Where a carrier has two routes by which freight may move between
two points within a state, one route wholly within the state and
the other partly through another, a prospective shipment which,
following the carrier's practice and, in the absence of
preference
Page 267 U. S. 405
expressed by the shipper, would move over the latter route, is
to be governed by the Interstate Commerce Act in respect of the
carrier's duty to avoid discrimination in furnishing cars, and a
state regulation in that regard is therefore inapplicable. P.
267 U. S.
407.
212 Mo.App. 512 reversed.
Certiorari to a judgment of the Court of Appeals of Missouri
affirming, with a reduction, a judgment for treble damages
recovered by Stroud from the railroad company, under Rev.Stats. Mo.
§§ 985, 9990, for discrimination in furnishing freight cars.
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action was brought by the respondent against the petitioner
in the Circuit Court of Ripley County, Missouri, to recover treble
damages under §§ 9985, 9990, Revised Statutes of Missouri 1919. The
petitioner is a common carrier of freight and passengers for hire
by railroad in Missouri and other states. Section 9985 contains the
following:
"It shall be unlawful for any such common carrier to make or
give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any
particular person . . . in the transportation of goods . . . or to
subject any particular person . . . to any undue or unreasonable
prejudice or disadvantage with respect to such transportation. . .
."
Section 9990, among other things, makes the carrier liable to
any person injured by a violation of the above-quoted provision for
three times the amount of damages sustained.
June 12, 1920, respondent, who was engaged in the lumber
business, had 20,000 feet of hardwood lumber
Page 267 U. S. 406
ready for shipment at Oxly, Missouri, a station on petitioner's
railroad, and applied for two cars on which to ship the lumber to
St. Louis, Missouri. The petitioner failed to furnish him any cars
until August 19, 1920. After he had ordered the cars, and before
they were delivered, other shippers at Oxly applied to the
petitioner for and were furnished cars for the transportation of
lumber. Respondent alleged that, by § 9985, petitioner was
prohibited from so discriminating against him, and that, as a
result of such unlawful discrimination, he was damaged in the sum
of $1,000. The complaint alleged the foregoing facts, but contained
no allegation that respondent attempted to designate any route,
intrastate or interstate, for the transportation of his lumber. The
answer denied the discrimination and alleged that petitioner moves
its cars from Oxly to St. Louis over two routes, one wholly within
the state of Missouri, the other by way of Thebes, crossing the
Mississippi River at that point and running through the State of
Illinois into St. Louis, that the usual and regular way of routing
cars loaded with lumber at Oxly and consigned to St. Louis would be
over the latter route through the State of Illinois, and would be
interstate commerce, and that § 9985 has no application to the
facts stated in respondent's complaint.
The first trial resulted in a judgment for respondent which was
reversed on appeal. 210 Mo.App. 311. However, the Court of Appeals
held that, under these sections, an action lies for damages for
discrimination in furnishing cars for the shipment of lumber which
could have gone over either an intrastate or interstate route. At
the second trial, petitioner's superintendent of transportation
testified that, under the routing circular then in force,
respondent's lumber would have been hauled over the interstate
route; that the line on the Missouri side of the river passes over
Iron Mountain and other Ozark
Page 267 U. S. 407
hills, and that the routing through Illinois over the more level
line is made as a matter of operating convenience and economy.
There was no other evidence on the point.
Cf. 210 Mo.App.
316. Respondent did not attempt to designate any route, intrastate
or interstate, and there is nothing to show that he expressed or
had any preference in respect of the route. At the close of all the
evidence in the case, the petitioner requested the court to
instruct the jury to return a verdict for petitioner. The court
refused to do so, and, notwithstanding the fact that respondent's
lumber would have moved over the interstate route, submitted the
case to the jury. There was a verdict of $1,000 for respondent, and
judgment was entered for three times that amount. Petitioner
appealed. 212 Mo.App. 512. The Court of Appeals held that
respondent was not entitled to a verdict in excess of $502.50, and
ordered that, if respondent file remittitur, judgment for $1,507.50
would be affirmed. The remittitur was filed, and judgment entered
accordingly. The case is here on certiorari. § 237, Judicial
Code.
Congress, in the exertion of its power over commerce among the
states, has enacted laws for the regulation of the furnishing of
cars to shippers. Interstate Commerce Act, § 1, (3), (4), (6),
(10), (11), (12), (14); § 3(1).
See United States v. New River
Company, 265 U. S. 533,
265 U. S. 541.
Section 3, c. 104, 24 Stat. 380 (as amended February 28, 1920, §
405, c. 91, 41 Stat. 479), is very similar to § 9985, and contains
the following:
"That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the
provisions of this act to make or give any undue or unreasonable
preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm,
corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic,
in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person,
company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular
description of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage
Page 267 U. S. 408
in any respect whatsoever."
It is elementary and well settled that there can be no divided
authority over interstate commerce, and that the acts of Congress
on that subject are supreme and exclusive. Transportation from Oxly
to St. Louis over the route partly within and partly outside of
Missouri is interstate commerce.
Hanley v. Kansas City Southern
Ry. Co., 187 U. S. 617,
187 U. S. 620;
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Speight, 254 U. S.
17. It was shown that the shipment would have moved by
that route. The record discloses no facts which would impose upon
petitioner any obligation to haul respondent's lumber over the
intrastate route.
See Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Solum,
247 U. S. 477,
247 U. S. 482.
The state law has no application to the furnishing of cars to
shippers for the transportation of freight in interstate commerce.
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. v. Hardwick Elevator
Co., 226 U. S. 426,
226 U. S. 435;
Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid, 222 U.
S. 424,
222 U. S. 435;
Steel v. Railroad, 165 Mo.App. 311, 317.
Judgment reversed.