1. Where a freight car with defective automatic coupler was
moved with the train from the main line to a siding to be cut out
and left there,
held that the use, movement, or hauling of
the car, within the meaning of the Safety Appliance Act, had not
ended when a brakeman went between it and he next car to detach the
chain and was injured by the movement of the car by gravity as the
engine was cut off; that he was within the protection of that
statute, and, under the Employer's Liability Act, his assumption of
the risk, or contributory negligence in going between the cars with
knowledge of the danger and without notice to the engineer did not
bar his right of action. P.
267 U. S.
291.
59 Minn. 166 affirmed.
Certiorari to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota which
affirmed a judgment for damages recovered against the railroad
company for personal injuries of a brakeman resulting in death.
Page 267 U. S. 289
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed a judgment in favor of
respondent for damages resulting from the death of his intestate,
Ring, fatally injured while in petitioner's service and while both
were engaging in interstate commerce. The original action was based
upon the Federal Employers' Liability Act, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65, 66,
c. 149, and the Safety Appliance Act of 1893, c.196, 27 Stat. 531,
as amended in 1910, by 36 Stat. 298, 299, c. 160,.
While the freight train upon which Ring served as brakeman was
upon the main line at Budd, Iowa, a drawbar pulled out of a car.
Thereupon the crew chained this car to the one immediately ahead.
The engine pulled the whole train onto the adjacent siding, which
lies on a gentle grade, and stopped. The intention was to detach
the damaged car and leave it there. The plan was to cut off the
engine, bring it around back of the train, remove the rear portion,
couple this to the forward portion, and move on. Acting under the
conductor's direction, Ring asked the head brakeman to tell the
engineer to proceed, and then, without the knowledge of either of
the others, he and the conductor went between the crippled car and
the next one in order to disengage the connecting chain. While they
were working there, the engineer cut off the engine, the car ran
slowly down the grade, and Ring, caught by the chain, suffered
fatal injuries.
A rule of the company provided that employees should advise the
engineer when they were going between or under cars and must know
that he understood their purpose before they put themselves in any
dangerous position. Ring gave no such warning, although familiar
with the rule and with the grade upon which the train stood.
Page 267 U. S. 290
Petitioner insists: (1) The facts do not bring the case within
the Safety Appliance Act, since the car had come to rest on the
side track and had ceased to be "used," within the meaning of the
statute. (2) The defective drawbar did not proximately contribute
to the injury. (3) The violation of the rule by Ring constituted
negligence subsequent to and independent of the question of a
defective safety appliance, and was a proximate cause of the
injury.
It is provided by the original Safety Appliance Act:
"Sec. 2. That on and after the first day of January, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, it shall be unlawful for any such common
carrier to haul or permit to be hauled or used on its line any car
used in moving interstate traffic not equipped with couplers
coupling automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled
without the necessity of men going between the ends of the
cars."
The amendment of 1910 directs:
"Sec. 4. That any common carrier subject to this Act using,
hauling, or permitting to be used or hauled on its line, any car
subject to the requirements of this Act not equipped as provided in
this Act shall be liable to a penalty of one hundred dollars for
each and every such violation: . . .
Provided, that, where
any car shall have been properly equipped, as provided in this Act
and the other Acts mentioned herein, and such equipment shall have
become defective or insecure while such car was being used by such
carrier upon its line of railroad, such car may be hauled from the
place where such equipment was first discovered to be defective or
insecure to the nearest available point where such car can be
repaired, without liability for the penalties imposed by section
four of this Act or section six of the Act of March second,
eighteen hundred and ninety-three as amended by the Act of April
first, eighteen hundred and ninety-six, if such movement is
necessary to make such repairs and
Page 267 U. S. 291
such repairs cannot be made except at such repair point, and
such movement or hauling of such car shall be at the sole risk of
the carrier, and nothing in this section shall be construed to
relieve such carrier from liability in any remedial action for the
death or injury of any railroad employee caused to such employee by
reason of or in connection with the movement or hauling of such car
with equipment which is defective or insecure or which is not
maintained in accordance with the requirements of this Act and the
other Acts herein referred to. . . ."
The Employers' Liability Act provides that, in an action under
it for injury or death of an employee,
"such employee shall not be held to have assumed the risks of
his employment [or to have been guilty of contributory negligence]
in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any
statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the
injury or death of such employee."
Former opinions have adequately explained the purpose of these
enactments.
St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v.
Taylor, 210 U. S. 281,
210 U. S. 293;
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. United States,
220 U. S. 559;
St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. Conarty,
238 U. S. 243;
Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S.
33;
Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v.
Gotschall, 244 U. S. 66;
Lang v. New York Central R. Co., 255 U.
S. 455;
Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U.
S. 239.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v.
Layton, 243 U. S. 617 --
must be understood as in entire harmony with the doctrine announced
in
St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. Conarty, and
not as intended to modify or overrule anything which we there
said.
Under the circumstances disclosed, we think it clear that the
use, movement, or hauling of the defective car, within the meaning
of the statute, had not ended at the time of the accident. To cut
this car out of the train so
Page 267 U. S. 292
that the latter might proceed to destination was the thing in
view, an essential part of the undertaking in connection with which
the injuries arose.
The things shown to have been done by the deceased certainly
amount to no more than contributory negligence or assumption of the
risk, and both of these are removed from consideration by the
Liability Act. When injured, he was
"within the class of persons for whose benefit the Safety
Appliance Acts required that the car be equipped with automatic
couplers and drawbars of standard height. . . . His injury was
within the evil against which the provisions for such appliances
are directed."
St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. Conarty, supra.
He went into the dangerous place because the equipment of the car
which it was necessary to detach did not meet the statutory
requirements especially intended to protect men in his
position.
We find no material error in the judgment below, and it is
Affirmed.