1. Congress may exempt foreign, and not exempt domestic,
corporations from taxation of their net income derived from sale
abroad of personal property purchased by them in this country. P.
266 U. S.
375.
2. To impose such a tax on domestic corporations while exempting
foreign corporations, is not to violate rights of the former under
the Fifth Amendment.
Id.
3. A tax on net income from exports is consistent with Art. I, §
9, par. 5 of the Constitution.
Peck & Co. v. Lowe,
247 U. S. 165.
Id.
Affirmed.
Error to a judgment of the district court dismissing the
complaint in an action to recover money paid under protest as an
income tax.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
The case displayed by the amended complaint, omitting verbal
circumlocutions, is as follows: plaintiff (plaintiff in error here)
is, and was at all of the times mentioned, a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of New Jersey. It is engaged in New
York in the business of exporting, which is defined to be the
purchase of personal property within the United States and the
Page 266 U. S. 374
sale thereof without the United States, and has, under the
Revenue Act of 1921, been required to pay an income tax on its net
income, part of which is derived from such foreign business.
At the same time and times, there were foreign corporations
engaged in like business of buying personal property within the
United States and exporting and selling it without the United
States. Under §§ 217 and 233 of the Revenue Act of 1921, these
corporations were wholly exempted from payment of the tax on the
net income or profits accruing or derived from such business.
On the 15th of March, 1922, the defendant (defendant in error
here), being Collector of Internal Revenue, and acting as such, in
pursuance of Sections 205 and 230 of the Revenue Act of 1921,
demanded of plaintiff the sum of $4,203.91 as due and payable from
the plaintiff as one-fourth part of its income tax for the fiscal
year ending March 31, 1921 -- that is, for the months of January,
February, and March, 1921, and threatened to enforce payment of
that sum together with penalties and interest thereon provided for
by the laws of Congress.
Plaintiff, on the 15th of March, 1922, solely to prevent
distraint and sale of its property, and protesting that no tax was
due and that defendant was without authority to exact or collect
the same or any part thereof, paid the tax.
On or about the 6th of December, 1922, plaintiff, in accordance
with law, made a claim in writing to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and demanded the repayment of the tax on the ground that it
was illegally assessed, that more than six months had expired since
the filing of the claim for refund as provided for by § 1318 of the
Revenue Act, and that no part of the claim had been remitted or
repaid to plaintiff, or to anyone for its account. This action was
then brought against the Collector.
Page 266 U. S. 375
Judgment was prayed for $3,999.08, the amount of the tax.
Motion was made by the district attorney to dismiss the amended
complaint on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.
The motion was granted on the authority of and upon the
reasoning of
National Paper & Type Co. v. Edwards,
Collector of Internal Revenue, 292 F. 633. Judgment was
formally entered dismissing the complaint upon the merits.
To review this action and judgment, this writ of error is
directed. The difference in treatment of domestic and foreign
corporations in respect to business of sales in foreign countries,
it is contended, is a "hostile discrimination and confiscation of
property."
To sustain the charge, plaintiff asserts that its business and
that of foreign corporations is done under exactly the same
circumstances and conditions, and that the discrimination hence
resulting offends the "due process of law" provision of the Fifth
Amendment. Cases are cited, and the deduction from them is declared
to be that "our whole system of law is predicated on the general
fundamental principle of equality of application of the law."
*
Here, the discrimination, if such it can be called, is in favor
of foreign corporations in respect to taxation of earnings from
business done in foreign countries. Clearly, as to such business,
Congress may adopt a policy calculated to serve the best interests
of this country in dealing with citizens or subjects of another
country, and may properly say that, as to earnings from such
business, the foreign subjects or citizens shall be left to the
taxation of their own government or to that having jurisdiction of
the sales. Even if we were to concede, as we cannot, that the Fifth
Amendment, in enjoining due process of law, requires as part
thereof equality of taxation, it certainly
Page 266 U. S. 376
could not be held to apply to a subject matter not within this
country.
Regarding the purchase of articles of personal property within
the United States and the mere fact of exportation therefrom,
domestic and foreign corporations may be pronounced alike -- may
seem to be in the same relation to taxing legislation. But there is
something else to consider, and its effect. There may be benefit in
the inviting of foreign corporations into the United States --
benefit in their investments and activities -- and, as counsel for
the government points out, the domestic corporation gets the power
of the United States to protect its interests and redress its
wrongs in whatever part of the world its business may take it. And,
as the government further points out, the foreign corporation must
look to the country of its origin for protection against injury and
redress of losses occurring in that and other foreign countries,
and not to the United States. The government therefore contends,
and rightly contends, that domestic corporations are required to
pay a tax on their incomes from all sources, while foreign
corporations are taxed only on their income from sources within the
United States, because, to repeat, only that income is earned under
the protection of American laws.
And we understand a further contention to be that the
discrimination is the fact that makes the tax on plaintiff a direct
burden, on and impediment to, its business of exporting, "in
violation of paragraph 5 of § 9 of Article I of the Constitution of
the United States," which provides that "no tax or duty shall be
laid on articles exported from any state." The alleged
discrimination is said in some way to emphasize and increase the
violation of that paragraph of the Constitution.
So far as the invocation of paragraph 5 depends upon
discrimination, what we have said disposes of it; if it be
independent of discrimination and based upon the fact
Page 266 U. S. 377
of a tax upon exports, it is completely answered and disposed of
adversely by
Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.
S. 165, and needs no further comment.
The difference in the legislation, we think, is constitutional,
and justified by the considerations which we have submitted. The
judgment is
Affirmed.
*
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312.