1. In a complaint showing by apt allegation that the plaintiff
sues as the Director General of Railroads continued in that office
by the President under §§ 202 and 211 of the Transportation Act, a
description of him "as agent," appointed under § 206 of the act,
may be rejected as surplusage. P.
264 U. S.
459.
2. Paragraph (3), added by the Transportation Act to § 16 of the
Interstate Commerce Act and providing:
"All actions at law by carriers subject to this Act for recovery
of their charges . . . shall be begun within three years from the
time the cause of action accrues, and not after,"
does not apply to an action by the Director General of Railroads
to recover demurrage charges accrued to the United States during
the period of federal control of railroads.
Id.
287 F. 522 affirmed.
Certiorari to a judgment of the circuit court of appeals which
reversed a judgment of the district court sustaining a demurrer to
the complaint in an action by the Director General of Railroads to
recover demurrage charges.
Page 264 U. S. 459
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action to recover demurrage charges accrued at Little
Rock, Arkansas, during May, June, and July, 1918, on certain
shipments of cotton linters. The defendant, petitioner here,
demurred to the complaint on the grounds: (a) That the cause of
action was barred by the statute of limitation, and (b) that
plaintiff was without authority to bring the action. The district
court sustained the demurrer, but was reversed by the court of
appeals. 287 F. 522.
There is nothing in the second point, and we dispose of it at
once. The contention is that the authority to maintain the action
is vested in the Director General of Railroads, originally
designated under the Federal Control Act, and continued by the
President under §§ 202 and 211 of Transportation Act 1920, c. 91,
41 Stat. 459, 469, and not in Davis, as Agent, appointed under §
206 of the latter act. Apt allegations, however, are found in the
body of the complaint to bring the plaintiff, Davis, within the
provisions of §§ 202 and 211. At most, the words "as agent" are
surplusage, and it is impossible that defendant could have been
prejudiced by their use. Act Feb. 26, 1919, c. 48, 40 Stat.
1181.
The action was brought more than three years after the cause of
action accrued. The statute relied upon as a bar is § 424,
Transportation Act 1920, 41 Stat. 491, 492, being a new paragraph
added to § 16 of the Interstate Commerce Act by way of amendment.
The pertinent words are:
"(3) All actions at law by carriers subject to this act for
recovery of their charges, or any part thereof, shall be begun
within three years from the time the cause of action accrues, and
not after."
It is insisted that the United States -- or the Director
General, representing the United States -- is included in the
provision as a carrier
Page 264 U. S. 460
subject to the act. Our opinion is otherwise. The act consists
of five titles. Title II is devoted exclusively to the subject of
the termination of federal control, which it is declared shall take
place at 12:01 a.m., March 1, 1920 -- the act becoming effective
February 28, 1920. Title III deals only with the subject of
disputes between carriers and their employees and subordinate
officials, creates Railroad Boards of Labor Adjustment and a
Railroad Labor Board, and vests them with appropriate powers. Title
IV consists entirely of amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act,
and includes § 424, here relied upon. While these three titles are
concerned with related subjects, they are entirely distinct one
from another. Title II, which is complete in itself, among other
things, provides in § 200 that, after the termination of federal
control, the President shall have no power to use or operate the
railroads or systems of transportation, or to control or supervise
the carriers or their business affairs, and directs him, § 202, to
adjust, settle, liquidate, and wind up all matters and all
questions and disputes, of whatsoever nature, arising out of or
incident to federal control as soon as practicable after the
termination thereof. The only provision prescribing a period of
limitation definitely in respect of such matters, is found in §
206(a), and it relates only to actions, suits and proceedings
brought against an agent to be designated by the President for that
purpose, and fixes as the period of limitation that now prescribed
by state or federal statutes, but not later than two years from the
passage of the act. In this title, thus specifically devoted to the
subject of winding up matters arising out of federal control,
nothing is to be found which suggests any limitation of time within
which actions, suits, or proceedings shall be brought to enforce
liabilities arising out of federal control, in favor of the United
States.
Turning now to Title IV, amending the Interstate Commerce Act,
the declaration at the beginning is that its
Page 264 U. S. 461
provisions "shall apply to common carriers" engaged in various
enumerated kinds of transportation. § 400, p. 474. There is to be
found in this title no provision specifically relating to the
period of federal control or dealing with the question of liability
to or of the government in respect of any matter arising during
such control. If Congress had intended to fix a period of
limitation applicable to actions, suits, or proceedings brought in
behalf of the United States in respect of liabilities arising out
of federal control, we should naturally expect to find it in Title
II, where such matters are exclusively dealt with, and not in Title
IV, which deals with common carriers entirely apart from such
control. It may not have been unusual in common speech to describe
the Director General as a carrier while he was operating the
railroads, but it is clear that he was not intended to be included
by that term as it is generally employed in acts of Congress.
Federal Control Act, c. 25, 40 Stat. 451, repeatedly recognizes a
distinction between the President -- including, of course, the
Director General -- and the carriers. The first section itself
limits the meaning of the word "carriers" to railroads and systems
of transportation which as carriers had been taken over by the
President. Accurately speaking, the Director General was not a
carrier, but an operator of carriers. The distinction to which we
have referred constantly appears in the provisions of the act, as,
for example: "The President may nevertheless pay to any carrier
while under federal control an annual amount," etc. § 2; "On the
application of the President or of any carrier," etc., § 3;
"Carriers while under federal control shall be subject to all laws
and liabilities as common carriers," etc. § 10; "actions at law or
suits in equity may be brought by and against said carriers," etc.
§ 10; "moneys and other property derived from the operation of the
carriers during federal control are hereby declared to be the
property of the United States." § 12.
Page 264 U. S. 462
In taking over and operating the railroad systems of the
country, the United States did so in its sovereign capacity, as a
war measure, "under a right in the nature of eminent domain,"
North Carolina R. Co. v. Lee, 260 U. S.
16;
Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Ault,
256 U. S. 554;
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U.
S. 135;
In re Tidewater Coal Exchange, 280 F.
648, 649, and it may not be held to have waived any sovereign right
or privilege unless plainly so provided. Moneys and other property
derived from the operation of the carriers during federal control,
as we have seen, are the property of the United States. § 12, 40
Stat. 457. An action by the Director General to recover upon a
liability arising out of such control is an action on behalf of the
United States in its governmental capacity,
Chesapeake &
Delaware Canal Co. v. United States, 250 U.
S. 123,
250 U. S. 126;
In re Tidewater Coal Exchange, supra, and therefore is
subject to no time limitation, in the absence of congressional
enactment clearly imposing it.
United States v. Nashville, C.
& St.L. Ry. Co., 118 U. S. 120,
118 U. S. 125;
United States v. Whited & Wheless, 246 U.
S. 552,
246 U. S. 561.
Statutes of limitation sought to be applied to bar rights of the
government must receive a strict construction in favor of the
government.
United States v. Whited & Wheless,
supra.
The foregoing analysis of the acts of Congress viewed in the
light of the principles just stated demonstrates that § 424 has no
application to an action of the kind here involved, but applies to
common carriers apart from their operation under federal control,
and we so hold.
Affirmed.