1. Under the Suits in Admiralty Act, suit against the United
States may be brought in the district where the libelant resides,
as well
Page 267 U. S. 123
as in that where the vessel is found, even though it would have
been a suit
in rem if involving only private parties. P.
267 U. S.
125.
2. The language in this regard (§ 2 of Act) should be accorded
its broad and ordinary meaning, and not be interpreted in a
restricted and distributive sense.
Id.
Reversed.
Appeal from a decree of the district court dismissing a libel
for want of jurisdiction, as brought in the wrong district.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT delivered the opinion of the Court.
William Nahmeh, employed as a fireman on the steamship
Quinnipiac, was injured August 3, 1920, in the performance
of his duties. One of his legs had to be amputated. To recover for
this injury, he filed a libel on March 20, 1922, against the United
States as owner of the
Quinnipiac, under the Suits in
Admiralty Act of March 9, 1920, c. 95, 41 St. 525, in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, where
he lived. The steamship
Quinnipiac was then in the
Southern District of New York. The United States appeared specially
and excepted on the ground that the libel did not show that the
steamship was at the date of the filing of the libel within the
Eastern District of New York, and there was no jurisdiction.
December 20, 1922, the appellant made a motion before the District
Court for the Eastern District for an order removing the cause to
the Southern District. The district court denied the motion to
transfer the cause, and, under a decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, in
The Isonomia, 285 F. 516, that
the only district in which such a suit
Page 267 U. S. 124
could be brought was where the vessel was, dismissed it for want
of jurisdiction.
The Suits in Admiralty Act was passed to provide a suit
in
personam in lieu of the previous unlimited right of suitors to
libel merchant vessels belonging to the United States government
in rem in the ports of the United States and in its
possessions -- a right which had proved objectionable. Section 2
and § 3 of the Act indicate the district courts in which suits
under the act were thereafter to be brought. The relevant parts of
those sections are as follows:
"Section 2: That in cases where if such vessel were privately
owned or operated, or if such cargo were privately owned and
possessed, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained at the
time of the commencement of the action herein provided for, a libel
in personam may be brought against the United States or
against such corporation, as the case may be, provided that such
vessel is employed as a merchant vessel or is a tug boat operated
by such corporation. Such suits shall be brought in the district
court of the United States for the district in which the parties so
suing, or any of them, reside or have their principal place of
business in the United States, or in which the vessel or cargo
charged with liability is found, . . . upon application of either
party, the cause may, in the discretion of the court, be
transferred to any other district court of the United States."
"Section 3: If the libellant so elects in his libel, the suit
may proceed in accordance with the principles of libels
in
rem wherever it shall appear that, had the vessel or cargo
been privately owned and possessed, a libel
in rem might
have been maintained. Election so to proceed shall not preclude the
libellant in any proper case from seeking relief
in
personam in the same suit."
We held in the case of
Blamberg Bros. v. United States,
260 U. S. 452,
that the Act did not authorize a
Page 267 U. S. 125
suit
in personam against the United States as a
substitute for a libel
in rem, when a United States vessel
was not in a port of the United States or in one of her possessions
at the time of filing the libel; that Congress had no power to
grant immunity from seizure in respect to such vessels when in
foreign ports, and did not intend to do so. There has been a
difference of opinion, however, with reference to the meaning of
the provisions as to jurisdiction in § 2, relating to vessels
within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Circuit Court of
Appeals of the Second Circuit, in the
Isonomia case,
construed § 2 strictly so far as it provides for jurisdiction,
because it depends on the statutory consent of the United States.
The court therefore came to the conclusion that the language fixing
three places of jurisdiction under the Act should not be held to be
cumulative, but should be applied distributively, and that the
provision by which the suits might be brought in the district where
the vessel charged with the liability was found should be held to
give the only place for jurisdiction in a suit
in personam
against the United States which was substituted by the Act for a
suit against the vessel
in rem. This same view was held by
the district court in
Galban Lobo & Co. v. United
States, 285 F. 665, and in
Axtell v. United States,
286 F. 165. A different view was taken in a district court of South
Carolina in
Middleton & Co. v. United States, 273 F.
199, and in
Alsberg v. United States, 285 F. 573, in the
Southern District of New York.
The opinion in the
Isonomia case was carefully
prepared, but we think that the rule as to a strict construction of
the language of statutes providing for suits against the United
States was there carried too far. In taking away what was then the
law, namely the right of claimants to sue merchant vessels of the
United States as if they were private vessels, Congress was
evidently anxious
Page 267 U. S. 126
to consult the convenience of intending libelants as far as it
could, and, as the United States was present everywhere in the
United States, it named as the proper place for suit either the
place of the residence of the parties suing, or of any one of them,
or their principal place of business, or where the vessel or cargo
charged with liability was found. It further expressly provided
that those which would have been under the prior act causes of
action
in rem might be united with those
in
personam. To avoid any difficulty in bringing needed parties
into the same suit, it directed that the cause might be transferred
in the discretion of the court to any other district court in the
United States. These liberal provisions indicate that the language
used in the section should have its broad and ordinary meaning, and
should not be interpreted in a restricted and distributive sense.
We think, therefore, that the suit brought in the district where
the libelant resided was a suit brought in accordance with § 2,
even though it would have been an action
in rem between
private parties, and that it made no difference where the vessel
then was, provided only that it was within the jurisdiction of the
United States.
The decree of the court below must therefore be reversed, and
the cause remanded to the district court for further
proceedings.