When a lease of an Indian allotment, made by the allottee in
excess of the powers of alienation allowed him by acts of Congress,
is declared by those acts to be absolutely null and void, a state
statute which, as applied by the state court, gives it effect as
creating a tenancy at will and as controlling, the amount of
compensation which the allottee may recover for the use and
occupation of the land by the persons named as lessees is to that
extent invalid under Article VI, cl. 2, of the Constitution. P.
263 U. S.
253.
85 Okla. 38,
reversed; certiorari dismissed.
Error to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma which
reversed a judgment recovered by the present
Page 263 U. S. 251
plaintiff in error in a trial court in his action to recover for
wrongful use and occupation of his allotted land.
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an action by an Indian allottee to recover for a
wrongful occupancy and use of his land.
The plaintiff was an adult Cherokee Indian of the full blood,
enrolled and recognized as a member of the tribe and still a ward
of the United States. The land was an 80-acre tract which had been
allotted to him in the division of the tribal lands -- 40 acres as
a homestead and the remainder as surplus land. He had full title,
but his power to alien or lease was subject to restrictions imposed
by Congress for his protection. By three successive instruments,
each given for a cash rental of $75, he leased the land, both
homestead and surplus, to the defendants for agricultural purposes.
The first lease was given late in 1915 for a term of one year,
beginning January 1, 1916; the second was given early in July,
1916, for a term of one year, beginning January 1, 1917; and the
third was given late in July, 1917, for a term of one year,
beginning January 1, 1918. The defendants went into possession
under the leases, and in 1917 and 1918, sublet the land to others.
From the subletting, the defendants realized $890.40 in 1917 and
$384.35 in 1918, these sums representing the actual rental value on
a crop-sharing basis in those years.
The action was begun in 1919 on the theory that the leases were
made in violation of the restrictions imposed
Page 263 U. S. 252
by Congress, and therefore were wholly void. At first, a
recovery was sought for all three years, but afterwards the claim
for 1916 was dropped. On the trial, the court treated the leases
for 1917 and 1918 as void, but ruled that the plaintiff had waived
the invalidity of the lease for 1917 by not promptly objecting to
any occupancy or use under it, and so could not recover for that
year. A recovery was had for 1918 of a sum conforming to what the
defendants had realized from the subletting for that year, with
interest. Both parties appealed to the supreme court of the state,
and it reversed the judgment, with a direction that no recovery be
allowed for either year. 85 Okl. 38. That court treated the leases
for both years as void, but construed and applied a statute of the
state as in effect requiring that the leases be regarded as
creating a tenancy at will and controlling the amount which the
plaintiff was entitled to demand and receive. This was done over
his objection that the state statute, so construed and applied, was
in conflict with the congressional restrictions, and therefore was
invalid. The plaintiff prosecutes this writ of error. Upon his
petition, a writ of certiorari was granted, 260 U.S. 716, but, as
it appears that the writ of error was well grounded, the writ of
certiorari will be dismissed.
The power of Congress to impose restrictions on the right of
Indian wards of the United States to alien or lease lands allotted
to them in the division of the lands of their tribe is beyond
question, and, of course, it is not competent for a state to enact
or give effect to a local statute which disregards those
restrictions or thwarts their purpose.
Tiger v. Western
Investment Co., 221 U. S. 286,
221 U. S. 316;
Monson v. Simonson, 231 U. S. 341,
231 U. S. 347;
Brader v. James, 246 U. S. 88,
246 U. S. 96;
Mullen v. Pickens, 250 U. S. 590,
250 U. S.
595.
An examination of the several enactments by which Congress has
restricted the leasing of Cherokee allotments
Page 263 U. S. 253
for agricultural purposes
* discloses that,
when the leases in question were given the situation was as
follows:
1. An adult allottee of the full blood could lease the homestead
for not exceeding one year, and the surplus for not exceeding five
years, without any approval of the lease, but could not lease for
longer periods without the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior.
2. Any lease not permitted by the restrictions was to be
"absolutely null and void."
The permission given to lease for limited periods without
approval was not intended to authorize the making of leases which
were to begin at relatively distant times in the future, but only
the making of such as were to take effect in possession immediately
or, what was equally within the spirit of the permission, on the
termination of an existing lease then about to expire.
United
States v. Noble, 237 U. S. 74,
237 U. S. 82-83.
And see Dowell v. Dew, 1 Younge & Collier's N.C. 345,
357; same case on appeal, 7 Jurist, 117.
It is conceded, and we think rightly so, that the leases for
1917 and 1918 fell outside the permission given. Both covered the
homestead as well as the surplus land; both were made midway during
the term of a like lease theretofore given, and were to take effect
in possession on the expiration of that lease, and neither was
approved by the Secretary of the Interior. Being outside the
permission, they were, as declared in the restricting provision,
"absolutely null and void."
Obviously, a lease which Congress, in the exertion of its power
over land allotted to an Indian ward, pronounces absolutely void
cannot be validated or given any force by a state, and a state
statute which requires that such a
Page 263 U. S. 254
lease be regarded as effective for any purpose is necessarily
invalid in that respect.
Monson v. Simonson, supra; Mullen v.
Pickens, supra.
The supreme court of the state, although recognizing the
invalidity of the leases under the congressional restrictions,
construed and applied a statute of the state (§ 3783, Rev.Laws
1910) as in effect requiring that the leases be regarded as
creating a tenancy at will and controlling the compensation which
the allottee could demand and the defendants should pay for the
occupancy and use of the land. We, of course, must treat the local
statute as intended to operate as that court say it does, and must
determine its validity on that basis. In that view of it, we think
the conclusion is unavoidable that it gives force and effect to
leases which a valid enactment of Congress declares shall be of no
force or effect, and that, in this respect, it must be held invalid
under Article VI, cl. 2, of the Constitution of the United
States.
The state court was persuaded that its conclusion had support in
decisions dealing with leases made between parties entirely
competent to make them, but not executed in conformity with local
laws, such as the statute of frauds. But decisions of that class
are not apposite. These leases were made in violation of a
congressional prohibition. They were not merely voidable at the
election of the allottee, but absolutely void, and not susceptible
of ratification by him. Nothing passed under them and none of their
provisions could be taken as a standard by which to measure the
compensation to which the allottee was entitled for the
unauthorized occupancy and use of his land.
It is not our province to inquire particularly into the need for
the protection intended to be afforded by the restrictions, but, if
it were, the need would find strong illustration in this case, for
it appears that each of the leases was obtained for a cash rental
of $75, and that, when
Page 263 U. S. 255
the time arrived for assuming possession under them, the
defendants readily sublet the land on terms which netted them
$890.40 in 1917 and $384.35 in 1918, the latter year being one of
pronounced drought.
Judgment reversed on writ of error.
Writ of certiorari dismissed.
* Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1375, § 72, 32 Stat. 716, 726; Act
April 26, 1906, c. 1876, §§ 19 and 20, 34 Stat. 137, 144; Act May
27, 1908, c.199, §§ 2 and 5, 35 Stat. 312.