1. Mere lapse of time, without imprisonment or other restraint
contemplated by law, does not constitute service of sentence. P.
263 U. S.
196.
2. Under the Parole Act of June 25, 1910, c. 387, 36 Stat. 819,
as amended January 23, 1913, c. 9, 37 Stat. 650, where a federal
convict breaks his parole and is retaken under a warden's warrant,
the Board of Parole may revoke his parole at any time before his
sentence has been fully served and require him to complete his term
of imprisonment without deduction for the time spent on parole. P.
263 U. S. 197.
3. With reference to the power of the Board to act as above,
time intervening between the issuance of the warden's warrant and
its execution, during which the federal convict was incarcerated in
a state penitentiary for a state offense, is not to be counted as
time served under his federal sentence. P.
263 U. S. 197.
279 F. 822 reversed.
Certiorari to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals which
affirmed an order of the district court in habeas corpus
discharging the present respondent from imprisonment in the federal
penitentiary at Leavenworth.
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
On November 25, 1914, Corall was convicted of the crime of
breaking into a post office and was sentenced to
Page 263 U. S. 194
be confined in the Leavenworth Penitentiary for three years from
that date. He served in prison until February 24, 1916, when he was
allowed to go out on parole under the Act of June 25, 1910, c. 387,
36 Stat. 819, as amended by the Act of January 23, 1913, ch. 9, 37
Stat. 650, portions of which are printed in the margin.
* On June 25,
1916, the warden, in accordance with § 4, issued a warrant for the
retaking of Corall as a parole violator. Before he was retaken, and
in October, 1916, he was convicted at Chicago of another crime, and
sentenced therefor to the Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet,
where he was confined until some time in December, 1919. After his
release from that prison he was retaken, December 17,
Page 263 U. S. 195
1919, on the warden's warrant to the Leavenworth Penitentiary.
In January, 1920, the parole board, pursuant to § 6, took action
appropriate to revoke and terminate the parole. The validity of
that action is the only question involved.
Corall claims that, allowing deductions for good conduct (Act of
June 21, 1902, c. 1140, 32 Stat. 397), the term of his sentence
actually ended before the expiration of three years from the date
it began, and on or about March 17, 1917. The warden contends that
the time elapsing between February 24, 1916, when he was paroled,
and December 17, 1919, when he was retaken, cannot be taken into
account; that, when the board acted to revoke his
Page 263 U. S. 196
parole, the sentence had not been served, and he was bound to
serve that part of it which remained unexpired when parole was
granted. February 4, 1921, Corall made application for a writ of
habeas corpus to the District Court for the District of Kansas.
That court decided he was illegally held, and ordered his
discharge. The warden appealed to the circuit court of appeals,
where the judgment was affirmed.
Mere lapse of time without imprisonment or other restraint
contemplated by the law does not constitute service of sentence.
Escape from prison interrupts service, and the time elapsing
between escape and retaking will not be taken into account or
allowed as a part of the term.
Dolan's Case, 101 Mass.
219, 222;
Petition of Moebus, 73 N.H. 350, 352. The parole
authorized by the statute does not suspend service or operate to
shorten the term. While on parole, the convict is bound to remain
in the legal custody and under the control of the warden until the
expiration of the term, less allowance, if any, for good conduct.
While this is an amelioration of punishment, it is in legal effect
imprisonment. The sentence and service are subject to the provision
of § 6 that, if the parole be terminated, the prisoner shall serve
the remainder of the sentence originally imposed without deduction
for the time he was out on parole.
Corall's violation of the parole, evidenced by the warden's
warrant and his conviction, sentence to and confinement in the
Joliet Penitentiary, interrupted his service under the sentence
here in question and was in legal effect on the same plane as an
escape from the custody and control of the warden. His status and
rights were analogous to those of an escaped convict.
Drinkall
v. Spiegel. Sheriff, 68 Conn. 441, 449, 450. The term of his
sentence had not expired in October, 1916, when, at Chicago, he was
convicted of another crime and sentenced to the Joliet
Penitentiary. Then, if not earlier, he ceased to be in
Page 263 U. S. 197
the legal custody and under the control of the warden of the
Leavenworth Penitentiary, as required by § 3 of the act and the
terms of the parole authorized thereby. His claim that his term
expired in 1917, before he was retaken and while he was serving
sentence at Joliet, cannot be sustained, and we hold that it had
not expired in January, 1920, at the time of the action of the
board. Under § 6, the board was authorized at any time during his
term of sentence, in its discretion, to revoke the order and
terminate the parole, and to require him to serve the remainder of
the sentence originally imposed without any allowance for the time
he was out on parole.
The judgment of the circuit court of appeals is reversed,
and the case is remanded to the district court with directions that
the respondent, Arthur Corall, be restored to the custody of the
warden of the United States penitentiary at Leavenworth,
Kansas.
* Section 1 is to the effect that prisoners may be released on
parole as provided in the act.
Section 2 provides that the superintendent of prisons of the
Department of Justice and the warden and physician of each United
States penitentiary shall constitute a board of parole for such
prison which shall establish rules and regulations for its
procedure subject to the approval of the Attorney General.
Section 3:
"That if it shall appear to said board of parole . . . that
there is a reasonable probability that such applicant will live and
remain at liberty without violating the laws, and if in the opinion
of the board such release is not incompatible with the welfare of
society, then said board of parole may in its discretion authorize
the release of such applicant on parole, and he shall be allowed to
go on parole outside of said prison, and, in the discretion of the
board, to return to his home, upon such terms and conditions,
including personal reports from such paroled person, as said board
of parole shall prescribe, and to remain, while on parole, in the
legal custody and under the control of the warden of such prison
from which paroled, and until the expiration of the term or terms
specified in his sentence, less such good time allowance as is or
may hereafter be provided for by act of Congress, and the said
board shall, in every parole, fix the limits of the residence of
the person paroled, which limits may thereafter be changed in the
discretion of the board. . . . "
Section 4:
"That if the warden of the prison or penitentiary from which
said prisoner was paroled or said board of parole or any member
thereof shall have reliable information that the prisoner has
violated his parole, then said warden at any time within the term
or terms of the prisoner's sentence, may issue his warrant to any
officer hereinafter authorized to execute the same, for the
retaking of such prisoner."
Section 5:
"That any officer of said prison or any federal officer
authorized to serve criminal process within the United States, to
whom such warrant shall be delivered, is authorized and required to
execute such warrant by taking such prisoner and returning him to
said prison within the time specified in said warrant therefor. . .
. "
Section 6:
"That at the next meeting of the board of parole held at such
prison after the issuing of a warrant for the retaking of any
paroled prisoner, said board of parole shall be notified thereof,
and if said prisoner shall have been returned to said prison, he
shall be given an opportunity to appear before said board of
parole, and the said board may then or at any time in its
discretion revoke the order and terminate such parole or modify the
terms and conditions thereof. If such order of parole shall be
revoked and the parole so terminated, the said prisoner shall serve
the remainder of the sentence originally imposed, and the time the
prisoner was out on parole shall not be taken into account to
diminish the time for which he was sentenced."
Section 7 provides for a parole officer for each penitentiary,
and makes it the duty of such officer to aid paroled prisoners in
securing employment and to visit and exercise supervision over them
while on parole and provides that the supervision of paroled
prisoners may also be devolved upon the United States marshals when
the board of parole may deem it necessary.