1. A citizen can have no legal right to enter into a contract
involving land with an alien who cannot legally make and carry out
the contract. P.
263 U. S.
321.
2. In the absence of a treaty to the contrary, a state has power
to deny aliens the right to own land within it borders. P.
263 U. S.
322.
3. A cropping contract between an owner of land in California
and a Japanese alien which, though it may not amount to a lease or
a transfer of an interest in real property, is more than a contract
of employment in that it gives the alien a right to use, and have a
share in the benefit of, the land for agricultural purposes exceeds
the privileges granted to such aliens by Art. I of the treaty of
February 21, 1911, 37 Stat. 1504, between the United States and
Japan, and is forbidden by the California Alien Land Law, which
denies to aliens ineligible to citizenship permission to have or
enjoy any privilege, not prescribed in the treaty in respect to the
use or the benefit of land for agricultural purposes. P.
263 U. S.
322.
4. In forbidding such contracts, the state law violates no right
of the landowner or the alien under the federal Constitution. P.
263 U. S. 324.
See Terrace v. Tompson, ante, 263 U. S. 197;
Porterfield v. Webb, ante, 263 U. S. 225.
Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33,
distinguished.
279 F. 117 reversed.
Appeal from a decree of the district court granting an
interlocutory injunction in a suit to enjoin state officials from
instituting proceedings to enforce the California Alien Land
Law.
Page 263 U. S. 318
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit brought by the appellees to enjoin the Attorney
General of California and the District Attorney
Page 263 U. S. 319
of Santa Clara County from instituting any proceedings to
enforce the California Alien Land Law [
Footnote 1] against them.
O'Brien is a citizen and resident of California, and owns 10
acres of agricultural land in the County of Santa Clara.
Page 263 U. S. 320
Inouye is a capable farmer, and is a Japanese subject living in
California. O'Brien and Inouye desire to enter into a cropping
contract covering the planting, cultivating,
Page 263 U. S. 321
and harvesting of crops to be grown on the land. They allege
that the execution of such a contract is necessary in order that
the owner may receive the largest return from the land, and that
the alien may receive compensation therefrom; that the Attorney
General and district attorney have threatened to and will enforce
the act against them if they execute the contract, and will forfeit
or attempt to forfeit the land by an escheat proceeding, and will
prosecute them criminally for violating the act. They aver that the
act is so drastic, and the penalties for its violation are so
great, that neither of them may execute the contract even for the
purpose of testing its validity and its application thereto, and
that, unless the court shall determine the validity of the act and
its application, they will be compelled to submit to it, whether
valid or invalid, and to the appellants' interpretation of it, and
so be deprived of their property without due process of laws and
denied the equal protection of the laws in contravention of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Appellees applied for an interlocutory injunction. The matter
was heard by three judges, as provided in § 266 of the Judicial
Code. The injunction was granted, and the Attorney General and
district attorney appealed.
O'Brien, who is a citizen, has no legal right to enter into the
proposed contract with Inouye, who is an ineligible Japanese alien,
unless the latter is permitted by law to make and carry out such a
contract. At common law, aliens, though not permitted to take land
by operation of law, may take by the act of the parties, but they
have no capacity to hold against the state, and the land so taken
may be escheated to the state.
See Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's
Lessee, 7 Cranch. 603,
11 U. S. 609,
11 U. S.
619-620;
Doe ex dem. Governeur's Heirs
v. Robertson, 11 Wheat. 332,
24 U. S. 355;
Phillips v. Moore, 100 U. S. 208,
100 U. S. 212;
Atlantic & Pacific Railroad v. Mingus, 165 U.
S. 413,
165 U. S. 431.
In the absence of
Page 263 U. S. 322
a treaty to the contrary, the state has power to deny to aliens
the right to own land within its borders.
Terrace v.
Thompson, 263 U. S. 197;
Haguenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483,
100 U. S.
484-488;
Blythe v. Hinckley, 127 Cal. 431,
aff'd, 180 U. S. 180 U.S.
333,
180 U. S. 340;
In the Matter of Okahara, 216 P. 614. The provision of the
act which limits the privilege of ineligible aliens to acquire real
property or any interest therein to that prescribed by treaty is
not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment.
Terrace et al.
v. Thompson, supra; Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.
S. 225;
In the Matter of Okahara, supra. The
treaty between the United States and Japan (37 Stat. 1504-1509)
does not confer upon the citizens or subjects of either in the
territories of the other the right to acquire, possess, or enjoy
lands for agricultural purposes.
Terrace et al. v. Thompson,
supra; In the Matter of Okahara, supra.
By the proposed cropping contract, Inouye is given the right for
a term of four years to plant, cultivate, and harvest crops --
berries and vegetables -- on the land, and to be free from
interference by the owner, who undertakes to protect him during the
term against interference by any other person. He is entitled to
housing for himself, and is granted the right to employ others to
work on the land, and to give to them free ingress and egress and
the right to live on the land. He is entitled to one-half of all
crops grown on the land during the term, to be divided after they
are harvested and before removal from the land, and is given a
reasonable time after the expiration of the term to remove his
share of the crops. He is required to accept his share of the crops
as reimbursement for expenditures made to carry on the farming
operations, and as his only return from the undertaking. Assuming
that the proposed arrangement does not amount to a leasing or to a
transfer of an interest in real property, and that it includes the
elements of a contract of employment (
In the Matter of Okahara,
supra), we are of opinion that it is more than a contract of
employment, and that, if executed, it will give to
Page 263 U. S. 323
Inouye a right to use and to have or share in the benefit of the
land for agricultural purposes. And this is so, notwithstanding
other clauses of the contract to the effect that the general
possession of the land is reserved to the owner, that the cropper
shall have no interest or estate whatever in the land, that he is
given one-half of all crops grown as compensation for his services
and labor, and that division of the crops is to be made after they
are harvested and before their removal from the land.
The treaty grants liberty to own or lease and occupy houses,
manufactories, warehouses, and shops, and to lease land for
residential and commercial purposes. [
Footnote 2] Section 2 of the act extends the privilege to
acquire, possess, enjoy, and transfer real property or any interest
therein only in the manner and to the extent and for the purposes
prescribed in the treaty. The treaty given no permission to enjoy,
use, or have the benefit of land for agricultural purposes. The
privileges granted by the act are carefully limited to those
prescribed in the treaty. The act as a whole evidences legislative
intention that ineligible aliens shall not be permitted to have or
enjoy any privilege in respect of the use or the benefit of land
for agricultural purposes. And this view is supported by the
circumstances and negotiations leading up to the making of the
treaty.
See Terrace v. Thompson, supra; Same v. Same, 274
F. 841, 844, 845. As applied to this case, the act may be read
thus:
"Ineligible aliens may own or lease houses, manufactories,
warehouses, and shops, and may lease land for residential and
commercial purposes. These
Page 263 U. S. 324
things, but no possession or enjoyment of land otherwise, are
permitted."
The term of the proposed contract, the measure of control and
dominion over the land which is necessarily involved in the
performance of such a contract, the cropper's right to have housing
for himself and to have his employees live on the land, and his
obligation to accept one-half the crops as his only return for
tilling the land clearly distinguish the arrangement from one of
mere employment. The case differs from
Truax v. Raich,
239 U. S. 33. In
that case, a statute of Arizona making it a criminal offense for an
employer of more than five workers, regardless of kind or class of
work or sex of workers, to employ less than 80 percent native-born
citizens of the United States was held to infringe the right,
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, of a resident alien to work in
a common occupation -- cooking in a restaurant. The right to make
and carry out cropper contracts such as that before us is not
safeguarded to ineligible aliens by the Constitution. A denial of
it does not deny the ordinary means of earning a livelihood or the
right to work for a living. The practical result of such contract
is that the cropper has use, control, and benefit of land for
agricultural purposes substantially similar to that granted to a
lessee. Conceivably, by the use of such contracts, the population
living on and cultivating the farm lands might come to be made up
largely of ineligible aliens. The allegiance of the farmers to the
state directly affects its strength and safety.
Terrace v.
Thompson, supra. We think it within the power of the state to
deny to ineligible aliens the privilege so to use agricultural
lands within its borders.
The decision of the Supreme Court of California in
In the
Matter of Okahara, supra, a habeas corpus case, does not
support the appellees' contention. In that case, an ineligible
Japanese was held on a warrant charging him with conspiracy to
effect a transfer of real property in violation
Page 263 U. S. 325
of § 10 of the Alien Land Law. The gravamen of the offense
charged was that Okahara, in furtherance of the conspiracy,
executed a contract with another whereby the latter transferred to
him for a term of five years an interest in 20 acres of
agricultural land. The only question before the court in that case
was whether the contract amounted to a transfer of real property or
of an interest therein in violation of § 10. The court said:
"the instrument before us cannot be characterized as a lease or
transfer of any interest in real property, because it lacks many of
the essential elements of a lease, while, on the other hand, it
bears all the characteristics of an agreement of hiring. But if it
cannot be said to be an agreement of employment pure and simple, it
cannot under any rule of construction be held to be more than a
cropping contract."
After referring to the terms of the contract and reviewing
authorities, it said:
"The argument that the law forbids the making of a contract of
employment or agreement to till the soil on shares can only be
sustained by adopting the theory that the particular agreement
under consideration transfers an interest in land."
The court held that the contract did not violate § 10, and
discharged Okahara. The contract in that case differs in important
particulars from the one before us; but, in the view we take of
this case, we need not determine whether, within the meaning of the
act, the contract between O'Brien and Inouye, if executed, would
effect a transfer of an interest in real property. The question in
this case is not whether the proposed contract is prohibited by §
10, but it is whether appellees have shown that they have a right
under the Constitution or treaty to make and carry out the
contract, and are entitled to an interlocutory injunction against
the officers of the state. A negative answer must be given.
The privilege to make and carry out the proposed cropping
contract, or to have the right to the possession, enjoyment,
Page 263 U. S. 326
and benefit of land for agricultural purposes as contemplated
and provided for therein, is not given to Japanese subjects by the
treaty. The act denies the privilege because not given by the
treaty. No constitutional right of the alien is infringed. It
therefore follows that the injunction should have been denied.
The order appealed from is reversed.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS and MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS think there is
no justiciable question involved, and that the case should have
been dismissed on that ground.
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
Initiative Measure Adopted November 2, 1920 (Statutes 1921, p.
lxxxiii).
"Section 1. All aliens eligible to citizenship under the laws of
the United States may acquire, possess, enjoy, transmit, and
inherit real property, or any interest therein, in this state in
the same manner and to the same extent as citizens of the United
States except as otherwise provided by the laws of this state."
"Section 2. All aliens other than those mentioned in section one
of this act may acquire, possess, enjoy, and transfer real
property, or any interest therein, in this state in the manner and
to the extent and for the purpose prescribed by any treaty now
existing between the government of the United States and the nation
or country of which such alien is a citizen or subject, and not
otherwise."
Section 3 provides that any company, association or corporation
a majority of whose members are ineligible aliens or in which a
majority of the issued capital stock is owned by such aliens is
permitted to acquire, possess, enjoy, and convey real property or
any interest therein in the manner and to the extent and for the
purposes prescribed by any treaty, etc. Hereafter, ineligible
aliens may become members of or acquire shares of stock in any
company, association or corporation that is or may be authorized to
acquire, possess, enjoy or convey agricultural land, in the manner
and to the extent and for the purposes prescribed by any treaty . .
. and not otherwise.
Section 4 provides that no ineligible alien and no company,
association or corporation mentioned in § 3 may be appointed
guardian of that portion of the estate of a minor which consists of
property which such alien or such company, association or
corporation is inhibited from acquiring, possessing, enjoying or
transfering by reason of the provisions of the act. The superior
court may remove the guardian of such an estate whenever it appears
to the satisfaction of the court that facts exist which would make
the guardian ineligible to appointment in the first instance.
"Section 5(a). The term 'trustee' as used in this section means
any person, company, association, or corporation that, as guardian,
trustee, attorney in fact, or agent, or in any other capacity, has
the title, custody or control of property, or some interest
therein, belonging to an ineligible alien or to the minor child of
such an alien, if the property is of such a character that such
alien is inhibited from acquiring, possessing, enjoying or
transferring it. . . ."
"(b). Annually every such trustee must file a verified written
report showing:"
"
* * * *"
"(3). An itemized account of all expenditures, investments,
rents, issues and profits in respect to the administration and
control of such property with particular reference to holdings of
corporate stock and leases, cropping contracts and other agreements
in respect to land and the handling or sale of products thereof is
required of such trustee."
Section 6 provides for sale and distribution of proceeds when,
by reason of the provisions of the act, heir cannot take real
property or membership or shares of stock in a company,
association, or corporation.
Section 7 provides for the escheat of property acquired in fee
by any ineligible alien, and that no alien, company, association or
corporation mentioned in § 2 or § 3 hereof shall hold for a longer
period than two years, the possession of any agricultural land
acquired in the enforcement of or in satisfaction of a mortgage or
other lien hereafter made or acquired in good faith to secure a
debt.
"Section 8. Any leasehold or other interest in real property
less than the fee hereafter acquired in violation of the provisions
of this act by any ineligible alien . . . or by any company,
association or corporation mentioned in section 3 of this act,
shall escheat to the State of California. . . . Any share of stock
or interest of any member in a company, association, or corporation
hereafter acquired in violation of the provisions of § 3 of this
act shall escheat to the State of California."
"Section 9. Every transfer of real property, or of an interest
therein, though colorable in form, shall be void as to the state
and the interest thereby conveyed or sought to be conveyed shall
escheat to the state if the property interest involved is of such a
character that an ineligible alien . . . is inhibited from
acquiring, possessing, enjoying, or transferring it, and if the
conveyance is made with intent to prevent, evade, or avoid escheat
as provided for herein."
"Section 10. If two or more persons conspire to effect a
transfer of real property, or of an interest therein, in violation
of the provisions hereof, they are punishable by imprisonment in
the county jail or state penitentiary not exceeding two years, or
by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or both."
[
Footnote 2]
"Article I. The citizens or subjects of each of the high
contracting parties shall have liberty to enter, travel and reside
in the territories of the other to carry on trade, wholesale and
retail, to own or lease and occupy houses, manufactories,
warehouses, and shops, to employ agents of their choice, to lease
land for residential and commercial purposes, and generally to do
anything incident to or necessary for trade upon the same terms, as
native citizens or subjects submitting themselves to the laws and
regulations there established."