1. Where the parties to a note and mortgage are citizens of the
same state, jurisdiction to collect the note by foreclose of the
mortgage
Page 264 U. S. 311
and deficiency judgment does not exist in the district court
through diversity of citizenship if one of the defendants is a
citizen of that state and the plaintiff, although of another state,
acquired the obligations by assignment from the original obligee.
Jud.Code § 24. P.
264 U. S.
312.
2. While this restriction does not apply to a plaintiff who,
although nominally the assignee, was really the payee, the evidence
in the present case fails to sustain the allegation that the payee
named in the note acted as the maker's broker in securing the loan
from the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff was at all times the
beneficial owner of the paper. P.
264 U. S.
313.
3. The rule that the restriction of Jud.Code § 24 does not
prevent a suit by the assignee on a new and subsequent agreement is
inapplicable where the suit is for foreclosure of a mortgage and
the relief sought by a deficiency judgment, against a purchaser of
the property who assumed its payment, is merely ancillary and
incidental to the primary purpose of the bill.
Id.
Affirmed.
Appeal from a decree of the district court dismissing, for want
of jurisdiction, a suit on a promissory note and mortgage.
MR. JUSTICE SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal under Section 238 of the Judicial Code from a
decree dismissing a suit in equity for want of jurisdiction. The
question certified for decision arises under the provision in
Section 24 of the Judicial Code that:
"No district court shall have cognizance of any suit . . . to
recover upon any promissory note or other chose in action in favor
of any assignee . . . unless such suit might
Page 264 U. S. 312
have been prosecuted in such court . . . if no assignment has
been made.
*"
The appellant, a citizen of Vermont, brought suit in the Eastern
District of Washington to recover on a promissory note for $5,000
and to foreclose a mortgage on land in the latter state given to
secure it. The makers and the payee of the note are citizens of
Washington. The note and mortgage were assigned and transferred by
the payee to the plaintiff for a valuable consideration. The
mortgaged land was thereafter conveyed by the makers of the note to
a citizen of Washington, who, it is alleged, in consideration of a
subsequent extension of the mortgage by the plaintiff, expressly
assumed its payment. The purchaser thereafter died. The defendants
are the executor of his will, a citizen of Washington, and the
devisees, citizens of Michigan and Ohio. A deficiency judgment is
prayed against the executor if the proceeds of the foreclosure
prove insufficient to pay the debt. Neither the makers nor the
payee of the note are sued.
We conclude that the suit was rightly dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.
1. Jurisdiction was invoked solely on the ground of diversity of
citizenship. However the plaintiff's assignor, the payee of the
note, being a citizen of Washington, could not have proceeded in
the district court against another citizen of the same state, and
hence, under the restriction in § 24 of the Code, nothing else
appearing, the court had no jurisdiction of the suit brought by the
plaintiff as assignee.
Gibson v.
Chew, 16 Pet. 315,
41 U. S. 316;
Kolze v. Hoadley, 200 U. S. 76,
200 U. S. 83,
and cases cited.
Page 264 U. S. 313
2. If, however, it is shown, upon allegation and proof, that the
relation of the parties to a note is otherwise than appears from
its terms, and that the plaintiff, although apparently assignee, is
in reality the payee, the Code provision does not apply, and his
right to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court is not
restricted by the fact that the suit could not have been prosecuted
by the nominal payee.
Holmes v. Goldsmith, 147 U.
S. 150,
147 U. S. 159.
Such is the case where the nominal payee was merely the agent of
the maker for the purpose of negotiating the note, and had no
beneficial interest therein or right of action thereon.
Blair
v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 400,
201 U. S. 448;
Kirven v. Chemical Co., 145 F. 288, 290;
Wachusett
Bank v. Stove Works, 56 F. 321, 323;
Baltimore Trust Co.
v. Secreven County, 238 F. 834, 836;
Commercial Trust Co.
v. Laurens County, 267 F. 901, 903.
To bring the suit within this exception, the plaintiff alleged
that, in taking and assigning the note and mortgage, the payee
acted as the mere broker and agent of the makers in procuring a
loan from the plaintiff, and neither became their creditor nor
acquired any beneficial interest in the note or mortgage, but that
the plaintiff was at all times the beneficial owner. The defendants
denied these allegations. These issues of fact were tried by the
district judge on evidence taken before him, from which he found
that the payee, a member of a firm engaged in the mortgage loan
business, did not act as agent for the makers, but for his firm, as
independent dealers, and acquired the note and mortgage and
afterwards sold them to the plaintiff as in "the ordinary case
where a person purchases property for resale."
An examination of the evidence discloses no error in this
finding; on the contrary, it accords with the greater weight of the
testimony.
3. It is urged that as the plaintiff seeks a deficiency judgment
against the executor on the ground that his
Page 264 U. S. 314
testator expressly assumed payment of the mortgage to the
plaintiff, the suit is maintainable in the district court on this
agreement, by reason of diversity of citizenship, without reference
to the question whether the payee could have proceeded on the
original note. The assignee of a chose in action, although
prevented by the Code from maintaining an action thereon in the
district court, may nevertheless, if the requisite diversity of
citizenship appears, proceed therein upon a new agreement
subsequently made.
American Colortype Co. v. Continental
Co., 188 U. S. 104,
188 U. S. 106;
Kolze v. Hoadley, supra, p.
200 U. S. 83.
This rule, however, has no application here, since the main object
of the suit is the foreclosure of the mortgage, to which the
plaintiff must trace title through the assignment, and the relief
sought by a deficiency judgment against the executor is merely
ancillary and incidental to the primary purpose of the bill.
Blacklock v. Small, 127 U. S. 96,
127 U. S. 103;
Kolze v. Hoadley, supra, p.
200 U. S.
85.
The decree of the district court is accordingly
Affirmed.
* This restriction upon the jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts has been in force, with some changes not here material,
since the Judiciary Act of 1789. The prior statutes, except Section
629 of the Revised Statutes, are set forth in
New Orleans v.
Quinlan, 173 U. S. 191,
173 U. S. 192.
Decisions under them as well, as under the Code provision, are
cited in this opinion without distinction in this respect.