The Act of March 1, 1918, c.19, 40 Stat. 438, empowering the
United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation to
requisition land for the construction thereon of houses for
employees, and the families of employee, of shipyards in which
ships were being constructed for the United States, and to
construct on such land for their use houses "and all other
necessary or convenient facilities," etc., authorized the taking of
land for an electric railway terminal, for the purpose of providing
convenient transportation for employees of a nearby shipyard, and
their families, for whom housing was being provided under the act
on other land in close proximity. P.
264 U. S.
253.
284 F. 231 affirmed.
Error to a judgment of the circuit court of appeals which
affirmed a judgment of the District Court for the defendants in
error in an action in ejectment brought against them by the
plaintiff in error.
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an action in ejectment by the land company against the
Fleet Corporation and the Public Service Company
Page 264 U. S. 251
for a small tract of land in Camden, New Jersey. The action was
begun in a state court and removed to the district court of the
United States, where, after trial, judgment was given for the
defendants. The judgment was affirmed by the circuit court of
appeals. 284 F. 231.
The facts out of which the case arose are easily stated.
On and prior to May 28, 1918, the land in question was owned and
possessed by the land company, and was without buildings or other
improvements. It was in close proximity to shipyards where ships
were being constructed for the United States for service in the
World War, and was also in close proximity to other lands in which
the Fleet Corporation had acquired an interest and on which it had
caused, or was causing, many houses to be constructed for the use
of the shipyard employees and their families. On that day, the
Fleet Corporation, acting under the Act of March 1, 1918, c.19, 40
Stat. 438, requisitioned the fee simple title of the land and took
possession. Afterwards, in conformity to the act, the Fleet
Corporation determined the compensation to be made for the land,
the amount being $19,743.20. The land company did not accept that
sum or any part of it, but questioned the authority of the Fleet
Corporation to make the requisition and take possession.
After the land was requisitioned, the Fleet Corporation
constructed thereon a loop of electric railway tracks with
platforms and sheds, connected the same with an adjacent electric
railway line operated by the public service company, and contracted
with that company to run its cars over the newly made loop to and
from the platforms and sheds so constructed, all for the purpose of
providing necessary and convenient transportation facilities for
the employees of the shipyards and their families. The land was
suitable for that purpose and, when the improvements were
completed, was used therefor under the contract
Page 264 U. S. 252
between the Fleet Corporation and the Public Service Company. No
houses were constructed on the land by the Fleet Corporation, nor
was it used otherwise than in providing the transportation
facilities just described.
The action in ejectment was brought on the assumption that the
land was unlawfully taken by the Fleet Corporation in that the
declared purpose of the taking was to use the land in housing the
employees and their families, when in truth the purpose was to use
it for an electric railway terminal, or to enable the Public
Service Company so to use it, and that the Fleet Corporation was
without authority to take it for such terminal use. Whether that
assumption was well or ill grounded is the question presented on
this writ of error.
The material part of the Act of March 1, 1918, under which the
Fleet Corporation acted, reads as follows:
"That the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet
Corporation is hereby authorized and empowered within the limits of
the amounts herein authorized --"
"(a) To purchase, lease, requisition, including the requisition
of the temporary use of, or acquire by condemnation or otherwise
any improved or unimproved land or any interest therein suitable
for the construction thereon of houses for the use of employees and
the families of employees of shipyards in which ships are being
constructed for the United States."
"(b) To construct on such land for the use of such employees and
their families houses and all other necessary or convenient
facilities, upon such conditions and at such price as may be
determined by it, and to sell, lease, or exchange such houses,
land, and facilities upon such terms and conditions as it may
determine."
"(c) To purchase, lease, requisition, including the requisition
of the temporary use of, or acquire by condemnation or otherwise
any houses or other buildings for the use of such employees and
their families, together with the land
Page 264 U. S. 253
on which the same are erected, or any interest therein, all
necessary and proper fixtures and furnishings therefor, and all
necessary and convenient facilities incidental thereto; to manage,
repair, sell, lease, or exchange such lands, houses, buildings,
fixtures, furnishings and facilities upon such terms and conditions
as it may determine to carry out the purposes of this act."
"(d) To make loans to persons, firms, or corporations in such
manner upon such terms and security, and for such time not
exceeding ten years, as it may determine to provide houses and
facilities for the employees and the families of employees of such
shipyards."
"Whenever said United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet
Corporation shall acquire by requisition or condemnation such
property or any interest therein, it shall determine and make just
compensation therefor, and if the amount thereof so determined is
unsatisfactory to the person entitled to receive the same, such
person shall be paid seventy-five percentum of the amount so
determined, and shall be entitled to sue the United States to
recover such further sum as added to such seventy-five percentum
will make such an amount as will be just compensation for the
property or interest therein so taken."
The requisition, as set forth in the record, shows that the land
was desired and was taken "for the uses and purposes" expressed in
the act, and not, as asserted by the land company, for the sole and
declared purpose of using it for housing the employees and their
families. So, if the act authorized a taking to provide necessary
or convenient facilities whereby these people readily could reach
and use local car lines, that purpose was comprehended in the terms
of the requisition.
The land company apparently takes the position that subdivision
(a) of the act is alone to be considered. If this position were
right, there would be good ground for
Page 264 U. S. 254
thinking that the only purpose for which a taking was authorized
was to provide housing facilities. But subdivision (b) must also be
considered. It and subdivision (a) are so plainly interrelated that
they must be read together. When this is done, it is obvious that
the purposes for which a taking was authorized were not confined to
providing housing facilities, but extended to providing "all other
necessary or convenient facilities" for the use of the employees
and their families. Other parts of the act, notably subdivisions
(c) and (d), strengthen this conclusion. Of course, the act must be
examined as a whole, and not as if each part were an independent
enactment. Its purpose was to facilitate the accomplishment of
large undertakings wherein it was necessary to employ artisans and
laborers in unusually large numbers, and to utilize their services
in the best possible way. It recognized not only that they and
their families should be housed, but that many other necessary or
convenient facilities should be provided for their use, and to
these ends it authorized an expenditure of $50,000,000.
Whether artisans or laborers could be obtained and retained in
requisite numbers would measurably be affected by the conditions
surrounding them in the employment, such as the facilities for
going from their places of living to their places of work, and the
converse, and the facilities for reaching markets, schools and
churches from their places of living.
Here, what was done was to provide facilities whereby an
extensive electric railway service in the City of Camden was
brought, with a suitable terminal, into close proximity to the
shipyards and to the lands where houses were provided for the use
of the employees and their families. In our opinion, these
transportation facilities were of a class which the Fleet
Corporation was authorized to provide and for which it was
empowered to requisition or take needed land. They were a
legitimate complement
Page 264 U. S. 255
to the housing facilities provided by the corporation in that
vicinity -- at great cost, according to the record. It was not
essential under the act that the other facilities be on the same
tract with the houses, any more than that all the houses be on a
single tract. The act was intended to be susceptible of practical
application in varying situations.
We conclude that the action of ejectment was brought on a
mistaken assumption, and was rightly determined against the land
company by the courts below. Questions which would arise if the
assumption or any material part of it were well grounded need not
be considered.
Judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA.
I concur in the judgment of the court. I dissent from the
grounds upon which the court bases it. It is my opinion that the
record establishes that the requisition of the land was made under
the first paragraph (a) of the Housing Act of March 1, 1918, the
fee simple in the land acquired, and, necessarily, it became
subject to all of the uses accessorial to the fee, every use
whatever; for the use of trolley tracks to connect with a street
railway as in this case, or to the erection of a church for the
spiritual guidance of employees and their families, or for a dance
hall and an accompanying refectory for the amusement of their
leisure. Indeed, for any use under the sun.
Twenty days after the requisition, the President, seeing the
situation and that the land was so subject, availed of it --
availed of the power given him under the Act of April 22, 1918, to
take over transportation systems for the transportation of shipyard
and plant employees, issuing his executive order of June 18, 1918,
by which he directed that the Fleet Corporation should "have and
exercise all power and authority vested" in him by
Page 264 U. S. 256
the act. By this direction and delegation, the Fleet Corporation
proceeded to construct the trolley tracks with the assistance of
the Public Service Railway Company, a defendant in the case. The
land became a terminal for the latter company.
The act of the President was in the public service, but it was
not an act of requisition of the land, it was after the requisition
of the land -- not its requisition. If this were not so, there is
color for the accusation of the Land & Improvement Company that
the Housing Act was used as a pretense -- used under the pretense
of acquiring land for the building of houses when the purpose was,
in effect, a different one.
During the taking of the testimony, counsel for the Fleet
corporation several times declared that the requisition was under
the Housing Act, and that whatever use the land was subsequently
put to was immaterial.
I quote from the record as follows:
"Now, then, the power under which we took this land was a power
delegated under 40 Stat. 438, directly delegated to the Fleet
Corporation, so that we could not in this requisition say that the
Fleet Corporation took this land by virtue of the Act of March 1,
1918, and by virtue of the Act of April 22, 1918, because the power
was not given to us under both of those acts; it was only given
under one of them."
"The Court: You claim you were the deputy of the President?"
"Mr. Pearse: Later."
"Mr. Jacobsen: After the taking of the land, we claim we were.
At the time we took the land, we had the right to take it by virtue
of statute, and after
we had it, we used it by virtue of power
delegated to us by the President. [Italics mine.] Those are
the actual facts; in other words, we took this land under a direct
power delegated to us. "
Page 264 U. S. 257
It will be observed that Mr. Pearse, of counsel for the Fleet
Corporation, in response to the court's inquiry as to when the
Fleet Corporation became the deputy of the President, answered,
"Later." It will also be observed that Mr. Jacobsen, of counsel for
the Fleet Corporation, continuing his comment, said that "after the
taking of the land we [the Fleet Corporation] claim we were;"
"later," and "after the taking of the land," meaning after the
executive order. Until it, there is nothing in the record to show
that there was prophecy or thought of trolley tracks or
transportation systems.
The opinion of the Court now delivered is, in my view, in
opposition to this. There is an attempt at consistency with it by
the declaration that the requisition was under the act, and for the
uses and purposes expressed in the act, and that the uses and
purposes were facilities for neighboring shipyards. In determining
the correctness of this conclusion, all paragraphs of the act must,
of course, be considered, but not one of them has provision for any
housing of employees, except what houses may be erected on the land
and for the employees who should occupy them.
As I have said, the President's order was moved by consideration
of the public service. The difference between the Court and me is
how the service was accomplished -- was it by requisition of the
land or the use of the land after requisition?
I think the latter; the Court declares the former. In other
words, it was a part of the requisition. Of course, the occupation
of the land after the construction of the trolley tracks was as
useful whether the right was acquired and exercised, one way as the
other. The trolley would be a facility as much in one case as in
the other, and to ascribe it to one and not to the other is to give
that one a gloss and show that it is denied to the other -- a
fictitious importance.
I repeat, the difference between the Court and me is one of
means, not of effect, and my view is that of the circuit
Page 264 U. S. 258
court of appeals; it is that of the Land & Improvement
Company; it is, in essential foundation, that of the government.
These circumstances cannot, of course, obstruct the declaration of
superior authority, as this Court is, although the grounds of the
exertion of the authority may surprise.