1. A statute of Maryland, 1922, c. 401, prohibits common
carriers of merchandise or freight by motor vehicle from using
public highways over specified routes without a permit; requires a
Commission to investigate the expediency of granting a permit when
applied for, and authorizes it to refuse if it deems the granting
of the permit prejudicial to the welfare and convenience of the
public.
Held unconstitutional as applied to one desirous
of using the highways as a common carrier in exclusively interstate
commerce.
Buck v. Kuykendall, ante, p.
267 U. S. 307. P.
267 U. S.
323.
2. The facts that the highways here in question were not
constructed or improved with federal aid, and that refusal of the
permit is not mandatory under the statute, but in exercise of a
broad discretion vested in the Commission, do not affect this
conclusion. P.
267 U. S.
324.
143 Md. 570 reversed.
Page 267 U. S. 318
Error to a judgment of the court of appeals of Maryland which
affirmed a judgment dismissing a bill for an injunction.
Page 267 U. S. 323
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
A statute of Maryland prohibits common carriers of merchandise
or freight by motor vehicle from using the public highways over
specified routes without a permit. The Public Service Commission is
charged with the duty to "investigate the expediency of granting
said permit" when applied for, and it is authorized to refuse the
same if it "deems the granting of such permit prejudicial to the
welfare and convenience of the public." Laws Md.1922, c. 401, §
4.
George W. Bush & Sons Company applied for a permit to do an
exclusively interstate business as a common carrier of freight over
specified routes, alleging its willingness and intention to comply
with all applicable regulations concerning the operation of motor
vehicles. After due hearing, the permit was denied. This suit was
brought in a court of the state to restrain the state officials
from interfering
Page 267 U. S. 324
with such use of the company's trucks. The bill alleged, and it
was admitted by demurrer, that the highways were not unduly
congested; that they are so constructed that they can carry burdens
heavier than that which would be imposed by plaintiff's trucks;
that the operation of its trucks would impose no different burden
upon the highways than the operation of the trucks of the same kind
and character by private persons, which was freely permitted, and
that, in refusing the permit, the Commission had considered merely
"whether or not existing lines of transportation would be benefited
or prejudiced and in this way the public interest affected." The
plaintiff claimed that, regardless of permit, it was entitled to
use the highways as a common carrier in exclusively interstate
commerce. The trial court dismissed the bill. Its decree was
affirmed by the highest court of the state. 143 Md. 570. The case
is here on writ of error under § 237 of the Judicial Code.
This case presents two features which were not present in
Buck v. Kuykendall, ante, p.
267 U. S. 307. The
first is that the highways here in question were not constructed or
improved with federal aid. This difference does not prevent the
application of the rule declared in the
Buck case. The
federal aid legislation is of significance not because of the aid
given by the United States for the construction of particular
highways, but because those acts make clear the purpose of Congress
that state highways shall be open to interstate commerce. The
second feature is that here, the permit was refused by the
Commission not in obedience to a mandatory provision of the state
statute, but in the exercise, in a proper manner, of the broad
discretion vested in it. This difference also is not of legal
significance in this connection. The state action in the
Buck case was held to be unconstitutional not because the
statute prescribed an arbitrary test for the granting of permits,
or because the director of
Page 267 U. S. 325
public works had exercised the power conferred arbitrarily or
unreasonably, but because the statute, as construed and applied,
invaded a field reserved by the commerce clause for federal
regulation.
Reversed.
The separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS, delivered in
this case and the one immediately preceding it,
ante, p.
267 U. S. 307.
I am of opinion that the courts below reached correct
conclusions in these causes.
The states have spent enormous sums in constructing roads, and
must continue to maintain and protect them at great cost if they
are to remain fit for travel.
The problems arising out of the sudden increase of motor
vehicles present extraordinary difficulties. As yet, nobody
definitely knows what should be done. Manifestly, the exigency
cannot be met through uniform rules laid down by Congress.
Interstate commerce has been greatly aided -- amazingly
facilitated, indeed -- through legislation and expenditures by the
states. The challenged statutes do not discriminate against such
commerce, do not seriously impede it, and indicate an honest
purpose to promote the best interests of all by preventing
unnecessary destruction and keeping the ways fit for maximum
service.
The federal government has not and cannot undertake precise
regulations. Control by the states must continue -- otherwise,
chaotic conditions will quickly develop. The problems are
essentially local, and should be left with the local authorities
unless and until something is done which really tends to obstruct
the free flow of commercial intercourse.
The situation is similar to the one growing out of the necessity
for harbor regulations. State statutes concerning pilotage, for
example, have been upheld although they amounted to regulation of
interstate and foreign commerce.
"They fall within that class of powers which may be exercised by
the States until Congress has seen fit to act upon the
subject."
Olsen v. Smith, 195 U. S. 332,
195 U. S.
341.