1. The propriety of a transfer of a case from the circuit court
of appeals will be inquired into by this Court of its own motion.
P.
267 U. S.
327.
2. A decree of the district court dismissing a bill "for lack of
jurisdiction" but in the absence of any challenge of the court's
jurisdiction as a federal court, and based upon a conclusion, after
full hearing upon pleadings and evidence, that the acts sought to
be enjoined were not violative of rights claimed by the plaintiff
under a federal statute,
held not to involve the
jurisdiction of the district court as a federal court, and not
appealable directly to this Court, but to the circuit court of
appeals. P.
267 U. S.
328.
3. When the district court lacks jurisdiction as a federal
court, it is without power to impose costs on the plaintiff. P.
267 U. S. 330.
292 F. 876 returned to the circuit court of appeals.
Appeal from a decree of the district court which dismissed a
bill by which the appellants sought to enjoin condemnation of their
land for railway purposes. The case was transferred to this Court
by the circuit court of appeals, to which the appeal was taken. It
is now returned to that court.
Page 267 U. S. 327
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a decree of the Federal Court for Western
Texas which dismissed a bill in equity with costs. There was a full
hearing upon pleadings and evidence. The plaintiffs had moved for
an interlocutory injunction, the defendants to dismiss the bill.
292 F. 876. The decree recited as the ground for dismissal "that
the court is without jurisdiction." The plaintiff took an appeal to
the circuit court of appeals, assigning 15 errors, of which only a
few referred in any way to jurisdiction. The appellate court was of
opinion that, under the rule declared in
United States v.
Jahn, 155 U. S. 109, it
was without jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the district
court had been challenged and the decision there was in favor of
the defendants. The circuit court of appeals therefore transferred
the case to this Court pursuant to Judicial Code, § 238a, as added
by Act Sept. 14, 1922, c. 305, 42 Stat. 837.
See McMillan
Contracting Co. v. Abernathy, 263 U.
S. 438. Whether the transfer should have been made is
the preliminary question requiring decision, although not raised by
counsel.
Smith v. Apple, 264 U. S. 274,
264 U. S.
275.
If the jurisdiction of the district court as a federal court was
the question there in issue, and was the only question, it is clear
that, under § 238, this Court alone had jurisdiction of the appeal
(
Chappell v. United States, 160 U.
S. 499,
160 U. S. 508;
The Carlo Poma, 255 U. S. 219),
and it was proper to transfer the case (
Hoffman v.
McClelland, 264 U. S. 552).
But if the question, called one of jurisdiction
Page 267 U. S. 328
by the lower courts, was not in fact a question of the
jurisdiction of the federal court as such, but whether the action
complained of violated a federal law (
Louie v. United
States, 254 U. S. 548;
Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.
S. 291,
263 U. S.
304-308), or whether a power possessed by the court
should be exercised (
Smith v. Apple, 264 U.
S. 274;
Oliver American Trading Co., Inc. v.
Mexico, 264 U. S. 440),
then the appeal was properly taken to the circuit court of
appeals.
The proceedings in the district court, including its opinion and
decree, and the briefs filed in this Court, show that at no time
was the jurisdiction of the trial court as a federal court
questioned there, and that its jurisdiction as a federal court was
clear. The suit was brought as one "arising under the Constitution
and laws of the United States, and particularly under" the Act to
Regulate Commerce as amended. The sum involved was alleged to
exceed $3,000 exclusive of interest and costs. All the defendants
were alleged to be citizens and residents of the district. All were
duly served. All appeared generally, answered, and introduced
evidence. The motion to dismiss assigned the grounds therefor, and
lack of jurisdiction of the court as a federal court was not one of
them. Lack of merits, lack of equity, and lack of that status which
alone would entitle a private individual to sue were the objections
urged. Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter was also
asserted in terms, but the pleadings and the opinion of the
district court show that this expression was not intended as a
challenge of the jurisdiction of the court as a federal court, but
as a denial of fundamental allegations in the bill essential to a
cause of action, and to the relief under the federal statute
invoked.
The bill alleged that the plaintiffs owned a tract of land in
Texas; that the two corporate defendants, and another defendant who
was the receiver of one of them, were
Page 267 U. S. 329
purposing to construct a railroad across the land; that, to this
end, they were proceeding under a statute of the state to condemn,
in the name of one of these corporations, a right of way over the
land; that the proposed railroad is in fact an extension of the
line of the other railroad corporation, which is engaged in
interstate commerce; that the new line is intended to be used in
interstate commerce, and that, irrespective of intention, it will
be required by the laws of Texas to be open to such commerce; that
it cannot legally be constructed without there first having been
obtained from the Interstate Commerce Commission a certificate of
public convenience and necessity, as provided in paragraphs 18 to
20 of § 1 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, as amended by
Transportation Act 1920, c. 91, § 402, 41 Stat. 456, 477, 478; that
the proposed condemnation of plaintiffs' land was undertaken
without first having secured such certificate, and that this action
violates plaintiff's rights under the federal statute. The district
court said in its opinion:
"Since the plaintiffs' right to injunction rests upon provisions
of an Act of Congress regulating interstate commerce, the Court
would be without jurisdiction unless the facts show: (1) that the
Asphalt Belt Railroad Company is owned and controlled by the San
Antonio, Uvalde & Gulf Railroad Company, an interstate carrier,
thus constituting it an extension and branch of the latter road; or
(2) that the A. B. company is obliged by law, and its purpose is,
to carry on business as an interstate carrier."
The trial court found, on the evidence and as matter of law,
that the railroad which had instituted and brought condemnation
proceedings was an independent intrastate carrier, that it was not
obliged to conduct an interstate business, and that hence its
action in instituting condemnation proceedings, without first
obtaining a certificate from the Interstate Commerce Commission,
was
Page 267 U. S. 330
not in contravention of the federal law. It is this ground, and
this only, on which the district court declared that the bill
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, meaning obviously
that, upon the facts found, it was not warranted in enjoining the
condemnation proceedings, and not that, as a federal tribunal, it
was without power to entertain the suit and inquire into the
matters alleged in the bill.
This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the plaintiffs
were ordered to pay "all costs." If the district court had lacked
jurisdiction as a federal court, it would have been without power
to order the plaintiffs to pay costs.
Blacklock v. Small,
127 U. S. 96;
Citizens' Bank v. Cannon, 164 U.
S. 319.
The cause must be returned to the circuit court of appeals with
directions to proceed.