1. An agreement between a railroad company and the Director
General of Railroads for settlement and release of claims like the
agreement in
St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. United States,
ante, 267 U. S. 346,
considered and
held within the authority of the Director
General, and binding on the railroad, even if without
consideration, it being under seal, and operative on the claim in
question. P.
267 U. S.
351.
2. Allegations held not sufficient to charge duress. P.
267 U. S. 352.
58 Ct.Clms. 336 affirmed.
Page 267 U. S. 351
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing the
petition on demurrer.
MR. JUSTICE Brandeis delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Claims which
dismissed the petition on demurrer. Plaintiff's claim is in
character the same as that sued on in
St. Louis, Kennett &
Southeastern R. Co. v. United States, ante, p.
267 U. S. 346. It
is presented in the same manner, and the government makes the same
defense. The provision for settlement and release of claims here
relied upon is substantially the same as in that case. But, in
other respects, the contract is entirely different. It is in the
form, known as the
per diem contract, which contains no
operative provision other than that providing for settlement and
release of claims. The rest of the document consists of recitals
and the testimonium clause. The consideration for the settlement
and release is therein stated to be
"obtaining the advantages of the two days' free time or reclaim
allowance and such other cooperation as is accorded to it by the
Director General of Railroads."
The petition alleges that the Director General gave no more than
he would have been obliged by law to give had no agreement been
made. This is not true. But it is, in any event, without legal
significance. The plaintiff's agreement embodying the release was
under seal. Hence, it is binding even if without a consideration.
The petition alleges also that the agreement
"was accepted by the
Page 267 U. S. 352
officers of the plaintiff for the purpose of saving for
themselves such rights, privileges, and conveniences as were
indicated by the Director General, and was signed for this purpose
only, and not otherwise, and for the supposed concessions set out
in the contract itself."
The allegation does not charge facts constituting legal duress.
United States v. Child &
Co., 12 Wall. 232,
79 U. S. 244.
Nor is it claimed that the agreement is void because of duress.
As in the
St. Louis Co. case, the Director General
clearly had authority to enter into the agreement in question.
Affirmed.