1. A judgment of the district court based on a general finding
for the plaintiff in a law case tried without a jury is not
reviewable in the circuit court of appeals upon the ground that the
plaintiff's evidence failed to sustain the cause of action pleaded
by the complaint. P.
266 U. S.
496.
2. In an action on a contract for insurance issued under the War
Risk Insurance Act, as amended October 6, 1917, jurisdiction of the
district court is to be exercised in accordance with the laws
governing the usual procedure of that court in actions at law for
money compensation.
Id.
3. Error in granting the government's motion to sit without a
jury in such a case cannot be complained of by the government.
Id.
4. Denial of a motion for special findings cannot be complained
of if not excepted to.
Id.
299 F. 61 reversed.
Error to a judgment of the circuit court of appeals reversing a
judgment for the plaintiff, in an action on a war risk insurance
contract, and directing entry of judgment for the United States.
For the opinion of the district court,
see 290 F. 972.
Page 266 U. S. 495
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action at law brought in the Federal Court for
Montana on a contract for insurance issued under the War Risk
Insurance Act as amended by Act October 6, 1917, c. 105, 40 Stat.
398, 409. The United States filed an answer denying liability and
moved for trial without a jury. The motion was granted. At the
close of plaintiff's evidence, the defendant moved for judgment.
The motion was denied. No special findings of fact were made.
Judgment for $3,335 was entered for the plaintiff upon a general
finding. 290 F. 972. Upon writ of error sued out by the government,
the circuit court of appeals reversed the judgment and directed the
district court to enter judgment for the defendant. 299 F. 61. The
case is here on the plaintiff's writ of error under ยง 241 of the
Judicial Code.
The action was brought by the insured. The contract provided for
payment in installments in case of total and permanent disability.
Whether the plaintiff was so disabled was the main issue. The
evidence introduced by him occupies forty pages of the printed
record. It disclosed, among other things, that, at the time of
enlistment, plaintiff was a common laborer with but several months
of recent high school education; that he was seriously wounded
overseas; that, after discharge, he resumed his studies; that
later, in the rehabilitation process, he entered upon the study of
law, and that he acted as his own counsel in the trial of the case.
The government's motion for judgment was made on the ground,
among
Page 266 U. S. 496
others, that plaintiff had failed to prove that he ever had
been, or then was, totally disabled within the meaning of the
contract of insurance.
The court of appeals held that the motion should have been
granted. Its judgment must be reversed, and that of the district
court must stand, because the case was tried without a jury and
there was only the general finding for the plaintiff. Neither the
evidence nor the questions of law presented by it were reviewable
by the court of appeals. To inquire into the facts and the
conclusions of law on which the judgment of the lower court rests
was not permissible.
Norris v.
Jackson, 9 Wall. 125;
Insurance
Co. v. Folsom, 18 Wall. 237;
Boardman v.
Toffey, 117 U. S. 271. The
bill of exceptions and the assignment of errors do not attempt to
present any other question which is substantial. The petition
confessedly set forth a good cause of action. The district court
had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter. Its
decision is final.
The jurisdiction possessed was that to be exercised in
accordance with the laws governing the usual procedure of the court
in actions at law for money compensation.
Crouch v. United
States, ante, 266 U. S. 180;
United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.
S. 547,
256 U. S. 552.
The district court, having erroneously decided that it was the
exceptional jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of Claims,
granted the government's motion to sit without a jury. Of this
error the government cannot complain. Nor can it complain of the
denial by the trial court of the motion for special findings. It
did not except thereto. Whether special findings can ever avail
where there was no stipulation in writing waiving the jury we need
not consider.
Compare 79 U. S. Case,
12 Wall. 275;
Campbell v. United States, 224 U. S.
99;
Cleveland v. Walsh Construction Co., 279 F.
57, 60-63.
Reversed.