 of the year before,
July 11, 1919, c. 6, 41 Stat. 35, a proviso was intended to include
individuals and corporations, the word "persons" is used in
connection with the words "citizens or subjects," and thus no doubt
is left of the inclusive effect of the proviso. The foregoing
inferences as to the narrower scope of the term "citizen" in
paragraph (b) are not conclusive, though they are persuasive.
But the strongest, and to us the convincing, argument that the
language of clause 1 of paragraph (b) was not intended to include
corporations is the especial mention of partnerships, associations,
and corporations in clause 6 as a different class from that of
clause 1 of the same section. That class is partnerships,
associations, corporations who were enemies under the Act because
of the business they did in Germany or Austro-Hungary, but whose
owners as partners, associates or stockholders were not enemies
either at the time of the sequestration or at the time of the
return.
It was evidently intended by § 9(b) not to allow any individual
enemies to be favored unless they, as women, only acquired their
status as enemies because of marriage to a male enemy or unless
they were diplomatic representatives of the enemy countries or
members of their families and the property involved was within
Page 267 U. S. 48
the United States because of their diplomatic service, or unless
they were enemies interned in the United States during the war and
were living in the United States at the time of the return of their
property. There was an obvious purpose to exclude all other
individual Germans or Austrians from the privileges of the section,
and it was to carry out this exclusion that clause 6 was drafted to
cover especially the subject of corporations, partnerships, and
associations in which Germans or Austrians should have no interest.
It was of a piece with the subsequent provision of the fifth
section of the Act of July 2, 1921, ending the war (42 Stat. 105,
106, c. 40), designed to retain in custody the property of all
German and Austrian nationals deposited with the Custodian in order
to aid this country and its nationals in collecting claims for
losses against the two enemy governments. The design was further
subsequently revealed, though not so closely adhered to, in clause
11, added to § 9, par.(b), by the second amendment to the Trading
with the Enemy Act (42 Stat. 1511, 1513, c. 285), by which property
could be returned to non-German or non-Austrian corporations
provided that Germans or Austrians did not own 50 percent of the
stock.
Clause 11 of the second amendment was in fact a legislative
construction of clause 1 of paragraph (b) of § 9 in the amendment
of 1920 as we construe it, because otherwise and according to the
contention of the defendants, a non-German or non-Austrian
corporation, though doing business in Germany or Austria, could,
under clause 1 and without clause 11, recover its property whatever
its stock ownership.
Had no clause 6 been inserted in the Act, possibly the words
"citizens or subjects" of clause 1 might have been held to include
corporations; but, with a specification of them as a separate
class, it would violate an obviously sound rule to include them by
construction in clause 1 also as citizens or subjects.
Page 267 U. S. 49
Much has been said in respect to the intent of Congress to be
liberal in this series of acts, as shown by the correspondence of
the Attorney General and his subordinates with the congressional
committees; but nothing has been called to our attention that seems
to us to have real significance in respect to the exact point in
this discussion.
In order to supply some reason or occasion for clause 6, if
clause 1 is to be held to include corporations as citizens or
subjects, it is suggested for appellants that the clause was
intended to cover German and Austrian corporations entirely owned
by citizens of the United States or of other countries than Germany
or Austria. We think this a far-fetched argument to explain the
very general words of this clause when such a purpose might have
been easily attained by specific provision for such exceptional
instances. Under the appellant's construction of clause 6, the
improbable overlapping duplication of clause 1 and clause 6 is so
manifest that we think the construction must be rejected. We
concur, therefore, with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, and
the District Supreme Court.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA participated in the consideration of this
case and concurred in the opinion prior to his resignation.
The separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS.
This cause requires interpretation of § 9, Trading with the
Enemy Act, approved October 6, 1917, c. 106, 40 Stat. 411, 419, as
amended by the Act of June 5, 1920, c. 241, 41 Stat. 977, copied
below. [
Footnote 1]
Page 267 U. S. 50
Section 2 of the original Act, which has remained unchanged,
declares:
"The word 'person,' as used herein, shall be deemed to mean an
individual, partnership, association, company, or other
unincorporated body of individuals, or corporation or body
politic,"
and that the word "enemy" shall be deemed to mean:
"(a) Any individual, partnership, or other body of individuals,
of any nationality, resident within the territory (including that
occupied by the military and naval forces) of any nation with which
the United States is at war [or an ally of such nation], or
resident outside the United
Page 267 U. S. 51
States and doing business within such territory, and any
corporation incorporated within such territory of any nation with
which the United States is at war [or an ally of such nation] or
incorporated within any country other than the United States and
doing business within such territory. . . ."
For many years, appellant has been incorporated under the laws
of Switzerland. Prior to 1917 and continuously thereafter until
1922, it did an insurance business in Germany. From 1910 until
November 18, 1918, it carried on the same business within several
of our states, and as security for its obligations deposited many
domestic
Page 267 U. S. 52
bonds -- a million dollars. On the latter date -- a week after
the Armistice -- the Alien Property Custodian took possession of
these bonds, and either he or the Treasurer of the United States
now holds them. Claiming the sequestered securities or their
proceeds under § 9, subsection (b), appellant began this proceeding
in the Supreme Court, District of Columbia, November 28, 1921. That
court held the corporation could not prevail, because subjects of
Germany held some of its stock, and upon motion dismissed the bill.
The court of appeals affirmed the decree. The corporation came
within the term "enemy" solely because of its business within
Germany; but
Page 267 U. S. 53
it is admitted that enemy subjects owned and controlled a
majority of the capital stock. Apparently the sequestration was
permissible; its propriety after cessation of hostilities is not
for our determination.
As an incorporated citizen or subject of Switzerland appellant
claims to come within paragraph (1) of the amended Act:
"(1) A citizen or subject of any nation or state or free city
other than Germany or Austria or Hungary or Austria-Hungary, and is
at the time of the return of such money or other property hereunder
a citizen or subject of any such nation or state or free city.
"
Page 267 U. S. 54
On the other hand, the insistence is that, although the words
"citizen or subject" often include corporations, as well as natural
persons, this is not necessarily true, but depends always upon the
intent disclosed by context and other accompanying circumstances.
Further, that, although corporations would normally fall within the
words of paragraph (1), without more, the contrary intent is
disclosed and they are excluded therefrom by the provisions
touching certain corporations found in paragraph (6):
"(6) A partnership, association, or other unincorporated body of
individuals outside the United States, or a
Page 267 U. S. 55
corporation incorporated within any country other than the
United States, and was entirely owned at such time by subjects or
citizens of nations, states, or free cities other than Germany or
Austria or Hungary or Austria-Hungary and is so owned at the time
of the return of its money or other property hereunder."
Also, that the purpose to exclude corporations from paragraph
(1) is further accentuated by the legislative construction
disclosed by paragraph (11), adopted March 4, 1923, 42 Stat. 1511,
1513, c. 285:
"(11) A partnership, association, or other unincorporated body
of individuals, having its principal place of
Page 267 U. S. 56
business within any country other than Germany, Austria,
Hungary, or Austria-Hungary, or a corporation, organized or
incorporated within any country other than Germany, Austria,
Hungary, or Austria-Hungary, and that the control of, or more than
50 percentum of the interests or voting power in, any such
partnership, association, other unincorporated body of individuals,
or corporation, was at such time, and is at the time of the return
of any money or other property, vested in citizens or subjects of
nations, states, or free cities other than Germany, Austria,
Hungary, or Austria-Hungary:
Provided, however, that this
subsection shall not affect any rights which any citizen or subject
may have under paragraph (1) of this subsection. "
Page 267 U. S. 57
The proviso of paragraph (11) sufficiently repels the suggestion
that it restricts paragraph (1): "This subsection [paragraph] shall
not affect any rights which any citizens or subject may have under
paragraph (1) of this subsection."
Reporting June 21, 1917 (H.R. 85, 65th Cong. 1st Sess.), the
House committee on interstate and foreign commerce recommended
passage of the original Trading with the Enemy Act, and said:
"The chief objects of this bill are (1) to recognize and apply
concretely, subject to definite modifications, the principle and
practice of international law interdicting trade in time of war,
and (2) to conserve and utilize upon
Page 267 U. S. 58
a basis of practical justice enemy property found within the
jurisdiction of the United States. . . . Citizens cannot be
permitted directly or indirectly to augment the material resources
of the enemy by commercial intercourse, and the necessity for this
interdiction is more obvious today than at any period of the
world's history. Never were the industrial, commercial and
financial resources of belligerent nations so vital to the success
of war as now. It is not extravagant to affirm that the effective
organization of these resources is more likely to determine the
result of the present conflict than armies and navies. Therefore,
everything reasonably possible should be done to prevent our enemy
from reaping the advantages of commercial transactions with the
people of the United States. To summarize, the purpose of the bill
is not to create new international rules or practices, but to
define and mitigate them."
In a favorable report on the same measure, August 31, 1917 (S.R.
113, 65th Cong. 1st Sess.), the Senate committee on commerce
said:
"The purpose of this bill is to mitigate the rules of law which
prohibit all intercourse between the citizens of warring nations,
and to permit, under careful safeguards and restrictions, certain
kinds of business to be carried on. It also provides for the care
and administration of the property and property rights of enemies
and their allies in this country pending the war. The spirit of the
Act is to permit such business intercourse as may be beneficial to
citizens of this country, under rules and regulations of the
President, which will prevent our enemies and their allies from
receiving any benefits therefrom until after the war closes,
leaving to the courts and to future action of Congress the
adjustment of rights and claims arising from such transactions.
Under the old rule, warring nations did not respect the property
rights of their enemies, but a more enlightened opinion
prevails
Page 267 U. S. 59
at the present time, and it is now thought to be entirely proper
to use the property of enemies without confiscating it; also to
allow such business as fire insurance, issuance and use of patents,
etc., to be carried on with our enemies and their allies, provided
that none of the profits arising therefrom shall be sent out of
this country until the war ends."
The intent to conserve and utilize enemy property upon a basis
of practical justice and to prevent the owners from receiving
benefits therefrom until after the war, but without ultimate
confiscation, is clear. And, where the words permit, the statute
and its amendments should be liberally interpreted to that end.
By executive orders, the President vested certain wide powers,
conferred upon him by the Trading with the Enemy Act, in the Alien
Property Custodian, and that officer diligently proceeded to
sequestrate property which, as he held, belonged to enemies.
See Central Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.
S. 554,
254 U. S. 567;
Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239,
255 U. S. 245;
Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U. S.
51,
262 U. S. 56.
Reporting to the President, February 22, 1919 (Sen.Doc. vol. 8, pp.
9, 13), the Custodian said:
"At the close of business on February 15, 1919, 35,400 reports
of enemy property had been received. The property of each enemy
person is treated in the office as a trust and administered by an
organization which is built upon the general lines of a trust
company. The number of separate trusts now being administered
amounts to 32,296 [at one time, it is said, they amounted to
50,000-Senate Hearing, S. 3852, July 27, 1922, p. 21], and have an
aggregate value of $509,945,724.75. About 9,000 of these cases are
covered by reports in which the administration has not yet reached
the stage of valuation. When the entire number of trusts reported
shall have been finally opened on the books and the readjustment of
values consequent upon appraisal shall have been completed,
Page 267 U. S. 60
it is safe to say that the total value of the enemy property in
the hands of the Alien Property Custodian will reach $700,000,000.
. . ."
"The legislative intent was plainly that all enemy property,
concealed as well as disclosed, should be placed entirely beyond
the control or influence of its former owners, where it cannot
eventually yield aid or comfort to the enemy directly or
indirectly. Until the peace terms are finally signed and the
ultimate disposition of enemy property determined by the Act of
Congress, it shall be the firm purpose of the Alien Property
Custodian to carry out the will of the Congress in respect thereto.
Neither litigation nor threat of litigation ought to be interposed
to stay that purpose."
During hostilities and thereafter, he sequestered the property
of enemy subjects, of citizens of the United States, of associated
nations, and of neutrals, found in the Philippine Islands, the
Hawaiian Islands, the Virgin Islands, Porto Rico, and throughout
continental United States. It included practically all forms of
tangible and intangible assets -- industrial plants, chemical and
woolen mills, steamship lines, banks, land and cattle companies,
salmon factories, mines of gold, silver and other metals, corporate
bonds and shares of stock, real estate, trusts represented by
securities, liquid assets, thousands of patents (5,700),
trademarks, prints, labels, and copyrights, etc. The individual
items varied in value from one dollar to thousands, even millions
of dollars. The enactment was novel, and gave rise to many
troublesome questions of fact and law.
After the conclusion of hostilities, insistent demands were made
for return of the property belonging to citizens of the United
States, of associated powers, of neutrals, and of the states partly
composed of territory detached from Germany or Austria.
The Act of July 11, 1919, c. 6, 41 Stat. 35, added to § 9 a
proviso which gave right of recovery to subjects
Page 267 U. S. 61
of associated nations whose property had been sequestered solely
because of residence within territory occupied by enemy forces --
e.g., Belgium and Northern France. There were several
hundred cases of French and Belgium property taken solely because
the owners were in such occupied territory. [H. Comm'n Hearings
1920, vol. 232-1, part 8, p. 11.] This amendment (copied in the
margin [
Footnote 2]) applied to
"a person who was an enemy or ally of enemy" and "is a citizen or
subject of such associated nation." The words "citizen or subject"
include "person," and "person," according to the statutory
definition,
Page 267 U. S. 62
includes "corporation." The same meaning of "citizen or subject"
should be accepted wherever they occur in the section.
March 31, 1920, the Attorney General advised the House committee
on interstate and foreign commerce (H.R. 1089, 66th Cong.2d
Sess.):
"The Secretary of State has written to me that this government
has recognized that the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine have now
become a part of France and that, in his opinion, the continued
retention by the Alien Property Custodian of property of residents
of these provinces who have acquired French nationality under the
Versailles treaty of peace cannot fail to have an unfavorable
effect upon the relations of the United States and France. The
Secretary of State expressed the view that the Trading with the
Enemy Act should be so amended as to allow the return of this
property. He suggested that I recommend to Congress an amendment to
this effect."
"The Secretary of State also points out that this government has
recognized the republics of Poland and Czechoslovakia and the
kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and that for this
government to retain the property of persons who are citizens of
those countries and resident within their borders would have a
prejudicial effect upon the relations between the countries in
question and the United States. The Secretary of State's
recommendation was that any amendment to the Trading with the Enemy
Act should be broad enough to authorize the return of property
belonging to citizens of these counties. He also felt that the
amendment should cover the cases of residents of territory which
may be allotted, under treaties yet to become effective, to an
allied or associated power (as, for example, Trieste), as well as
territory which, under plebiscites to be held in accordance with
treaty provisions, may be allotted to a neutral country (as, for
example, that portion of Schleswig which may be allotted to
Denmark). "
Page 267 U. S. 63
"I am herewith forwarding to you a draft of a bill to amend
Section 9 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, which I believe will
provide the relief requested by the Secretary of State."
May 5, 1920 (H.R. 1089, 66th Cong.2d Sess.), the Secretary of
State wrote to the Attorney General:
"I have the honor to refer to my letter of March 23, 1920,
concerning an amendment to Section 9 of the Trading with the Enemy
Act authorizing the release of property taken over by the Alien
Property Custodian belonging to enemy persons who, by virtue of the
peace treaties, become citizens, subjects or nationals of countries
other than Germany, Austria, or Hungary. In addition to the classes
of property referred to therein, I believe that any amendment to
Section 9 should also contain provisions permitting the return of
all property which at the time it was taken over by the Alien
Property Custodian, belonged to nationals, citizens or subjects of
the United States, as well as those of neutral or friendly states
and of Turkey and Bulgaria."
"The various neutral and allied states whose nationals' property
has been taken over by the Alien Property Custodian by reason of
their residence in enemy or ally of enemy territory, or otherwise,
for some time have been pressing for the release of such property.
It appears that the Department of Justice has ruled that, under the
Trading with the Enemy Act in its present form, it is not in a
position to release this property. During the actual conduct of
hostilities, it may have been advisable to retain such property. In
view, however, of the cessation of hostilities, this department
feels that the government should no longer retain this property,
even though a technical state of war may still exist. To do so
would undoubtedly create an unfavorable impression in the states
concerned, and would be of no advantage to the United States in its
negotiations with enemy countries. "
Page 267 U. S. 64
Enclosing the letter last quoted, the Attorney General wrote
again to the House committee, May 11, 1920 (H.R. 1089, 66th Cong.2d
Sess.):
"Referring to my letter of March 31 concerning certain
legislation amendatory to Section 9 of the Trading with the Enemy
Act to be submitted to your committee at the suggestion of the
Secretary of State, as stated to you in my letter of April 22,
through inadvertence, the draft of the proposed legislation was not
inclosed in the letter of March 31, and thereafter the Secretary of
State requested that the matter be held up so that certain
additional relief, which he considered necessary to give, might be
incorporated in the proposed amendment. These suggestions he has
since furnished to me, and the enclosed draft of a bill amending
Section 9 has been drawn with a view to meeting these suggestions.
I am also enclosing a copy of his letter to me, dated May 5, 1920,
in order that your committee may have the benefit of the
information which it contains."
"The relief called for by this letter required extensive changes
in the text of the bill which was designed to accompany my letter
of March 31, and accordingly I will reanalyze its provisions, and
indicate the change which it would make in existing law. . . ."
"Subsection (b) of the proposed amendment provides, in
substance, for the return of all enemy property except that held by
persons who are in fact
bona fide subjects or citizens of
Germany, Austria or Hungary."
May 21, 1920, the Secretary of State sent the following to the
same committee (H.R. 1089, 66th Cong.2d Sess.):
"The Attorney General has informed me that, on May 11, 1920, he
submitted to you a draft of an amendment to Section 9 of the
Trading with the Enemy Act, permitting the return of property taken
over by the Alien Property Custodian belonging to citizens or
subjects of neutral
Page 267 U. S. 65
states and states associated with this government in the World
War, as well as to persons who have or will, in pursuance of treaty
provisions, become citizens or subjects of such states, for
example, Alsace-Lorraine, or citizens or subjects of new states
which have been recognized by this government, such as Poland and
Czechoslovakia."
"The draft, it is understood, is largely based on
representations from this department, made in view of the fact that
the Attorney General holds that, under the Trading with the Enemy
Act in its present form, he is unable to release property to owners
who, when it was taken over, were included for any reason in the
terms 'enemy' or 'ally of enemy,' as used in the Act, and
consequently, in spite of strong representations by various neutral
and associated governments, it has been impossible to return the
property of their nationals which it would appear this government
should no longer retain. To longer retain property of this
character can hardly fail to unfavorably affect the relations of
this government with the governments concerned, and I am strongly
of the opinion that Section 9 of the Act should be amended at an
early date so as to permit, in proper cases, the return of such
property. I hope that it will be possible to give favorable
consideration to the matter, and that an amendment of the Act can
be passed before the recess of Congress."
The House Committee held protracted hearings (H. Comm'n Hearings
1920, vol. 232-1, part 8), and heard representatives of the State
Department, the Attorney General's office and the Alien Property
Custodian, who stated what had been done and pointed out the
purpose of the proposed amendments. The following is quoted from
statements of Mr. Hill, Assistant to the Solicitor, State
Department, and Mr. Boggs, Special Assistant to the Attorney
General:
Page 267 U. S. 66
"The Chairman: [Mr. Hill,] does not seizure and retention of
this property, by the Alien Property Custodian, of citizens of
Czechoslovakia, Jugo-Slavia, Bulgaria, Turkey and Alsace-Lorraine,
involve any embarrassment on the part of the State Department?"
"Mr. Hill: It does; yes, sir. In addition to that, they have
taken the property of citizens of Switzerland, Holland, and other
neutral countries who, at the time, by reason of residence in
Germany or otherwise, were included in the term 'enemy.' We have
taken over that property, and, under the present wording of the
Act, the Custodian cannot release it, and the Attorney General
cannot upon application Act favorably, because it was, technically,
enemy property at the time. We have a number of cases of that kind,
and they are causing a great deal of embarrassment."
"I may also refer to the case of Czechoslovakia. This government
has recognized the government of Czechoslovakia. Congress made an
appropriation for a minister to that country, and we have
accredited a minister there. This government has recognized the
existence of that country through the executive, and yet we
continue to hold the property of its citizens, which we cannot
release at this time without an amendment of the Act, because they
were enemies at the time the property was taken over. The
Czechoslovakian government has pressed us a good deal for the
return of that property. Conditions in Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Jugo-Slavia, etc., are very serious, and the return of their
citizens' property, in view of the very advantageous rates of
exchange at this time, would be of material assistance in the
rehabilitation of those countries."
"Take the case of Poland: the same situation exists there. We
have a great deal of Polish property. Where the Poles were residing
in that part of Poland which was formerly Austria-Hungarian or
German territory, the department
Page 267 U. S. 67
has been very much embarrassed because there is no discretion
with the Attorney General to return such property. There has been
considerable irritation shown by the various neutral countries, and
considerable pressure by these new associated states, such as
Poland and Czechoslovakia and also Jugo-Slavia, which is a part of
the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. We continue to hold
the property of their citizens, although they were our associates
during the war."
"Mr. Denison (of the committee): Under the terms of this bill,
can that situation be met in the case you referred to of citizens
of Sweden and Norway?"
"Mr. Hill: Paragraph 1 on page 4 permits the return of property
of 'a citizen or subject of any nation or state or free city other
than Germany or Austria or Hungary or Austria-Hungary (including
any state or free city in the four nations last named).' That would
permit the return of such property."
"Mr. Dewalt (of the committee): [Mr. Boggs,] does the proposed
Act have in contemplation the cases of residents of
Alsace-Lorraine, occupied territory?"
"Mr. Boggs: Yes, sir."
"Mr. Dewalt: How do you protect them and what rights do they
receive under this Act?"
"Mr. Boggs: That refers to subdivision No. 1 of subsection (b),
contained on page 4 of the present draft. 'A citizen or subject of
any nation or state or free city other than Germany or Austria or
Hungary or Austria-Hungary' -- as it now reads -- '(including any
state or free city in the four nations last named), and is at the
time of the return of his money or other property hereunder a
citizen or subject of any such nation or state or free city.'"
"Now, that would permit the return to a person who was not a
citizen at the time the property was taken and is not now a citizen
of one of the enemy countries. In order to clarify the situation
with regard to Alsace-Lorraine
Page 267 U. S. 68
and other countries that have been transferred from enemy to
non-enemy or friendly status by virtue of the war, there has been
inserted the proviso [to Section 9 quoted above]."
The foregoing letters and statements indicate the complicated
situation which followed common acceptance of the Treaty of
Versailles and failure by the United States to end the technical
state of war until July 2, 1921 (chapter 40, 42 Stat. 105). They
reveal the desire of the Executive Departments for prompt return of
sequestered property not owned by
bona fide subjects or
citizens of Germany or Austria-Hungary, and their interpretation of
the proposed enactment. Paragraphs (1), (4), (6), (7), and (8) of
subsection (b) apparently originated with the State Department. The
House committee made a favorable report upon the bill, accompanied
by these letters (H.R. 1089, June 2, 1920, 66th Cong.2d Sess.),
and, among other things, said:
"The bill has the approval of the Departments of Justice and
state, as will appear by the letters attached and which are made a
part of this report. . . ."
"The United States, while holding approximately $556,000,000
worth of private property which it found in this country belonging
to individual citizens of enemy countries residing in their country
at the outbreak of the war and still residing there, does not
intend to confiscate this property. It was the intention of
Congress when the property was taken that it should merely be held
in custody during the war and that, after the war, the property or
its proceeds should be returned to the owners. It has never been
the purpose or the practice of the United States to seize the
private property of a belligerent to pay our government's claims
against such belligerent. Such practice is contrary to the spirit
of international law throughout the world. The reasons for the
enactment of the pending measure are clearly set forth in the
accompanying
Page 267 U. S. 69
communications received from the Attorney General and the
Secretary of State. For the reasons set forth in the letter of the
Secretary of State, prompt and favorable action is urged in order
that the State Department may be relieved of some embarrassment in
its dealings with some countries of Europe. For these reasons, the
committee favorably reports the bill as above amended."
The House (Cong.Rec. vol. 59 pt. 8, p. 8429) passed the bill
shortly after this report, and within a few days thereafter the
Senate took like action (
id., 8475). The manifest design
was to restore certain property in compliance with the original
purpose of Congress.
The amending statute reenacted the material provisions of
original § 9 as subsection (a), and added six subsections -- (b),
(c), (d), (e), (f), and (g). It deleted the proviso of July 11,
1919, concerning persons in occupied territory, and inserted a
general proviso applicable to the whole section, which directs that
no person shall be deemed or held to be citizen or subject of
Germany or Austria-Hungary who had been or should become citizen or
subject of any state or nation partly composed of territory once
held by either of those empires. [
Footnote 3] "Person," of course, includes corporation, and
thus, in the section now to be construed, "citizen or subject"
clearly include corporations, and have their true and normal
meaning.
Page 267 U. S. 70
Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller, 266 U.
S. 457, considers § 9, and declares:
"Subsection (a) of Section 9 gives now, as the same words gave
from the first, the right of recovery to any person never 'an enemy
or ally of enemy,' within the statutory definitions. . . .
Subsection (b) adds to those allowed to recover from the first a
considerable number always within the definition of 'enemy' and
affords to them the measure of relief which Congress deemed proper
long after peace had been actually restored. . . . Before its
passage, the original Trading with the Enemy Act was considered in
the light of difficulties certain to follow disregard of corporate
identity and efforts to fix the status of corporations as enemy or
not according to the nationality of stockholders. . . ."
"Section 7, subsection (c), was never intended, we think, to
empower the President to seize corporate property merely because of
enemy stockholders' interests therein. Corporations are brought
within the carefully framed definitions (Sec. 2) of 'enemy' and
'ally of enemy' by the words,"
"Any corporation incorporated within such territory of any
nation with which the United States is at war [or any nation which
is an ally of such nation] or incorporated within any country other
than the United States and doing business within such
territory."
We there pointed out that, under the Act, a corporation is an
entity with character of its own irrespective of the status
attributed to stockholders, and is "enemy" only when directly
within the statutory definition. The theory that all corporations
are excluded from subsection (a)
Page 267 U. S. 71
because some are specifically mentioned in subsection (b),
paragraph (6), was definitely rejected, and we held that a
corporation of the Straits Settlements (British in character) which
had never done business in enemy territory did not come within the
definition, although German nationals owned the controlling
interest.
In his letter of May eleventh, the Attorney General expressed
the view that subsection (b) provided "for the return of all enemy
property, except that held by persons who are in fact
bona
fide subjects or citizens of Germany, Austria or Hungary," and
the Secretary of State thought that it permits the
"return of property taken over by the Alien Property Custodian
belonging to citizens or subjects of neutral states, and states
associated with this government in the World War, as well as to
persons who have or will, in pursuance of treaty provisions, become
citizens or subjects of such states, for example, Alsace-Lorraine,
or citizens or subjects of new states which have been recognized by
this government, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia."
The eight paragraphs of subsection (b) are separated by "or,"
and owners of seized property who are within any described class
may recover. Every paragraph adds some owners, and none restricts
another by express words. The apparent purpose was to relieve any
owner if within any paragraph, not to mark out inclusive and
exclusive classes.
Paragraph (1) is broad enough to include the property of all
neutrals, and so to interpret it will do no violence to any part of
the Act. The words "citizen or subject," as commonly used in
international matters, include corporations.
Paul v.
Virginia, 8 Wall. 168,
75 U. S.
177-178;
United States v. Northwestern Express
Co., 164 U. S. 686,
164 U. S. 689;
Ramsey v. Tacoma Land Co., 196 U.
S. 360,
196 U. S. 362;
Moore's International Law Digest, vol. 3, p. 804;
Id.,
vol. 6, pp. 641, 642.
Page 267 U. S. 72
Corporations of neutral countries, although controlled by enemy
stockholders, were never declared to be "enemy" unless they did
business within hostile territory; the statute gave no regard to
residence or nationality of stockholders. Such business also made
enemies of neutral individuals, and they can recover under
paragraph (1). Hostilities having ended, neutral nations could
properly demand the same right for their corporations. Confiscation
is everywhere disavowed; neutral property may not be used for
adjusting claims against belligerents, and ordinary fair dealing
requires its release. To seize the effects of a neutral corporation
after cessation of hostilities and then hold them solely because of
some enemy stockholder would defeat the lawmakers' honorable
intention and give rise to grave suspicion concerning the purpose
of our government. On the argument, counsel for appellees admitted
that the view which he advocated would prevent return of the
sequestered property of a corporation organized under the laws of a
neutral nation if a German subject owned a single share of the
stock -- if, indeed, he owned less than 1 percent, while Americans
or neutrals held the remainder. This unfortunate, if not absurd,
result indicates the unsoundness of the proposed construction.
Paragraphs (2) and (3) add certain women who married enemy
nationals; (4) and (5) add diplomatic and consular officers and
interned persons; (7) and (8) make further definite additions.
Paragraph (6) adds to those already described "a partnership,
association, or other unincorporated body of individuals outside
the United States" (Germany and Austria-Hungary are outside);
also
"a corporation incorporated within any country other than the
United States (this includes Germany and Austria-Hungary) and was
entirely owned at such time by subjects or citizens of nations,
states, or free cities other than Germany or Austria or Hungary or
Austria-Hungary and is so owned at
Page 267 U. S. 73
the time of the return of its money or other property
hereunder."
This includes corporations of Germany or Austria-Hungary, or of
any state left within those empires, [
Footnote 4] if entirely owned by citizens of the United
States or an associated power or a neutral. The practice of
organizing local companies to do the business of foreign owners has
become very general. Certain important German corporations were
wholly owned by individuals or corporations of the United States.
British subjects had large investments in German concerns, and
probably the same is true of subjects of Sweden, Norway, Holland,
Denmark, Switzerland, and Italy. There were obvious reasons for
releasing property of a corporation when wholly owned by our own
people, by nationals of associated powers, or by neutrals, and
paragraph (6) effects this.
Consider --
That the purpose of the original Act was to provide for the care
and administration, pending the war, of property which might be
helpful to our enemies, and to deprive the owners of its use "until
the war closes."
That no corporation was declared "enemy" because of the
nationality of stockholders, but only when incorporated within
enemy territory or doing business there.
That property of Americans, of citizens of associated nations
and of neutrals was sequestered because of residence or business
carried on within enemy countries.
That, although appellant had been permitted to do business
within the United States during the whole period of
Page 267 U. S. 74
actual hostilities, its property was seized after the Armistice
when such property could not be utilized for hostile purposes.
That the Act of 1919 permitted return of property of any
"person" (this includes corporation) then a "citizen or subject" of
an associated power treated as "enemy" solely because of residence
within enemy lines.
That, after the Armistice, our Executive Departments represented
to Congress the urgent demands for sequestered property of citizens
and subjects of associated nations, neutrals, and states composed
in part of territory formerly within Germany or Austria-Hungary,
and reported the impending deleterious effect upon our foreign
relations.
That the agents of the State Department and the Attorney
General's office pointed out that the amendments proposed by them
provided,
"in substance, for the return of all enemy property except that
held by persons who are in fact
bona fide subjects or
citizens of Germany, Austria or Hungary."
That a general proviso applicable to all of § 9 directs that,
for its purposes, "no person shall be deemed or held to be a
citizen or subject of Germany or Austria or Hungary or
Austria-Hungary" if he becomes the subject of any nation composed
in part of territory formerly belonging to those empires, and it
extends relief to such persons. The words "citizen or subject," as
there used, clearly include "persons," and, by statutory
definition, the latter includes a corporation.
That the original seizure of the property in question would be
difficult to justify, and certainly the United States can have no
moral right longer to retain or to confiscate it. Neutral property
cannot be used in settlement of claims against enemy countries. So
to do would be wholly inconsistent with our traditions and
pretensions.
Page 267 U. S. 75
That the words "citizen or subject of any nation," in paragraph
(1), according to common usage, are broad enough to include
corporations.
That the use of the disjunctive "or" in separating the
paragraphs of subsection (b) indicates that, if an owner comes
within the description of any class, he may recover. The fact that
he falls within more than one is not material.
That paragraph (6) describes a class of owners not within the
words of paragraph (1), and affords possible relief, obviously
desirable, for our own citizens, associates, and neutrals.
That a liberal construction should be given the amendment with a
view to carrying out its benevolent purposes, and not a narrow,
strained one which would reflect discredit upon the government.
That the construction asked by appellees is neither natural nor
necessary, and would lead to the unfortunate conclusion that seized
property of a neutral corporation must be retained because a German
owns one share out of many thousand. Without doing violence to any
part of the Act and by giving effect to every word therein,
citizens of neutrals may secure just relief and the United States
escape the serious charge, of oppressive and unfriendly action.
In view of all these things, I am unable to accept the view
which appellees urge upon us. It seems sufficiently plain that the
court below fell into error, and to affirm the challenged decree
would leave our government in a most unenviable position. "There is
no debt with so much prejudice put off as that of justice."
[
Footnote 1]
"Sec. 9. (a) [As originally enacted.] That any person not an
enemy or ally of enemy claiming any interest, right, or title in
any money or other property which may have been conveyed,
transferred, assigned, delivered, or paid to the Alien Property
Custodian or seized by him hereunder and held by him or by the
Treasurer of the United States, or to whom any debt may be owing
from an enemy or ally of enemy whose property or any part thereof
shall have been conveyed, transferred, assigned, delivered, or paid
to the Alien Property Custodian or seized by him hereunder and held
by him or by the Treasurer of the United States may file with the
said custodian a notice of his claim under oath and in such form
and containing such particulars as the said custodian shall
require, and the President, if application is made therefor by the
claimant, may order the payment, conveyance, transfer, assignment,
or delivery to said claimant of the money or other property so held
by the Alien Property Custodian or by the Treasurer of the United
States, or of the interest therein to which the President shall
determine said claimant is entitled:
Provided, that no
such order by the President shall bar any person from the
prosecution of any suit at law or in equity against the claimant to
establish any right, title, or interest which he may have in such
money or other property. If the President shall not so order within
sixty days after the filing of such application, or if the claimant
shall have filed the notice as above required and shall have made
no application to the President, said claimant may, at any time
before the expiration of six months after the end of the war,
institute a suit in equity in the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia, or in the district court of the United States for the
district in which such claimant resides, or, if a corporation,
where it has its principal place of business (to which suit the
Alien Property Custodian or the Treasurer of the United States, as
the case may be, shall be made a party defendant) to establish the
interest, right, title, or debt so claimed, and if so established
the court shall order the payment, conveyance, transfer,
assignment, or delivery to said claimant of the money or other
property so held by the Alien Property Custodian or by the
Treasurer of the United States or of the interest therein to which
the court shall determine said claimant is entitled. If suit shall
be so instituted, then such money or property shall be retained in
the custody of the Alien Property Custodian, or in the Treasury of
the United States, as provided in this Act, and until any final
judgment or decree which shall be entered in favor of the claimant
shall be fully satisfied by payment or conveyance, transfer,
assignment, or delivery by the defendant, or by the Alien Property
Custodian, or Treasurer of the United States on order of the court,
or until final judgment or decree shall be entered against the
claimant or suit otherwise terminated."
"(b) [Added June 5, 1920.] In respect of all money or other
property conveyed, transferred, assigned, delivered, or paid to the
Alien Property Custodian or seized by him hereunder and held by him
or by the Treasurer of the United States, if the President shall
determine that the owner thereof at the time such money or other
property was required to be so conveyed, transferred, assigned,
delivered, or paid to the Alien Property Custodian or at the time
when it was voluntarily delivered to him or was seized by him was
--"
"(1) A citizen or subject of any nation or state or free city
other than Germany or Austria or Hungary or Austria-Hungary, and is
at the time of the return of such money or other property hereunder
a citizen or subject of any such nation or state or free city;
or"
"(2) A woman who, at the time of her marriage, was a subject or
citizen of a nation which has remained neutral in the war, or of a
nation which was associated with the United States in the
prosecution of said war, and who, prior to April 6, 1917,
intermarried with a subject or citizen of Germany or
Austria-Hungary and that the money or other property concerned was
not acquired by such woman either directly or indirectly from any
subject or citizen of Germany or Austria-Hungary; or"
"(3) A woman who at the time of her marriage was a citizen of
the United States (said citizenship having been acquired by birth
in the United States), and who prior to April 6, 1917, intermarried
with a subject or citizen of Germany or Austria-Hungary, and that
the money or other property concerned was not acquired by such
woman either directly or indirectly from any subject or citizen of
Germany or Austria-Hungary; or"
"(4) A citizen or subject of Germany or Austria or Hungary or
Austria-Hungary and was at the time of the severance of diplomatic
relations between the United States and such nations, respectively,
accredited to the United States as a diplomatic or consular officer
of any such nation, or the wife or minor child of such officer, and
that the money or other property concerned was within the territory
of the United States by reason of the service of such officer in
such capacity; or"
"(5) A citizen or subject of Germany or Austria-Hungary, who by
virtue of the provisions of sections 4067, 4068, 4069, and 4070 of
the Revised Statutes, and of the proclamations and regulations
thereunder, was transferred, after arrest, into the custody of the
War Department of the United States for detention during the war
and is at the time of the return of his money or other property
hereunder living within the United States; or"
"(6) A partnership, association, or other unincorporated body of
individuals outside the United States, or a corporation
incorporated within any country other than the United States, and
was entirely owned at such time by subjects or citizens of nations,
states, or free cities other than Germany or Austria or Hungary or
Austria-Hungary and is so owned at the time of the return of its
money or other property hereunder; or"
"(7) The government of Bulgaria or Turkey, or any political or
municipal subdivision thereof; or"
"(8) The government of Germany or Austria or Hungary or
Austria-Hungary, and that the money or other property concerned was
the diplomatic or consular property of such government; or"
"(9) [Added March 4, 1923.] An individual who was at such time a
citizen or subject of Germany, Austria, Hungary, or
Austria-Hungary, or who is not a citizen or subject of any nation,
state, or free city, and that such money or other property, or the
proceeds thereof, if the same has been converted, does not exceed
in value the sum of $10,000, or, although exceeding in value the
sum of $10,000, is nevertheless susceptible of division, and the
part thereof to be returned hereunder does not exceed in value the
sum of $10,000:
Provided, that an individual shall not be
entitled under this paragraph to the return of any money or other
property owned by a partnership, association, unincorporated body
of individuals, or corporation at the time it was conveyed,
transferred, assigned, delivered, or paid to the Alien Property
Custodian, or seized by him hereunder; or"
"(10) [Added March 4, 1923.] A partnership, association, other
unincorporated body of individuals, or corporation, and that it is
not otherwise entitled to the return of its money or other
property, or any part thereof, under this section, and that such
money or other property, or the proceeds thereof, it the same has
been converted, does not exceed in value the sum of $10,000, or
although exceeding in value the sum of $10,000, is nevertheless
susceptible of division, and the part thereof to be returned
hereunder does not exceed in value the sum of $10,000:
Provided, that no insurance partnership, association, or
corporation, against which any claim or claims may be filed by any
citizen of the United States with the Alien Property Custodian
within sixty days after the time this paragraph takes effect,
whether such claim appears to be barred by the statute of
limitations or not, shall be entitled to avail itself of the
provisions of this paragraph until such claim or claims are
satisfied; or"
"(11) [Added March 4, 1923.] A partnership, association, or
other unincorporated body of individuals, having its principal
place of business within any county other than Germany, Austria,
Hungary, or Austria-Hungary, or a corporation, organized or
incorporated within any country other than Germany, Austria,
Hungary, or Austria-Hungary, and that the control of, or more than
50 percentum of the interests or voting power in, any such
partnership, association, other unincorporated body of individuals,
or corporation, was at such time, and is at the time of the return
of any money or other property, vested in citizens or subjects of
nations, states, or free cities other than Germany, Austria,
Hungary, or Austria-Hungary:
Provided, however, that this
subsection shall not affect any rights which any citizen or subject
may have under paragraph (1) of this subsection --"
"Then the President, without any application being made
therefor, may order the payment, conveyance, transfer, assignment,
or delivery of such money or other property held by the Alien
Property Custodian or by the Treasurer of the United States, or of
the interest therein to which the President shall determine such
person entitled, either to the said owner or to the person by whom
said property was conveyed, transferred, assigned, delivered, or
paid over to the Alien Property Custodian:"
"
Provided, that no person shall be deemed or held to be
a citizen or subject of Germany or Austria or Hungary or
Austria-Hungary for the purposes of this section, even though he
was such citizen or subject at the time first specified in this
subsection, if he has become or shall become,
ipso facto
or through exercise of option, a citizen or subject of any nation
or state or free city other than Germany, Austria, or Hungary,
(first) under the terms of such treaties of peace as have been or
may be concluded subsequent to November 11, 1918, between Germany
or Austria or Hungary (of the one part) and the United States
and/or three or more of the following-named powers: The British
Empire, France, Italy, and Japan (of the other part), or (second)
under the terms of such treaties as have been or may be concluded
in pursuance of the treaties of peace aforesaid between any nation,
state, or free city (of the one part) whose territories, in whole
or in part, on August 4, 1914, formed a portion of the territory of
Germany or Austria-Hungary and the United States and/or three or
more of the following-named powers: The British Empire, France,
Italy, and Japan (of the other part). For the purposes of this
section, any citizen or subject of a state or free city which at
the time of the proposed return of money or other property of such
citizen or subject hereunder forms a part of the territory of any
one of the following nations: Germany, Austria, or Hungary, shall
be deemed to be a citizen or subject of such nation. And the
receipt of the said owner or of the person by whom said property
was conveyed, transferred, assigned, delivered, or paid over to the
Alien Property Custodian shall be a full acquittance and discharge
of the Alien Property Custodian or the Treasurer of the United
States, as the case may be, and of the United States in respect to
all claims of all persons heretofore or hereafter claiming any
right, title, or interest in said property, or compensation or
damages arising from the capture of such property by the President
or the Alien Property Custodian:
Provided further,
however, that, except as herein provided, no such action by the
President shall bar any person from the prosecution of any suit at
law or in equity to establish any right, title, or interest which
he may have therein."
"(c) [Added June 5, 1920.] Any person whose property the
President is authorized to return under the provisions of
subsection (b) hereof may file notice of claim for the return of
such property, as provided in subsection (a) hereof, and thereafter
may make application to the President for allowance of such claim
and/or may institute suit in equity to recover such property, as
provided in said subsection, and with like effect. The President or
the court, as the case may be, may make the same determinations
with respect to citizenship and other relevant facts that the
President is authorized to make under the provisions of subsection
(b) hereof."
"(d) [Added June 5, 1920.] Whenever a person, deceased, would
have been entitled, if living, to the return of his money or other
property hereunder, then his legal representative may proceed for
the return of such property as provided in subsection (a) hereof:
Provided, however, that the President or the court, as the
case may be, before granting such relief shall impose such
conditions by way of security or otherwise as the President or the
court, respectively, shall deem sufficient to insure that such
legal representative will redeliver to the Alien Property Custodian
such portion of the money or other property so received by him as
shall be distributable to any person not eligible as a claimant
under subsections (a) or (c) hereof."
"(e) [Added June 5, 1920.] No money or other property shall be
returned nor any debt allowed under this section to any person who
is a citizen or subject of any nation which was associated with the
United States in the prosecution of the war unless such nation in
like case extends reciprocal rights to citizens of the United
States; nor, in any event, shall a debt be allowed under this
section unless it was owing to and owned by the claimant prior to
October 6, 1917, and as to claimants other than citizens of the
United States unless it arose with reference to the money or other
property held by the Alien Property Custodian or Treasurer of the
United States hereunder."
"(f) [As in original Act.] Except as herein provided, the money
or other property conveyed, transferred, assigned, delivered, or
paid to the Alien Property Custodian, shall not be liable to lien,
attachment, garnishment, trustee process, or execution, or subject
to any order or decree of any court."
"(g) [As in original Act.] This section shall not apply,
however, to money paid to the Alien Property Custodian under
section 10 hereof."
[
Footnote 2]
"[Added to § 9 by amendment of 1919.]
Provided,
however, that in respect of all property heretofore determined
by the President to have been held for, by, on account of, or on
behalf of, or for the benefit of a person who was an enemy or ally
of enemy, if the President, after further investigation, shall
determine that such person was an enemy or ally of enemy solely by
reason of residence in that portion of the territory of any nation
associated with the United States in the prosecution of the war
which was occupied by the military or naval forces of Germany or
Austria-Hungary, or their allies, and that such person is a citizen
or subject of such associated nation, then the President, without
any application being made therefor, may order the payment,
conveyance, transfer, assignment, or delivery of such money or
other property held by the Alien Property Custodian, or by the
Treasurer of the United States, or of the interest therein to which
the President shall determine such person entitled, either to the
said enemy or to the person by whom said property was conveyed,
transferred, assigned, delivered or paid over to the Alien Property
Custodian. And the receipt of the said enemy or of the person by
whom said property was conveyed, transferred, assigned, or
delivered to the Alien Property Custodian, shall be a full
acquittance and discharge of the Alien Property Custodian or the
Treasurer of the United States, as the case may be, and of the
United States in respect of all claims of all persons heretofore or
hereafter claiming any right, title, or interest in said property,
or compensation or damages arising from the capture of such
property by the President or the Alien Property Custodian:
Provided further, however, that, except as herein
provided, no such action by the President shall bar any person from
the prosecution of any suit at law or in equity to establish any
right, title, or interest which he may have therein."
[
Footnote 3]
"No person shall be deemed or held to be a citizen or subject of
Germany or Austria or Hungary or Austria-Hungary for the purposes
of this section, even though he was such citizen or subject at the
time first specified in this subsection, if he has become or shall
become,
ipso facto or through exercise of option, a
citizen or subject of any nation or state or free city other than
Germany, Austria, or Hungary, (first) under the terms of such
treaties of peace as have been or may be concluded subsequent to
November 11, 1918, between Germany or Austria or Hungary (of the
one part) and the United States and/or three or more of the
following-named powers: the British Empire, France, Italy, and
Japan (of the other part), or (second) under the terms of such
treaties as have been or may be concluded in pursuance of the
treaties of peace aforesaid between any nation, state, or free city
(of the one part) whose territories, in whole or in part, on August
4, 1914, formed a portion of the territory of Germany or
Austria-Hungary and the United States and/or three or more of the
following-named powers: the British Empire, France, Italy, and
Japan (of the other part)."
[
Footnote 4]
German Civil Code (1900):
"Sec. 22. An association whose object is the carrying on of an
economic enterprise acquires juristic personality, in the absence
of special provisions of imperial law, by grant from the state. The
power to make such grant belongs to the state in whose territory
the association has its seat."
"Sec. 23. An association whose seat is not in any state may, in
the absence of special provisions of imperial law, be granted
juristic personality by resolution of the Federal Council."