1. In the absence of a bill of exceptions or special findings,
the jurisdiction of the district court over a law case tried by
stipulation without a jury is determinable, on direct appeal to
this Court, only upon the questions of law apparent on the face of
the pleadings. P.
267 U. S. 307.
2. An action in the district court to recover just compensation
for goods alleged to have been commandeered or requisitioned under
the Lever Act, may be brought, under § 10 of that statute, in the
district where the seizure occurred.
Id.
3. Where a statement of claim filed in the district court under
§ 10 of the Lever Act sought recovery of the value of coal alleged
to have been requisitioned under that Act by the President through
the Fuel Administrator and used by the United States in the
operation of various railroads -- " a public use connected with the
common defense" --
held that objections raised by
demurrer, in terms questioning the jurisdiction upon the grounds
that there had been no preliminary determination of value, and
partial payment, as contemplated by the statute, and that the cause
of action was for a diversion of the coal, under § 25, remediable
only by action against the agent designated by the President under
§ 206(a) of the Transportation Act, 1920, did not go to the
jurisdiction of the court, but concerned the merits.
Binderup
v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U. S. 291.
Id.
Affirmed.
Page 267 U. S. 303
Jurisdictional appeal, under Judicial Code, § 238, from a
judgment of the district court awarding compensation for coal taken
by the government.
Page 267 U. S. 304
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Seeking to recover $17,422.32 as compensation for 3,840.9 tons
of bituminous coal, defendant in error, a
Page 267 U. S. 305
Connecticut corporation, instituted this action against the
United States by filing statement of claim in the United States
district court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
It alleged:
That jurisdiction of the action arises under the Fifth Amendment
and the tenth section of the Lever Act. 40 Stat. 276, 279, c.
53.
That the coal in question had been shipped from the mines under
valid contracts during the first part of October, 1919, was owned
by the claimant, and, prior to October 30, 1919, was at Port
Richmond piers, Philadelphia, or at Port Reading piers, New
Jersey.
That jurisdiction of the action arises under the Fifth Amendment
and the tenth § of the Lever Act, c. 53, 40 Stat. 276, 279, c.
53
That,
"by virtue of the authority conferred by the aforesaid act of
Congress, the President of the United States, acting by and through
the Fuel Administrator at Port Richmond piers, Philadelphia, or at
Port Reading piers, New Jersey, commandeered and requisitioned"
this coal during November and December, 1919.
"The said coal was commandeered and requisitioned from or
through the Commissioner of the Tidewater Coal Exchange, the
superintendent of transportation of the Philadelphia & Reading
Railroad Company, the shipping and freight agent of the United
States Railroad Administration at Port Reading terminal piers, New
Jersey, the Bituminous Coal Distribution Committee, the Regional
Coal Committee, the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company,
the Port Reading Railroad Company, the federal treasurer at Port
Reading terminal piers of the United States Railroad
Administration, and the Jamison Coal & Coke Company, the
vendors of the said coal to the plaintiff. All of the aforesaid
coal was received, accepted, retained and used by the United States
of America, and used in the operation of various railroads, to-wit:
Boston & Maine Railroad, Maine Central Railroad, which said use
was a public use connected with the common defense."
That the fair and reasonable value of the coal was $4.536 per
ton f.o.b. the mines; that nothing has been
Page 267 U. S. 306
paid to claimant on account of said coal so commandeered and
requisitioned, and it should have judgment for the value thereof
with interest.
A motion by the United States to dismiss the action upon the
ground that the claimant was a citizen of Connecticut, and
therefore the court lacked jurisdiction, was overruled. Thereupon
the United States interposed a demurrer and set up that the court
had no jurisdiction of the cause, that the statement of claim
showed no cause of action, that, under the Lever Act, district
courts of the United States have jurisdiction of actions only after
determination by the President of the value of the property taken,
expression of dissatisfaction by the owner, and payment of 75
percentum of the determined amount; that the complaint sets forth a
diversion of coal under § 25 of the Lever Act, not a requisition
under § 10, and that the remedy, if any, was to sue the Agent
designated by the President under § 206(a) of the Transportation
Act 1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 461. This was overruled, and the
United States answered.
It was stipulated by counsel that,
"a jury trial being waived, the issues of fact in this case may
be tried and determined by the court without the intervention of a
jury, in accordance with §§ 649 and 700 of the United States
Revised Statutes."
The cause was heard by the court upon the pleadings and
evidence. What purports to be a transcript of the latter is
printed, but it was not made part of the record by bill of
exceptions. The trial judge filed an opinion and entered judgment
for the claimant. No special findings were asked or made.
The cause is here by direct writ of error. The parties agree
that only the question of jurisdiction is open. For the United
States, it is said "the court below was without jurisdiction to
render the judgment, and that is the sole question presented."
Page 267 U. S. 307
As the record contains no bill of exceptions, upon this direct
writ of error, we can review only questions of law apparent on the
face of the pleadings insofar as they directly relate to the
court's jurisdiction.
Insurance Co. v.
Folsom, 18 Wall. 237;
Law v. United
States, 266 U. S. 494.
Jurisdiction was invoked under the Lever Act. The claim is for
something alleged to have been commandeered or requisitioned by the
President, as provided by § 10, and this section confers
jurisdiction without qualification upon district courts to hear and
determine controversies directly resulting from such action.
Houston Coal Co. v. United States, 262 U.
S. 361,
262 U. S. 365.
Proceedings in the district where the seizure actually occurred are
not forbidden, and seem entirely appropriate.
The allegations of the complaint were sufficient to set out a
substantial claim under a federal statute. Accordingly, there was
jurisdiction in the court to pass upon the questions so presented.
Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U.
S. 291,
263 U. S.
305.
Affirmed.