Where a person was held for removal under an indictment charging
murder on a military reservation under exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States, and the existence of such exclusive jurisdiction
involved consideration of many facts and seriously controverted
questions of law,
held that determination of that issue
was for the court where the indictment was found, and was not open
for decision in another district in habeas corpus. P.
264 U. S.
402.
291 F. 311 reversed.
Page 264 U. S. 400
Certiorari to a judgment of the circuit court of appeals which
reversed a judgment of the district court dismissing a writ of
habeas corpus, and ordered the prisoner discharged.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Pothier and another were duly indicted, October 13,
1922, for the murder of Alexander P. Cronkhite, on October 25,
1918,
"within and on lands theretofore acquired for the exclusive use
of the United States, and under the exclusive jurisdiction thereof,
and within the Southern Division of the Western District of
Washington, to-wit, within and on the Camp Lawis Military
Reservation."
Pothier was arrested in the State of Rhode Island, and, after
hearings before the commissioner and the district court, a warrant
for his removal was directed as provided by ยง 1014, Rev.Stats. By
this habeas corpus proceeding, the validity of the warrant is
questioned and respondent's release sought. His contention is that
the United States had not acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the
place of the crime, as alleged by the indictment, because they had
not then received a deed to the land.
Page 264 U. S. 401
The district court said and held, 285 F. 632:
"The argument of the defense is that, by the terms of the
statute, the passing of the deed is a prerequisite to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States, and that, as the deed postdates
the time of the alleged murder, the United States did not than have
exclusive jurisdiction over the lands conveyed by said deed. But
the evidence shows also that, before the passage of the deeds, and
before the date of the alleged murder, Pierce County, acting as the
arm and agent of the state, had acquired by condemnation, and had
turned over to the United States military authorities, many tracts
of land comprised within the Camp Lewis Military Reservation which
had been selected by a representative of the Secretary of War and
which, when donated to the United States, the Secretary of War had
been authorized to accept. Buildings had been erected and the camp
permanently occupied before January 29, 1918, and before July,
1918, there were 50,000 men in camp. There is much evidence tending
to show that, as to a number of the tracts of land comprised in the
camp, there was, before the date of the alleged crime, a practical
consummation of the donation, and that the agents of the county and
of the United States had done all that it was necessary to do in
order to vest title and exclusive jurisdiction in the United
States, save the execution and recording of the deeds whereby the
title of the United States should be evidenced. The contention of
the United States that the evidence of
de facto exercise
of exclusive jurisdiction is sufficient, in itself, to show
probable cause cannot be disregarded in view of the
quaere
in
Holt v. United States, 218 U. S.
245,
218 U. S. 252:"
"The documents referred to are not before us, but they properly
were introduced, and, so far as we can see, justified the finding
of the jury, even if the evidence of the
de facto exercise
of exclusive jurisdiction was not enough, or if the United States
was called
Page 264 U. S. 402
on to try title in a murder case. . . ."
"I am of the opinion that the defendant has failed to overcome
the
prima facie case made by the indictment, and that the
evidence fails to show the want of probable cause."
The circuit court of appeals, 291 F. 311, was
"of the opinion that no other conclusion can be drawn from the
evidence than that, at the time the crime charged in the indictment
was committed, the United States had acquired no title in the land
embraced within Camp Lewis Military Reservation; that the
sovereignty of the state over the tract had not then been yielded
up, and was not until the deed, map, etc., were filed in the office
of the County Auditor of Pierce County for record, which was not
until November 15, 1919, more than a year after the alleged murder.
This being so, there is an absolute want of probable cause for the
removal of the appellant to answer to the crime charged.
Greene
v. Henkel, 183 U. S. 249,
183 U. S.
261."
It accordingly reversed the judgment of the district court and
directed Pothier's discharge.
We think there was enough to show probable cause and that the
judgment of the district court is correct. Whether the locus of the
alleged crime was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States demands consideration of many facts and seriously
controverted questions of law. As heretofore often pointed out,
these matters must be determined by the court where the indictment
was found. The regular course may not be anticipated by alleging
want of jurisdiction and demanding a ruling thereon in a habeas
corpus proceeding. Barring certain exceptional cases (unlike the
present one), this Court
"has uniformly held that the hearing on habeas corpus is not in
the nature of a writ of error, nor is it intended as a substitute
for the functions of the trial court. Manifestly, this is true as
to disputed questions of fact, and it is equally so as to disputed
matters of law, whether they relate to the sufficiency of the
indictment or
Page 264 U. S. 403
the validity of the statute on which the charge is based. These
and all other controverted matters of law and fact are for the
determination of the trial court."
Henry v. Henkel, 235 U. S. 219,
235 U. S. 229;
Louie v. United States, 254 U. S. 548.
Reversed.