1. The power to punish contempt to enforce obedience inheres in
all courts, as essential to the performance of their functions. P.
264 U. S.
103.
2. Contempt proceedings are
sui generis -- neither
civil actions nor criminal prosecutions, as ordinarily understood,
nor criminal prosecutions within the Sixth Amendment.
Id.
3. The contempts defined by § 21 of the Clayton Act (October 15,
1914, c. 323, 38 Stat. 730) -- disobedience of a lawful writ, etc.,
by
Page 264 U. S. 96
an act such as to constitute also a criminal offense -- are not
by the Act declared criminal. P.
264 U. S.
104.
4. Proceedings to punish such a contempt, committed by
disobedience of an injunction, are within the jurisdiction of the
district court in the division where the main cause is pending,
although the contempt was committed in another division of the
district. Jud.Code §§ 51, 52, and 53, do not control the venue.
Id.
Affirmed.
Error to an order of the district court sentencing the
plaintiffs in error to fine and imprisonment for contumacious
disobedience of an injunction.
Page 264 U. S. 100
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiffs in error challenged the jurisdiction of the court
below -- United States District Court, Western Division of the
Western District of Missouri -- to try and punish them for
disobeying its order, upon the ground that the contumacious acts
occurred in another division of the district. Only the question of
jurisdiction is here.
An information charged that plaintiffs in error willfully
disobeyed the injunction lawfully issued in equity cause,
St.
Louis, San Francisco Railway Company, Complainant v. International
Association of Machinists, et al., Defendants, pending in the
Western Division of the Western District
Page 264 U. S. 101
of Missouri, by attempting, within the Southwestern Division of
the same district, to prevent certain railroad employees from
continuing at work. The order ran against men on strike, and the
cause is treated as one within the purview of the Clayton Act
(October 15, 1914, c. 323, 38 Stat. 730). Sections 21, 22 24, and
25 of that act are set out below.
*
of Missouri, by attempting, within the Southwestern Division of
the same district, to prevent certain railroad employees from
continuing at work. The order ran against men on strike, and the
cause is treated as one within the purview of the Clayton Act
(October 15, 1914, c. 323, 38 Stat. 730). Sections 21, 22 24, and
25 of that act Counsel for plaintiffs in error maintain that
ordinary contempts punishable by courts of equity without trial by
jury differ radically from the "statutory contempt" here disclosed,
which, under the Clayton Act, must be dealt with as a criminal
offense. And they insist that §§ 51, 52,
Page 264 U. S. 102
and 53, Judicial Code, control the venue when such "statutory
contempt" is alleged.
Section 51 provides that, with certain exceptions: "No person
shall be arrested in one district for trial in another, in any
civil action before a district court."
Section 52:
"When a state contains more than one district, every suit not of
a local nature, in the district court thereof, against a single
defendant, inhabitant of such state, must be brought in the
district where he resides; but if there are two or more defendants,
residing in different districts of the state, it may be brought in
either district, and a duplicate writ may be issued against the
defendants, directed to the marshal of any other district in which
any defendant resides."
Section 53:
"When a district
Page 264 U. S. 103
contains more than one division every suit not of a local nature
against a single defendant must be brought in the division where he
resides; but if there are two or more defendants residing in
different divisions of the district, it may be brought in either
division. . . . All prosecutions for crimes or offenses shall be
had within the division of such districts where the same were
committed, unless the court, or the judge thereof, upon the
application of the defendant, shall order the cause to be
transferred for prosecution to another division of the
district."
None of the cited Code sections makes specific reference to
contempt proceedings. These are
sui generis -- neither
civil actions nor prosecutions for offenses, within the ordinary
meaning of those terms -- and exertions of the power inherent in
all courts to enforce obedience, something they must possess in
order properly to perform their functions.
Bessette v. W. B.
Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324,
194 U. S.
326.
Page 264 U. S. 104
To disobey a judicial order is not declared criminal by the
Clayton Act. It recognizes that such disobedience may be contempt,
and, having prescribed limitations, leaves the court to deal with
the offender. While it gives the right to trial by jury and
restricts the punishment, it also clearly recognizes the
distinction between "proceeding for contempt" and "criminal
prosecution."
"No proceeding for contempt shall be instituted against any
person unless begun within one year from the date of the act
complained of, nor shall any such proceeding be a bar to any
criminal prosecution for the same act or acts."
§ 25.
The Clayton Act says nothing about venue in contempt proceedings
-- leaves it as theretofore. The power of the court below to issue
the enjoining order is not questioned. By disobeying the order,
plaintiffs in error defied an authority which that tribunal was
required to vindicate. It followed established practice, as
modified by the statute, and we think the objections to its
jurisdiction are unsubstantial.
The following cases are in point:
Eilenbecker v. District
Court of Plymouth County, 134 U. S. 31,
134 U. S. 35
et seq.; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson,
154 U. S. 447,
154 U. S. 489;
In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564,
158 U. S.
594-596,
158 U. S. 599;
Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., supra, pp.
194 U. S.
326-327;
Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range
Co., 221 U. S. 418,
221 U. S. 441,
221 U. S. 450;
Binkley v. United States, 282 F. 244;
McGibbony v.
Lancaster, 286 F. 129;
Dunham v. United States, 289
F. 376;
McCourtney v. United States, 291 F. 497.
Gompers v. United States, 233 U.
S. 604, does not support the claim that the challenged
contempt proceedings amounted to prosecution for a criminal offense
within the intendment of § 53, Judicial Code. While contempt may be
an offense against the law and subject to appropriate punishment,
certain it is that, since the foundation of our government,
proceedings to punish such offenses have been
Page 264 U. S. 105
regarded as
sui generis, and not "criminal
prosecutions" within the Sixth Amendment or common
understanding.
The judgment below must be affirmed.
*
"Sec. 21. That any person who shall willfully disobey any lawful
writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of any district
court of the United States or any court of the District of Columbia
by doing any act or thing therein, or thereby forbidden to be done
by him, if the act or thing so done by him be of such character as
to constitute also a criminal offense under any statute of the
United States, or under the laws of any state in which the act was
committed, shall be proceeded against for his said contempt as
hereinafter provided."
"Sec. 22. That whenever it shall be made to appear to any
district court or judge thereof, or to any judge therein sitting,
by the return of a proper officer on lawful process, or upon the
affidavit of some credible person, or by information filed by any
district attorney, that there is reasonable ground to believe that
any person has been guilty of such contempt, the court or judge
thereof, or any judge therein sitting, may issue a rule requiring
the said person so charged to show cause upon a day certain why he
should not be punished therefor, which rule, together with a copy
of the affidavit or information, shall be served upon the person
charged, with sufficient promptness to enable him to prepare for
and make return to the order at the time fixed therein. If upon or
by such return, in the judgment of the court, the alleged contempt
be not sufficiently purged, a trial shall be directed at a time and
place fixed by the court: Provided, however, that, if the accused,
being a natural person, fail or refuse to make return to the rule
to show cause, an attachment may issue against his person to compel
an answer, and, in case of his continued failure or refusal, or if
for any reason it be impracticable to dispose of the matter on the
return day, he may be required to give reasonable bail for his
attendance at the trial and his submission to the final judgment of
the court. Where the accused is a body corporate, an attachment for
the sequestration of its property may be issued upon like refusal
or failure to answer."
"In all cases within the purview of this act, such trial may be
by the court, or, upon demand of the accused, by a jury, in which
latter event the court may impanel a jury from the jurors then in
attendance, or the court or the judge thereof in chambers may cause
a sufficient number of jurors to be selected and summoned, as
provided by law, to attend at the time and place of trial at which
time a jury shall be selected and impaneled as upon a trial for
misdemeanor, and such trial shall conform, as near as may be, to
the practice in criminal cases prosecuted by indictment or upon
information."
"If the accused be found guilty, judgment shall be entered
accordingly, prescribing the punishment, either by fine or
imprisonment, or both, in the discretion of the court. Such fine
shall be paid to the United States or to the complainant or other
party injured by the act constituting the contempt, or may, where
more than one is so damaged, be divided or apportioned among them
as the court may direct, but in no case shall the fine to be paid
to the United States exceed, in case the accused is a natural
person, the sum of $1,000, nor shall such imprisonment exceed the
term of six months: Provided, that in any case the court or a judge
thereof may, for good cause shown, by affidavit or proof taken in
open court or before such judge and filed with the papers in the
case, dispense with the rule to show cause, and may issue an
attachment for the arrest of the person charged with contempt; in
which event such person, when arrested, shall be brought before
such court or a judge thereof without unnecessary delay and shall
be admitted to bail in a reasonable penalty for his appearance to
answer to the charge or for trial for the contempt, and thereafter
the proceedings shall be the same as provided herein in case the
rule had issued in the first instance."
"Sec. 24. That nothing herein contained shall be construed to
relate to contempts committed in the presence of the court, or so
near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, nor to
contempts committed in disobedience of any lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree, or command entered in any suit or action
brought or prosecuted in the name of, or on behalf of, the United
States, but the same, and all other cases of contempt not
specifically embraced within § twenty-one of this act, may be
punished in conformity to the usages at law and in equity now
prevailing."
"Sec. 25. That no proceeding for contempt shall be instituted
against any person unless begun within one year from the date of
the act complained of, nor shall any such proceeding be a bar to
any criminal prosecution for the same act or acts, but nothing
herein contained shall affect any proceedings in contempt pending
at the time of the passage of this Act."